

ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

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Furthering democratization, the Expanded International Military Education and Training Program (E-IMET) conducted by the U.S. Departments of State and Defense seeks to further human rights. Case studies evaluated El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua including a review of U.S. government and nongovernmental reports and budgets, and a survey of previous students who attended 8 different U.S. military-sponsored courses selected for their human rights focus from 1991-2000. Findings inconclusive, but offered encouraging results that E-IMET, as a part of the overall U.S. grant program, facilitates human rights initiatives. Attendees appear to be the right persons for the subject courses who subsequently return to upwardly mobile positions with opportunities to influence their country's future policies.

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E-IMET:
IS IT ACCOMPLISHING ITS HUMAN RIGHTS FOCUS
IN LATIN AMERICA?

by
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A DISSERTATION

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At the time of conclusion of such a study, it's realized how many persons made such a significant contribution—facilitating in such a way that had they not interacted, there would have been little in terms of results.

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ABSTRACT

Furthering democratization, the Expanded International Military Education and Training Program (E-IMET) conducted by the U.S. Departments of State and Defense seeks to further human rights. Case studies evaluated El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua including a review of U.S. government and nongovernmental reports and budgets, and a survey of previous students who attended 8 different U.S. military-sponsored courses selected for their human rights focus from 1991-2000. Findings inconclusive, but offered encouraging results that E-IMET, as a part of the overall U.S. grant program, facilitates human rights initiatives. Attendees appear to be the right persons for the subject courses who subsequently return to upwardly mobile positions with opportunities to influence their country's future policies.

Chapter 1

Introduction

Today, when America's military is called upon to act, we often do so as part of a coalition. This reflects the value of our security assistance programs, including International Military Education and Training. These programs contribute to America's defense industrial base, take advantage of opportunities to promote democratic practices, and help friends and allies to develop armed forces that are more capable and better able to operate with our own. (Albright, 2000, p. 10)

These words, spoken by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, were part of her fiscal year 2001 Budget Request for Foreign Operations testimony. As part of the statements she offered the Senate Appropriations Committee and the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs on April 13th, 2000, they sum up the broad Security Assistance program goals of the United States—noting in particular the International Military Education and Training component.

Statement of Problem

The onus is on the Departments of State and Defense, and most particularly, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency to measure the effectiveness of the wide range of security assistance programs. This has become more important as we move into the next century due to the critical and continuous scrutiny of the budget of U.S. national government, especially within the realm of assistance to other countries. This scrutiny is being conducted by various segments of government and constituencies, while Congress, expressed within the

Government Performance Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 has mandated the documentation of program performance.

From the earliest of studies conducted on U.S. security assistance initiatives, findings and recommendations have documented the need for an evaluation system to be established and measurable criteria developed. The General Accounting Office specifically recommended that the process begin with the Expanded International Military Education and Training Program (E-IMET) (United States General Accounting Office [GAO], 1992, p. 27). Begun in the early 1990s, this small program—it was hoped—would provide the base for a springboard to documenting security assistance successes or failures system wide. This has been a difficult task on two counts—both on which all the stakeholders could come together and researchers could handle. However, the importance of this effort is underscored by the annual review of budget requests by the presidential administration and the lack of firm documentation Congress can use as a basis for an informed decision. It is generally believed that security assistance programs are extremely beneficial in meeting United States interests overseas; there's just very little hard evidence on which the players can hang their hats.

Purpose of Study

There have been previous studies of International Military Education and Training (and to a very limited extent the Expanded portion of that program). However they have focused primarily on the output versus the outcome dimension of that program. This is not to say that output statistics are not valuable information. However, with the advent of the Government Performance Results Act and the demands of Congress to provide the

outcome data, it's important to at least try to better encompass the whole story, no matter how difficult it is to obtain.

This study is to aid in picking up the gauntlet thrown down by the GPRA—to assist in collecting the information which will help document the effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) of the Expanded International Military Education and Training (E-IMET) program. Is the program meeting its stated goals?

This will in no way be the end all report. It will only take a small percentage of the assisted countries, a small segment of the goals of E-IMET, and a small number of the courses approved for E-IMET due to their focus in achieving those goals. However, it is hoped that this study will add more to the foundation provided to this researcher with which others can continue.

Limitations and Assumptions

Because of the extremely large number of countries participating in the IMET/E-IMET program (114 in Fiscal Year 2001) (Martin, 2001, pp. 16-20), it would be impossible to look at that entire community. (An entire list of the countries worldwide involved in IMET for 2000/2001 is at Appendix D.) Only the three subject countries of Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua will be investigated. Because of the wide scope of the three major goals of E-IMET, this study will only attempt to evaluate the one dealing with the area of human rights. Lastly, because of that human rights focus and a couple of other student audience and attendance factors, only a small segment—8, of the 117 courses (or geographic area-specific versions of courses) will be included in the study (Defense Security Cooperation Agency [DSCA], 2000).

While this is such a small initiative within the grand scheme of E-IMET (and IMET as a whole), it is hoped that the conclusions of this study may be assumed as potential benefits or areas for improvement of these programs as they currently operate worldwide—and especially within the geographic area of Central/Latin America (an area where human rights issues have been a continued concern and a primary focus of U.S. foreign policy in recent years).

Lastly, it's important to remember (and it will be addressed more specifically in subsequent chapters that not only are there numerous types of military assistance in addition to IMET and E-IMET, there are also numerous other types of assistance which the U.S. government provides through a large number of agencies—endeavoring to accomplish similar, if not the identical goals. “At least 35 entities from various U.S. departments and agencies have a role in U.S. rule of law assistance programs” (GAO, 1999a, p. 3). IMET/E-IMET must be taken as a part of that whole, and may be difficult to separate out of an entire aid package.

Chapter 2

Literature Review

Introduction

Prior to building a model or reviewing the actions of the Extended International Military Education and Training (E-IMET) program, it is necessary to examine relevant literature to put the program in perspective. After briefly outlining overall security assistance programs, this chapter will examine the literature addressing three key contextual elements concerning E-IMET: 1) the history of grant training culminating with the parent program of E-IMET, that being International Military Education and Training (IMET), 2) the history, brief as it is, of E-IMET, and 3) a synopsis of previous research conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of grant training.

The focus of this chapter is on grant military education and training assistance. The value of any conclusions derived from this review is their relationship, with application, to any proposed model to evaluate effectiveness of E-IMET. Most particularly, in increasing awareness of and fostering internationally recognized human rights within the three Latin American countries selected: El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua.

Overview of Security Assistance

The most basic concept to understand as we begin is that of “Security Assistance.” The Defense Department defines it within Joint Publication 1-02 (as cited in Brandt, 2000) as: Groups of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, and other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense related services, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives.

Security assistance “began primarily in response to events that threatened U.S. interests—for the most part, threats to friendly states from neighbors supported and encouraged by the former Soviet Union” (GAO, 1992, p. 13). While the demise of the Soviet Union “generated increased emphasis on providing support to emerging democracies” (GAO, p. 13) especially in Central Europe and the former Soviet Republics, other challenges have influenced the direction taken in this program. The Gulf War and an increased focus on the international drug trafficking have also influenced changes in program goals (GAO, pp. 13-14).

The issue of human rights has also become a primary objective. Taken in the context of human rights, “security assistance” is an umbrella term encompassing a variety of programs geared “to provide statutory leverage over a broad range of activities so that the U.S. government may effectively carry out its human rights policies” (Brandt, 2000). There are other reasons for security assistance programs with varying definitions and perspectives dependent upon the audience, but the real essential thrusts are two-fold: (1) “in furtherance of national policy and objectives” (Allen, 1982, p. 5) and to (2) “improve

military forces and to promote self-sufficiency” (Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management [DISAM], 1991, p. 18). Sometimes, as we’ll see later during this literature review, these are not always seen as mutually all-inclusive.

International Military Education and Training (IMET) is one of the six components of Security Assistance. Let’s define them all in order get a better view of the entire picture. We’ll start with a simple definition of IMET and then characterize other segments of Security Assistance within the context of their similarities or differences to IMET.

1) IMET is a “relatively modest” grant program (U.S. government to foreign governments) which “provides training in the United States and, in some cases, in overseas U.S. military facilities to selected foreign military and related civilian personnel” (Brandt, 2000).

2) Foreign Military Sales (FMS) is a “non-appropriated program through which eligible foreign governments purchase defense articles, services, and training from the United States government” (Brandt, 2000). Note that foreign countries may purchase training under FMS. This is different from IMET as IMET is a grant program from the U.S. government to the foreign government; no money changes hands. Under FMS, there is an actual payment for services rendered. In either situation, there is U.S. government approval for the release of whatever is provided. Just because a country desires to purchase goods or services, does not necessarily mean that they will receive exactly what they requested in the beginning of the process.

In essence, the caps dictated to FMS are due to either non-release of equipment or services to the requesting country or (the self-imposed) budget limitations by a country.

As countries carry on FMS agreements (referred to as “cases”), payments are made and held in a trust fund for the country to carry out the purposes of their programs. The Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) is responsible for trust fund management, and “exercises stringent controls over the FMS trust fund to insure proper visibility and accountability are maintained for all payments made by a customer for every FMS case. (DISAM, 1994, p. 300.)

3) Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) is simply “a sale made by U.S. industry directly to a foreign buyer” (Brandt, 2000). While these “do not involve a government-to-government agreement. Rather the U.S. Governmental ‘control’ procedure is accomplished through licensing by the Office of Defense Trade Controls in the Department of State” (Brandt). This mechanism is to help ensure that U.S. security interests are not compromised and that the flow of articles and information remains consistent with U.S. foreign policy objectives—as is the case of approval for the flow within FMS or IMET.

While we would most often think of articles or equipment being purchased through DCS, training (most often in conjunction with maintenance or use of those “hardware” purchases) can also be bought through DCS from the item’s manufacturer. Payments for DCS purchases are based on the agreement between the country and the seller, without DFAS, or another government agency’s involvement (such as in the case of a trust fund for FMS purchases).

4) The Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP) is composed of “Congressionally appropriated *grants and loans* which enable eligible foreign governments to purchase U.S. defense articles, services, and training through either FMS

or DCS channels. . . . [Geared to ease the] transition of foreign governments from grant aid to cash purchases” (Brandt, 2000). In essence this is a guaranteed loan program from the U.S. government to foreign governments, issued on a case-by-case basis. Within this definition, it should be noted that the end result of the secured article, service, or training is the same whether a country uses FMS or DCS. The main difference is that under FMS the U.S. government infrastructure is used to purchase and deliver the product. The choice of whether a country desires to use FMS or DCS is the choice of that individual country, with the release of goods or information approved (in either case) by the U.S. government.

Although a number of countries have been recipients of FMFP over the years, the ones who have benefited the most are Israel, Egypt, and to a lesser extent Jordan. In FY 2001, they received approximately 1.98 billion, 1.294 billion and 75 million dollars respectively. Note that this totals 3.349 billion dollars. The entire FMFP budget for the year was a little over 3.576 billion dollars (Martin, 2001, pp. 13-15). Of the countries selected for this research, only El Salvador, in the early to mid 1990s received any substantial funding within this category.

5) The Economic Support Fund (ESF) “was established to promote economic and political stability in areas where the United States has special political and security interests and where the U.S. has determined that economic assistance can be useful in helping secure peace or to avert major economic or political crises” (Brandt, 2000). This program consists of both loans and grants to foreign governments (Brandt).

The funds may be used to finance imports of commodities, capital, or technical assistance in accordance with the terms of a bilateral agreement. . . . These funds enable a recipient to devote more of its own resources to defense and security purposes [or other national priorities] than it could

otherwise do without serious economic or political consequences.
(Samelson, 1994, p. 648)

As with FMFP, ESF has had a number of recipients over the years, but currently much of the funding goes to efforts in the Middle/Near East. In FY 2001, that area of the world was allocated 1.849 billion of the almost 2.32 billion dollar worldwide budget (Martin, 2001, pp. 21-23). The countries that are the subject of this study received somewhat sizable ESF funds in the early to mid 1990s.

6) Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) simply “finances U.S. contributions to international peacekeeping operations” (DISAM, 1991, p. 8). As we would note, peacekeeping operations have greatly expanded over the last decade and this program is “an attempt to consolidate various peacekeeping operations under a single security assistance program” (DISAM, 1994, p. 45). To provide a better frame of reference as to the overall cost of this security assistance arm, the budget for peacekeeping was increased from \$76.5 million to \$153 million from fiscal years 1999 to 2000 (Brandt, 2000). For FY 01, the budget was trimmed to \$127 million (Martin, 2001, pp. 23-24). None of the three countries—El Salvador, Guatemala, nor Nicaragua—have received any PKO funding.

Security assistance manifests itself through other related programs. These include the lease of defense articles to allies or international organization and sale (under FMS or grant programs) of excess defense articles/equipment. Emergency drawdowns of U.S. government articles, services, and training are authorized (within limits) for military and non-military forces in instances such as disaster relief, counter-narcotics operations, refugee assistance and Vietnam War-era MIA/POW location and repatriation.

Additionally, third country transfers of equipment (transfers from the original recipient to another country) can also be permitted.

Although the public may have a perception that military aid to countries around the world is a significant amount of money, it has historically been a very small percentage of the national budget. Table 1 provides a comparison of the U.S. federal budget to the segment that has historically gone to International Security Assistance (all categories of assistance).

Table 1

U.S. Federal/Security Assistance Budget Totals Historical Comparison (Dollars in Millions)

Fiscal Year	U.S. Federal Budget Total ^a	Security Assistance Budget Total ^b	Security Assistance % of Federal Budget
1950-1989	14,139,498	126,107	0.89
1990	1,253,198	8,652	0.69
1991	1,324,403	9,823	0.74
1992	1,381,684	7,490	0.54
1993	1,409,512	7,639	0.54
1994	1,461,902	6,642	0.45
1995	1,515,837	5,252	0.35
1996	1,560,572	4,565	0.29
1997	1,601,282	4,632	0.29
1998	1,652,619	5,135	0.31
1999	1,702,875	5,531	0.32
2000	1,788,826	6,387	0.36
2001 (E)	1,856,238	6,320	0.34
2002 (R)	1,960,564	6,701	0.34

Note. Information included in this table was taken from a number of sources as annotated by specific notes below. Full reference information is included within the Reference list of this document. This table is consolidated with others at Appendix C.
(E) = Estimate. (R) = Requested.

^aInformation for year 1950-1989 derived from OMB (2001a); information for years 1990-2002 derived from USGPO (2001).

^bInformation for years 1950-1957 derived from USGPO (1958, p. 954); information for years 1958-1961 derived from USGPO (1963, p. 425); information for year 1962-2002 from USGPO (2001).

It should also be interjected that, because of the U.S. national government's annual budgeting process, dollar figures for each of the grant security assistance programs are approved with each annual budget. To formally state, Security Assistance is not only a Department of Defense program. The State Department has a major role in the process as contained in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Part III, Chapter 2, Administrative Provisions, Sections 622 and 623 excerpted below as cited in Amos, Bieber, Johnson, & Mallet (1979, pp. 4-5):

Sec. 622. Coordination with Foreign Policy – (a) Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to infringe upon the powers or functions of the Secretary of State.

(b) The President shall prescribe appropriate procedures to assure coordination among representative of the United States Government in each country, under the leadership of the Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission. The Chief of the Diplomatic Mission shall make sure that recommendations of such representatives pertaining to military assistance (including civic action) and military education and training programs are coordinated with political and economic considerations, and his comments shall accompany such recommendations if he so desires.

(c) Under the direction of the President, the Secretary of State shall be responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of economic assistance, military assistance, and military education and training programs, including but not limited to determining whether there shall be a military assistance (including civic action) or a military education and training program for a country and the value thereof, to the end that such programs are effectively integrated both at home and abroad and the foreign policy of the United States is best served thereby.

Sec. 623. The Secretary of Defense – (a) In the case of assistance under part II of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall have primary responsibility for --

- (1) the determination of military end-item requirements;
- (2) the procurement of military equipment in a manner which permits it integration with service programs;
- (3) the supervision of end-item use by the recipient countries;
- (4) the supervision of the training of foreign military and related civilian personnel;
- (5) the movement and delivery military end-items; and

(6) with the Department of Defense, the performance of any other functions with respect to the furnishing of military assistance, education and training.

(b) The establishment of priorities in the procurement, delivery, and allocation of military equipment shall be determined by the Secretary of Defense.

History of International Military Education & Training

Grant training came into being shortly after World War II under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. This act authorized military aid to free nations to enable them to protect themselves against the threat of aggression, and was generally entitled Military Assistance Program (MAP).

Grant training, now known as International Military Education and Training (IMET) came out of MAP. Between 1949 and 1976, “the system” remained relatively unchanged. IMET was enacted by the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, which amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Chapter 5, Section 541 as follows:

Sec. 541. General Authority – The President is authorized to furnish, on such terms and conditions consistent with this Act as the President may determine (but whenever feasible on a reimbursable basis), military education and training to military and related civilian personnel of foreign countries. Such training and education may be provided through ---

- (1) attendance at military educational and training facilities in the United States (other than Service academies) and abroad;
- (2) attendance at special courses of instruction at schools and institutions of learning or research in the United States and abroad; and
- (3) observation and orientation visits to military facilities and related activities in the United States and abroad. (Amos et al., 1979, p, 5)

Through this Act, grant training under the title of IMET was authorized under separate (specific) authority. However, military education and training was limited at this

time to uniformed military and civilians affiliated with the defense department/ministry of designated countries. (Important note—the program originally included only personnel directly involved in the foreign country’s defense establishment. The addition of non-defense establishment personnel will be discussed as we look at the Expanded IMET program.)

We’ve already noted the roles of the Departments of State and Defense within the umbrella of Security Assistance. Other key organizations and individuals are integrated into the planning, programming, and implementation of the IMET program. While the whole process can get extremely involved, let’s look at the basic flow of events, keeping in mind for future use that this process would also include E-IMET since it flows through the same planning process at the same time as part of IMET’s funding allocation.

Forecasts of each individual country’s training requirements are documented and forwarded via an Annual Integrated Assessment of Security Assistance (AIASA) from in-country Security Assistance Offices/Officers (SAOs). In actuality under optimum circumstances, these needs are reasonably programmed within a three-year training plan developed by host country officials and SAOs. The requirements are reviewed by Departments of State and Defense (including the region’s unified command, such as USSOUTHCOM for the geographic region of South/Central America) and evaluated within foreign policy and political considerations. They are then submitted by the executive branch for approval and funding in the Congressional Presentation Document [now called Congressional Budget Justification or CBJ] (Keeling, 1999, p. 9).

The SAO, coordinating with host country training personnel, determines which of those requests existing U.S. training programs can meet. Specific schools and courses

desired are presented at annual Security Assistance Training Program Management Reviews (SATPMRs) conducted by each unified command. These reviews are normally held in the spring, prior to the affective (U.S. Government's) fiscal year beginning the upcoming October. Commencing at this meeting and continuing through the coming months, security assistance training agencies, working together with SAOs, formalize the means to fulfill as many of these requirements as possible. In essence, the needs are plugged into existing course schedules—resulting in scheduled course quotas for the country.

Based on the number of requests coming from potentially dozens of countries desiring the same training, there may be a shortage of quotas available within a coming year—actually a frequent occurrence. Therefore some reprogramming and reprioritization of a country's needs may need to be accomplished in order to use the country's IMET budget, which ultimately flows down after Congress acts upon the President's request. Consequently, dialogue continues between the country, via the SAO, and security assistance training agencies throughout the year.

Many courses which the United States military provides for its own personnel are designated as IMET courses; however, prior to international students attending at any time, it must be deemed releasable to members of a foreign military as a whole or the particular country initiating the request to take the course for the first time. Therefore, IMET ranges from professional military education to basic and advanced technical training—giving “U.S. friends and allies knowledge and skills to improve their military forces and to promote self-sufficiency” (DISAM, 1991, p. 18)—supplementing their own indigenous training programs. Additionally,

Attending courses in the United States, increases rapport between foreign students and their U.S. counterparts. . . . [Just as important], the IMET program exposes them to the U.S. professional military establishment and to the American way of life, including U.S. regard for democratic values, respect for individual and human rights, and belief in the rule of law. (DISAM, 1991, p. 18)

Since 1950, the percentage of the federal budget funding going towards MAP/IMET has fluctuated. Between 1950-1989, it collectively amounted to .0169 percent of the budget. In more recent years (since 1990), it's run between .0015 to .0035 percent of the budget – always significantly less than one percent of the overall budget, and not keeping pace with the annually increasing federal budget (United States Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget [OMB], 2001a). In total over 600,000 international personnel have been trained through the program over the years (DSCA, 1999). Table 2 illustrates the year-by-year comparison of the federal budget to IMET funding, along with students trained worldwide. (Appendix C provides more detail by including Latin American IMET and student counts.)

Human rights, although not until more recently publicized, has historically been an issue in the security assistance arena. The Mutual Security Act of 1954 initially stipulated guidelines for U.S. policy in that regard—denying security assistance benefits to “any country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.” While there have been some disconnects between the guidelines of this Act and actual U.S. foreign policy from time to time, the Act of 1954 established the position of Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs as well as required the Secretary of State to report to Congress “on the observance of human rights policy by any countries who were requesting or being considered for security assistance.” (Edwards & Meneley, 1993, p. 33). The position of

Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs has evolved into what is now the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (United States Department of State [DoS], 2001a).

Fiscal Year	U.S. Federal Budget Total ^a	Total IMET Budget	IMET % of Federal Budget	Worldwide No. of IMET Students Trained
1950-1989	14,139,498	2,391.243 ^b	0.0169	554,270 ^b
1990	1,253,198	43.461 ^b	0.0035	4,975 ^b
1991	1,324,403	46.040 ^b	0.0035	4,898 ^b
1992	1,381,684	42.209 ^b	0.0031	4,380 ^b
1993	1,409,512	42.627 ^b	0.0030	4,417 ^b
1994	1,461,902	22.250 ^b	0.0015	2,597 ^b
1995	1,515,837	26.350 ^b	0.0017	2,659 ^b
1996	1,560,572	38.997 ^b	0.0025	3,482 ^b
1997	1,601,282	43.475 ^b	0.0027	3,454 ^b
1998	1,652,619	50.0 ^b	0.0030	8,070 ^b
1999	1,702,875	50.0 ^b	0.0029	8,947 ^b
2000	1,788,826	50.0 ^c	0.0028	8,216 ^c
2001 (E)	1,856,238	57.875 ^c	0.0031	9,655 ^c
2002 (E)	1,960,564	65.0 ^d	0.0033	10,307 ^d

Note. Information included in this table was taken from a number of sources annotated by specific notes below. Full reference information is included within the Reference list of this document. This table is consolidated with others at Appendix C. Dashes indicate information not available. No. = Number. (E) = Estimate. (R) = Requested.

^aInformation for year 1950-1989 derived from OMB (2001a); information for years 1990-2002 derived from USGPO (2001). ^bInformation derived from DSCA (1999). ^cInformation derived from Martin (2001, pp. 19-20). ^dInformation provided by K. Judkins, personal communication, July 3, 2001.

Again, in 1979 and 1980, under the Carter Administration, human rights were more institutionalized in security assistance. The International Security Act of 1979 stated “in allocating funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act and the Arms Export

Control Act (of 1976), the President shall take into account significant improvements in human rights records of recipient countries” (Edwards & Meneley, 1993, p. 37).

More particularly in the IMET arena, the purpose “to increase awareness of international human rights issues” was added (by way of a Congressional Presentation Document) (Allen, 1982, pp. 8-9) to the longer-standing objectives of furthering international peace and security and more effective resource management by recipient countries.

The Advent and Continuation of Expanded-IMET

Provided further, That not less than \$1,000,000 of the funds appropriated under this heading (*that being IMET*) shall be made available for developing, initiating, conducting and evaluating courses and other programs for training foreign civilian and military officials in managing and administering military establishments and budgets and for training foreign military and civilian officials in creating and maintaining effective military judicial systems and military codes of conduct, including observance of internationally recognized human rights. . . Such civilian personnel shall include foreign government personnel of ministries other than ministries of defense if the military education and training would (i) contribute to responsible defense resource management, (ii) foster greater respect for and understanding of the principle of civilian control of the military, or (iii) improve military justice systems and procedures in accordance with internationally recognized human rights.

This amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Section 541 (as quoted earlier) was approved by the 101st Congress for the FY 91 and subsequent annual appropriations (via Public Law 101-513). It is called Expanded or E-IMET because the target audience of IMET was “expanded” or broadened to include civilians not specifically within a foreign country’s defense establishment. This was an important step in that it also expanded the role of the U.S. military. The “kinds of training mandated through its IMET-E legislation do not conform to the traditional combat role and conventional

orientation of the U.S. military. Systematic U.S. military training of foreign civilian officials will be an even greater departure” (Taw & McCoy, 1993, p. viii).

E-IMET was christened in the early 1990s as “Congress felt a need to expand the IMET program to reach a larger cross section of foreign societies . . . [and] increase the chance for success in developing a more democratic philosophy within foreign nations” (Walker, 1998, pp. 6-7). More particularly, the Appropriations Committees of both Houses saw “changing world political-military circumstances warranted a new direction for the traditional IMET program, one that would bring an increased emphasis on enhancing the skills and professionalism of both civilian and military leaders and managers of foreign military establishments” (Grimmett, 1996, p. 3).

One might ask why the language would include military within the definition of the program instead of strictly noting the addition of civilians outside of a country’s defense establishment. (In fact, this researcher asked that very question.) Many courses falling under the E-IMET program are taught by mobile education teams (METs) within the specific country. (Some teams may even be hosted within one country, but involve participants from a number of countries, which split the cost of the training program. This is known as a regional MET.) These courses focus on bringing a country’s key leadership—to include military, civilian Ministry of Defense, civilian legislative, and even non-governmental organizations together during presentations and courses. Courses are conducted in a seminar format that encourages dialogue between all the participants, “in most cases for the first time” (R. Verry, personal communication, December 5, 2000). This provides a bona fide opportunity to break down long-standing barriers, and help each community to understand their respective roles and realize the criticality of each of

them to work together in addressing issues that affect their country's military (R. Verry, personal communication, December 5, 2000).

In actuality the inclusion of the various civilian participants within E-IMET has been stair-stepped. "National legislators [civilians] who are responsible for oversight and management of the military" were authorized in fiscal year 1993; non-governmental organization personnel were authorized in fiscal year 1996 (Public Law 104-164) (Brandt, 2000).

Not all IMET courses are designated as E-IMET—in the grand scheme it's a very small percentage. Some courses are designated as E-IMET regardless of who attends the course (military or civilian) due to the rationale that military leadership will be given education on the role of the military in a democracy, and civilian control of the military during the course. Therefore E-IMET objectives can be met when a country's military members are provided that education. Such is the case for courses taught at the National Defense University (NDU). (R. Verry, personal communication, December 5, 2000.)

There are other courses that are considered E-IMET only when a civilian attends. These courses contain information considered as required for a civilian placed in a position of leadership within a country's military.

It is strongly believed that if civilians are expected to lead—they must have the knowledge and skills necessary—or the military will not respect their positions or decisions. For example, many of the civilians selected/appointed to serve in positions in the former Warsaw Pact countries previously worked as merchants, bankers, salesmen, or laborers—they had no idea as to where or how to deal with defense resources management, etc. That is why we seek as many civilians as possible to attend these courses. (R. Verry, personal communication, December 5, 2000.)

You will note that (within the excerpt of Public Law 101-513, cited at the beginning of this section) that the initial E-IMET earmark was \$1,000,000 (out of a total

IMET appropriation that year of \$47,196,000). The trend (and intent) has been the shifting of more funds over the years from traditional IMET to E-IMET courses and training (Cope, 1995, p. 45). This has come through congressional intent within appropriation committee reports and the resultant focus of Departments of State and Defense in the program's implementation each year. Over the past several years, E-IMET has represented approximately 30 percent of the total IMET budget (R. Verry, personal communication, December 5, 2000). While there has never been a regulated cap of the percentage of IMET money used within the E-IMET breakout, there are feelings within both military and congressional channels that it should not grow much beyond 30 percent due to the bite it then takes out of the total IMET program (R. Verry & K. Judkins, personal communication, January 29, 2001).

One other important sidelight in addressing the courses involved in E-IMET is the inclusion of English language training (ELT) when it's conducted as a part of the training regimen of a student proceeding to a course that qualifies under E-IMET. The cost of this training is included in the percentages for each unified command; however in discussing this factor with training managers it needs to be better facilitated in the electronic record keeping. Currently the unified command training personnel must double check records to note whether a student went to ELT prior to attending follow on training or education courses (W. Venzke, personal communication, June 19, 2001). The issue and mechanism of ELT will be addressed as we look at the methodology of this study in Chapter 3.

In most cases there have not been hard and fast spending target percentages for the amount of E-IMET coming from IMET set by country or geographic region of the

world. The lone region where this is not the case is in Latin/South America. The worldwide target of \$1,000,000 (roughly two percent of the IMET total) has been transformed into a goal for United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) to 30 percent of its IMET funding being used for E-IMET. Technically, the 30 % goal was only formally applied in fiscal years 98 and 99. It was legislated in the FY98 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (P.L. 105-118) Section 584, although terminology of the act used the word “should” rather than “shall,” making it a target versus an earmark. In FY99, the House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Foreign Operations (HACFO) removed this language from the Bill but retained it in report language. As of FY00, this language setting percentage goals disappeared from the legislation; however, USSOUTHCOM continues to shoot for an unofficial 30% target. (D.M. Stevens, personal communication, January 9, 2001.)

USSOUTHCOM has regional responsibility for South/Latin America and helps determine the priorities—training being a part—for their region (just as the other regional unified commands do for their areas of the globe). While all regions take advantage of E-IMET programs to some extent, USSOUTHCOM, PACOM (Pacific Command), and EUCOM (European Command) lead the pack with 30 percent or slightly better. In the fiscal years 98 and 99, USSOUTHCOM used 31 and 32 percent of its IMET budget for E-IMET. A significant number (15) of individual countries within USSOUTHCOM’s region used over 40 and up to 100 percent of their allocation for E-IMET in at least one of those two years (D.M. Stevens, personal communication, December 1, 2000). Again as previously mentioned, for reference purposes, Tables 1 and 2 from previous pages

have been consolidated at Appendix C. Also added to this appendix is USSOUTHCOM statistics of IMET funding and students trained by fiscal year.

To keep these expenditures in the proper context, we need to be mindful of the historic concern that the United States has had for human rights (and the other E-IMET goals) within this hemisphere. Also important is the fact that countries such as Guatemala have been placed under legislation requiring them to use E-IMET only—emphasizing the training of non-combat related skills within their military. Indeed embassy officials within the Latin/South America region have encouraged their country counterparts to use E-IMET. (D. M. Stevens, personal communication, January 9, 2001.)

USSOUTHCOM has had little difficulty in getting the countries in their region to support E-IMET (in terms of desiring to send students to the courses)—which had been a concern as E-IMET came into being. Rather a primary problem has been in securing sufficient course quotas to satisfy all their requests—which we’ve previously mentioned. This is combined with other factors including the lack of in-country funds to meet their training needs and a lack of civilians in the Latin American government structure. (D.M. Stevens, personal communication, January 9, 2001 and GAO, 1992, p. 27.)

In addressing the “civilian participation” (an ultimate desire of E-IMET), a goal of 25 percent is established for the entire IMET program (including E-IMET). Approximately 25 percent of USSOUTHCOM’s students throughout various training programs are currently civilian. This 25 percent includes more than those that attended designated E-IMET courses; it also includes students who have attended the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies—which is outside the IMET allocation. Due to the reasons already discussed, it would be very difficult and unlikely for USSOUTHCOM, or even

worldwide totals, to meet a goal of 25 percent of strictly E-IMET students to be civilian. The percentage figure for civilian participation—like the 30 percent funding target for use of the IMET appropriation for E-IMET—was included in the FY98 legislation, was only in the FY99 report language, and dropped out as an official target in FY00. (D. M. Stevens, personal communication, January 9, 2001.)

Previous Research

Although there have been elements of previous research interwoven through the historical information previously presented, there are several studies that have been conducted particularly for the IMET program over past years which deserve special attention. These will be taken in chronological order, reviewing how methodology, findings, and/or recommendations have built upon previous research. Chronology is also important due to the changes made within the IMET program itself to include the addition of E-IMET in 1991.

The first study was conducted in 1979 by researchers affiliated with General Research Corporation under contract by the Defense Security Assistance Agency (now known as the Defense Security Cooperation Agency). The purpose of this study was to evaluate the planning, budgeting, and programming of U.S. training of foreign military students. The ultimate ramifications of this study were to ensure that IMET funds were allocated in such a way to properly achieve priority military and political objectives (Amos et al., 1979, p. 1). Ultimately it looked at criteria to be used in determining the proper funding levels of IMET (during the Zero-Based Budgeting era) and how to mix those funds with FMS purchases by individual countries—taking into consideration the

ability of other nations to pay for training under FMS. This information would, in turn, be used to help determine individual country IMET funding levels more objectively.

This researcher views this (1979) study as a precursor as the United States has moved into the era of the Government Performance and Results Act (of 1993)—attempting to establish firm criteria in which to establish performance measures with which to evaluate effectiveness (outcome) vice simply efficiency (output) of governmental programs. Using report (output) data available at the time and interviews with knowledgeable officials, the research team found the IMET program to be “an important, effective, and relatively inexpensive instrument for the achievement of U.S. Security Assistance and foreign policy objectives” (Amos et al., 1979, p, vi) seeing the need for the program to continue.

However, Amos, Bieber, Johnson, and Mallet went a few steps further. They felt (in line with Zero-Based Budgeting) that the program should be tied more precisely to objectives—a single objective if possible, acknowledged to be a difficult task (p. 81). This was placed in the overall context of whether objectives could be better met by IMET vice another method of U.S. involvement. They also perceived the importance of documenting how a particular country program “contributes to U.S. goals for observance of human rights” (p. 82) as additional data to be included in the budgeting process.

One other noteworthy comment within this report is that in order for IMET to be effective, one element is the “monitoring of utilization of U.S. training by the trainee after returning home. . . . It is significant that many Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs) have either limited or no records of those from their country of station who have received U.S. military training” (Amos et al., 1979, pp. 41-42). This is an area of

concern within other reports, and a difficult task for training personnel to keep up with (often one-person-deep positions or done as an additional duty by a person with other responsibilities within the organization).

This research (apparently) resulted in the 1980 amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act to “authorize tuition costing in terms of ‘the additional costs that are incurred by the United States Government in furnishing such assistance’” (Brandt, 2000).

The Arms Export and Control Act was also:

amended to allow IMET recipients to purchase FMS training on an “additional cost” basis. The practical effects of these changes were to substantially reduce tuition costs for IMET-funded students, and thereby increase the amount of training an eligible country can obtain with its IMET grant funds and through FMS purchases. (Brandt, 2000)

Throughout the 1980s, there was very little research conducted on this subject. The work by Kenneth Allen has been noted/cited on occasion. This information was compiled in 1982 while Major Allen was a student at the U.S. Air Force Air Command and Staff College. This project built upon the Amos (et al) study, and largely made similar recommendations regarding program objectives. An important portion of this study, was the use of data within the Amos (et al) study noting the numbers of students who attended U.S. training programs and subsequently achieved flag/general officer rank in their military or held important positions within their country—the numbers totaling 1200 and over 1000 respectively within those categories (Allen, 1982, p. 13). The idea within this accounting is that these persons have been placed in subsequent positions of authority and thus have the opportunity to influence policy within their country that would be supportive of U.S. interests—a reasonable conclusion, but not very quantifiable

without further research. Realize also that any research prior to 1991 would not include any comment regarding the Expanded IMET program.

In 1990, the General Accounting Office reviewed the IMET program at the request of members of the U.S. Senate to “determine whether the Departments of State and Defense had (1) complied with program policies and procedures and (2) met the U.S. foreign policy objective of exposing IMET trainees to U.S. values, including human rights” (1990, p. 1). The GAO obtained training program information from several nations to include Guatemala, Haiti, and Peru as well as from the unified commands (to include USSOUTHCOM) and the Departments of State and Defense. They also “obtained the views of U.S. and foreign officials on the programs benefits and desirability and feasibility of expanding nation-building training in the program” (p. 1).

The results of this study again built on those conducted previously. Among “numerous benefits” of the program, the exposure of students to U.S. values and concern for human rights was specifically cited. It was concluded that IMET programs complied with policy, but that better oversight was needed. Particular systems were needed for monitoring the home country’s use of their IMET graduates and means to evaluate the IMET program’s success. The bottom line comment in the results summary for the study: “it is difficult to ensure the most effective use of IMET funds” (GAO, 1990, p. 1).

Within its recommendation for an evaluation system for grant training, the following is included in the report:

We previously reported on the importance of establishing an evaluation system for grant training [within Problems in Administration of the Military Assistance Training Program, Report B163582, February 16, 1971]. As we found, the military assistance training program was difficult to assess because of the lack of established measurable criteria. As a result, DOD had no assurance that the purposes of the program were being

fully achieved. We concluded that, in the interest of good management, an evaluation system would be useful as a management tool. (GAO, 1990, p. 20)

(Note again, the stated difficulty of applying measurable criteria to such a program.)

A secondary result of the study was the recommendation that nation building should be considered a civilian-sector role and that agencies (like the U.S. Agency for International Development and the U.S. Information Service) should provide such training. This recommendation came from those two agencies. Part of the reason for such a response was the “tenuous civil-military relationship” in Guatemala (GAO, 1990, p. 26). Nation-building aside, it is interesting that E-IMET, coming into play within two years of this report being published saw civil-military relationships, effective resource management, and human rights as key issues.

Again in 1992 the GAO published a report—this time exploring post Cold War Security Assistance programs. This study dealt with the changes in IMET strategy—largely involving the direction and goals with the addition of E-IMET, although it was at its inception). Emerging democracies, resource management, civil-military (civic) actions and human rights were reviewed. Their findings are a lynchpin in the context and methodology for this researcher’s study. The importance of educating civilians (both government and other host-country nationals), who traditionally lack “practical experience or expertise,” was noted in the interest of long-term political stability (GAO, 1992, pp. 25-26).

Additionally, their review of IMET indicated that students may not get “specific training” (noting the area of civic actions), or may get varying degrees of human rights awareness training (GAO, 1992, pp. 30 & 32). This points to the important concept that

the individual parts of the program may have to be viewed in the context of the whole program's concern with democratization.

Different courses, especially those in the technical training arena (where a student may be attending to learn how to operate or repair a particular type of equipment) have varying opportunities to better address these issues. Professional military education courses tend to provide the best opportunity to address human rights topics. The GSA found that "about half of the IMET graduates questioned . . . did not recall receiving any human rights training while attending courses in the United States. For the most part, these students attended technical rather than professional military education courses" (GAO, 1992, p. 33). Additionally, they recorded human rights abuses had occurred within the past five years in some of the countries (Honduras, Poland, Nigeria, and Indonesia) they selected within their study.

They also reflected on the addition of a number of courses conducted by various schools and service branches that increase the emphasis on military justice and human rights, but went on to further document the lack of an effective monitoring system to determine "the effect that human rights awareness training has on international students." At that time, U.S. officials felt that such a mechanism wasn't necessary since "human rights education is not a stated objective of the IMET program" as well as that measuring the effectiveness of such a program could not be done (GAO, 1992, pp. 34-35).

Notwithstanding the difficulty, the GAO based on comments of DSAA (now DSCA) officials, believed that some effectiveness could be measured after giving E-IMET five more years of potential influence. This would allow more countries to

participate over time and provide previous students the time to move into more “prominent positions to effect change” (GAO, 1992, p. 25).

In keeping with the recommendation from its 1990 study, the conclusions and recommendations from this study were very similar, but a bit more all encompassing:

Therefore, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Director of the DSAA to (1) revise the Security Assistance Management Manual to reflect the language in the Foreign Assistance Act concerning human rights awareness training to international students, (2) develop programs that will make more specific human rights training available to international students, and (3) continue efforts to develop a mechanism to evaluate the effectiveness of the human rights awareness training, as part of the evaluation system for IMET. (GAO, 1992, p. 37)

It is this perception and context that spurs on the research explored within this researcher’s current project.

In 1995, another comprehensive study was conducted by a team of researchers under the leadership of Colonel John A. Cope (United States Army) assigned to the Institute of National Strategic Studies [INSS] within the National Defense University. Believing that “more needs to be known about the Defense Department educated foreign military students in the past, IMET’s effectiveness in supporting U.S. policy interests, and its prospects for the future” (1995, p. 2), the team used its own questionnaire to guide discussion with government officials with program-related responsibilities. It also reviewed past studies and relevant literature, conducted two workshops bringing together experts from agencies of the Departments of Defense and State and several nongovernmental organizations, and queried all unified commands and most of their subordinate security assistance offices, as well as service agencies that implement IMET programs and many of the schools and institutes participating in them. (Cope, 1995, p. 3)

Among the five research questions the group focused on was “Does IMET provide an effective introduction to and understanding of U.S. political values, particularly as they relate to democratic society and respect for human rights?” (p. 3).

The overall findings were resounding in support of IMET—unanimous endorsement of the program from the over 100 persons (at all levels queried), along with

strong support for program continuance (Cope, 1995, p. 3). This team saw IMET grounded “on the belief that many officer graduates will rise to positions of prominence within their armed forces, and in all probability, also within their governments and communities” (Cope, p. 4).

Amid the particular findings, IMET offered “no guarantee of far-reaching capacity to alter recipient institutional values or governmental behavior. Practitioners speak instead of access, rapport, and ease of communication, terms used synonymously with ‘influence’” (Cope, 1995, p. 25). Cope’s group also found that it is indeed “difficult to measure the degree to which a former student officer or civilian [whether IMET or FMS] is favorably inclined toward the United States” (p. 26). However, available data, would suggest that the group of “powerful leader-graduates with no subjective ties and no interest in U.S. values after the academic or training experience [is] atypical [and] very small in number” (p. 27). Note that this lends credence to the potential support of country leaders which had previously attended U.S. training expressed by Allen in 1982—and the growing numbers which are monitored by Departments of State and Defense offices today.

Cope (et al) did address findings regarding human rights, citing that “success with such a program is very difficult to measure accurately in quantifiable ways. It is defined largely after the fact in terms of what has not occurred” (1995, p. 42). However this team viewed E-IMET as “uniquely able to bring civilian and military personnel together . . . effectively outside the United States . . . explicitly designed to address human rights and democratic institution issues” (1995, pp. 37-38). The potential greatly exists for E-IMET to complement other programs sponsored by agencies such as the U.S. Agency for

International Development (USAID), the American Bar Association and even in-country programs sponsored by local or international groups such as the United Nations.

Addressing comments to a problem noted in the Amos (et al) study, the “the INSS study group found general agreement that the advent of E-IMET programs, particularly for civilians, offered a promising opportunity to institute a common program designed to maintain contact with foreign students throughout their careers” (Cope, 1995, p. 46).

Caveats are added later. One within the summarizing comments that clear program guidance is needed (p. 62), and an additionally note earlier in the document that “more active participation by ambassadors is necessary if country IMET and E-IMET programs are to fulfill their potential” (p. 50). This team also recommended “a fixed annual ceiling for E-IMET of 20 percent of the IMET appropriation” (p. 63), in addressing the concerns of the eroding of the military training dollar as training becomes more costly and the additional requirement of sending more students under E-IMET (p. 47). You will recall that currently several of the unified commands are running around 30 percent of their IMET budgets going towards E-IMET.

Before moving on to the final piece of literature, it’s important to discuss a part of IMET/E-IMET that has been considered key in a number of those previously reviewed. The Informational Program (IP) “is experiential education intended to provide foreign students with an awareness of and functional understanding of internationally recognized human rights and the American democratic way of life. . . . with funds derived from IMET and FMS course tuition costs” (Cope, 1995, pp. 17-19). Through this program, students are taken on various “field trips” (for sake of a better word) to various locations and activities to get first-hand knowledge of the United States. In terms of conducting

training in the U.S., over the home country, there is a “tremendous advantage of exposing the foreign trainee to the American people, their way of life, institutions, beliefs, and aspirations” (Amos et al., 1979, pp. 47-48).

These trips occur during language training and are done during their primary courses as well. The IP’s success depends upon “the energy and enthusiasm of program directors at [individual] schools” (Keeling, 1999, p. 7); the trips can include visits to courthouses, police stations, prisons or other locations that stress human rights issues. (Other locations are chosen on the basis of meeting other IP program goals.) The GAO in 1990 (p. 22) saw the IMET program meeting its objective to expose participants to all of these values “through both the formal training process and planned extracurricular activities.” While it works best when used in courses conducted within the U.S. because of the trips, the subjects can also be addressed within courses done in other countries. Additionally, even if “subjects such as civil-military relations and human rights are not taught *per se*, but are introduced as vehicles to develop English language proficiency through group discussions” (Cope, 1995, 20), they are still an effective tool. Remember also, some courses do address these subjects formally as a matter of the course within their curriculum—it’s very easy to have a block of instruction for “Rule of Law” within any course due to the nature of the subject and it’s applicability throughout the military environment.

The Informational Program is used within FMS training as well—a class may have a mix of FMS and IMET students. Thus, it promotes this goal regardless of the “category” of student sitting in the classroom. Also important, even with the formal IP, since a number of students are in the U.S. for an extended period of training, much is

accomplished simply through “incidental exposure” as students interact in all areas of life with the American public (Taw & McCoy, 1993, p. 17).

The IP is a key ingredient of security assistance training and is considered to be a very worthwhile tool throughout literature. This significance deemed it worthwhile to devote a segment of this paper in its description and discussion.

In 1998, another study (as a master’s thesis project) was conducted by Todd Calhoun, a student at the Naval Postgraduate School. This project was unlike other studies in that it did not attempt to document successes or failures of the E-IMET or IMET programs. Rather archival sources, along with specialized interviews, focused research on the mechanics needed in evaluating E-IMET. Because of this focus, much time will be spent within this review of the particulars of Calhoun’s project.

Calhoun’s research question was “What could a performance evaluation system developed for the E-IMET program look like” (Calhoun, 1998, p. 6)? Calhoun selected to hone in on the E-IMET program in light of the Government Performance and Results Act (of 1993), taken in the context of the 1992 GAO Report noted earlier in this review—finding that the Departments of Defense and State “had not yet agreed on a format or the type of information to be included in an assessment of the overall IMET program” (Calhoun, 1998, p. 6; GAO, 1992, p. 25). Since the Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s input was that the success of E-IMET could not be measured for “at least another five years” (GAO, 1992, p. 25), you’ll recall that a major recommendation by GAO (1990, p. 20) was for the Department of Defense, jointly with the State Department, to develop a system to evaluate the effectiveness of the IMET program. It would definitely make sense to take E-IMET, in the interim period while it was “becoming

measurable” and as a portion of IMET, at the outset. It makes for an easier bite to chew on (as well as a viable test of effectiveness/performance measures), rather than initially attempting to evaluate IMET as a whole.

In recent days the new Bush administration has put more teeth into application of the GPRA. In the administration’s FY2002 budget input, it commented strongly:

The initial years of GPRA implementation have focused on developing a performance management framework, accompanied by a growing increase in the use of this performance information to support budget decisions. However, a systematic integration of budgeting with program performance has yet to occur, and GPRA has not been fully harnessed to improve management and managerial accountability. Bringing about a better linkage between performance and budget information will be a priority for this administration. (OMB, 2001b)

These factors set the stage for this researcher’s particular study, and demonstrate the interest in the project by federal government agencies.

Calhoun looked at public sector performance evaluation literature to try to identify a continuum of policy and program evaluation paradigms. He also identified the various stakeholders within the program. The stakeholders obviously included the Departments of Defense and State who jointly administer the program, but also added the Executive Office of the President which sets national security assistance direction, as well as the Congress who appropriates the funding for the program as well as drew the lines to try to develop performance measures via the GPRA (Calhoun, 1998, p. 107). Attempting to correct long-standing findings of a number of studies, Calhoun set out to develop and validate (via interviewing the key players in the process) a “Global Objectives Hierarchy” for U.S. Security Assistance programs as a whole. After developing the objectives, Calhoun developed performance indicators believed to establish measurement of success in achieving those objectives (p. 7). This is where

Calhoun stopped the process—seeing several obstacles in really measuring the performance of E-IMET. These obstacles are important to review in the context of this dissertation project, as all three categories must be considered in attempting to come up with meaningful results for the “stakeholders”.

Institutional obstacles get to the heart of the various stakeholders interests—making it difficult to secure agreement of a single set of security objectives. These objectives oftentimes are not separated from the major strategies by the two cabinet-level departments. However, Calhoun believed that once he had “separated objectives from strategies a common set of national security assistance objectives emerged” (Calhoun, 1998, p. 107).

Technical obstacles “include differentiating between output and outcome measures, the need for several measures of performance for any one program, the lack of standards for judging governmental performance, and the lack of timely performance feedback” (Calhoun, 1998, pp. 107-108). Two key observations include (1) that there is no standard in existence to indicate “whether E-IMET is ‘effective enough’ to merit increased funding” and (2) “security assistance programs like E-IMET are often long-term intervention efforts. . . . [that] often do not produce immediate results and . . . not conducive to the immediacy of the GPRA reporting requirement” (p. 108).

Finally, the financial obstacles—in terms of money and human resources—can be “very costly” (Calhoun, 1998, p. 108). Systematic tracking of progression within the major goals of E-IMET, let alone security assistance, for so many countries would be a formidable task. This is true even when considering a recommendation by Calhoun, with a lot of merit—for DSCA to conduct a baseline assessment in order to determine

selection (by country) of performance indicators, realizing that certain indicators would be more applicable over others for a specific country's situation. This, in turn, would allow for systematic reporting of "progressions away from the baseline must follow in order to establish a stronger cause and effect relationship and meet the requirements of the Results Act" (Calhoun, 1998, pp. 111-112).

Thus, Calhoun's final recommendation was that DSCA consider implementation of his proposed performance indicators. This would be done through country-specific score cards of performance indicators built jointly by DSCA and in-country security assistance officials followed by a baseline assessment to establish the foundation for future reference noted within the report (Calhoun, 1998, pp. 113-114).

We've looked at the general research and findings coming from the Calhoun project. Let's move on to the particular objectives he attributed to the area of human rights. Within E-IMET, human rights are tied to improved military justice systems—which are also tied within the overall strategy of civilian control of the military. (As Calhoun and other researchers have noted in the past, it's difficult to spread these objectives out in such a limited fashion.) However, because of the ramifications such factors can have on this dissertation project and future work in this field, Appendix E provides each objective delineated further with its respective performance measures.

Very important, and worth noting here within the text of this literature review are the limitations as noted by Calhoun within his work. Cited are two issues taken in terms of the specific performance measures listed, and an additional three issues that would hamper the "rational-analytic assessment of E-IMET" which deserve attention in the context of future research.

Concerning the particular performance measures, Calhoun interjects that it's difficult to determine what/which military justice system to use as the model for evaluating changes within each subject country. Customs and traditions may limit the strict application of the U.S. judicial model in some countries. "Application of all the performance indicators identified in this study may not be possible in some countries. Additionally, the proposed performance indicators only measure structural and process changes, not behavioral ones" (1998, pp. 88-90). Unquestionably, it is those behavioral changes that are ultimately the most important. Behavioral changes would actually require more subjective measures not provided for within those proposed by Calhoun.

Regarding the overarching limiting factors to conducting a real analytical look at E-IMET, the primary issue is that of the inability to control external variables—the classic concern within any "scientific" model. "It is difficult to separate the effects of the external environment from the E-IMET intervention" (Calhoun, 1998, p. 109). Quantifying benefits is another key concern as is the bringing together of the disjointed security assistance community, which Calhoun contends has not improved throughout the 1990s (pp. 109-110).

Nonetheless, Calhoun's study provides an excellent starting point with areas and concerns to consider within this dissertation project. These will be addressed in Chapter 3, discussing the Methodology of this study. It's important to note the groundbreaking effort placed within Calhoun's attempt to come up with measurable characteristics within such chronically unquantifiable attributes.

Controversial Issues

There are three controversial issues deserving attention, which tend to underscore that disjointed security assistance community described by Calhoun. They involve perceptual difficulties and are not addressed within any particular order of importance. They involve the tapping of IMET funds to further E-IMET; the belief that IMET sanctions are counterproductive; and the view that if the U.S. withdraws from providing training or equipment, there are other parties that will step into the picture. Although not necessarily within the scope of this project, they help couch the particulars within IMET (and E-IMET) as well as overall security assistance issues.

The ascending dollar figure, as already noted upwards of 30 percent of the money designated for IMET, being tapped by E-IMET from the overall IMET appropriation causes concern (termed “troubling dimension” by Cope, 1995, p. 45) within some military channels. This perception sees it detracting from the traditional intent of IMET (and Security Assistance as a whole)—pulling away military instruction from professional military education and technical training geared to “improve military forces and to promote self-sufficiency” (DISAM, 1991, p. 18). On the other side of the argument is the position that all foreign assistance is done “in furtherance of national policies and objectives” (Brandt, 2000). In looking at the merit of both perceptions, there could be rationale for policy to dictate a separation of E-IMET from IMET with each having its own prescribed funding/appropriation. This type of decision would have to be based on the documented successes and perceived benefits of both categories—IMET and E-IMET.

The second contention concerns the potential productivity of pressing sanctions against countries for issues such as illegal drug trafficking or human rights abuses which prevent countries from being included in the IMET program (or other security assistance programs). It has been a topic of discussion at numerous training program reviews, and is documented within other research projects. “The effectiveness of IMET as a sanction is very difficult to assess. But this technique obviously interrupts the military to military relationship that we hope to encourage” (Keeling, 1999, p. 20). A Regional Conflict Working Group put it in this way (back in 1988)—happening to address it in the context of USSOUTHCOM at that time:

The irony of such sanctions on IMET, is that they often cut off communication with precisely those countries and those categories of individuals we wish most to influence. The impact can be illustrated by the list of Latin American countries currently under sanctions, which includes Chile, and Peru; Argentina and Brazil were recently removed from these sanctions. Together the sanctioned countries in USCINSO’s [USSOUTHCOM’s] region constituted 80 percent of the land mass and 71 percent of the population.

Since IMET is a people-oriented program with potential for a major contribution to developing nations, it should not be included within the sanctions applied to more material-oriented MAP and FMS programs (Regional Conflict Working Group; Submitted to the Commission on Integrated Long Term Strategy, 1988, p. 46).

The third, and final, issue that could be noted here is that U.S. policy-makers need to be mindful that if the United States determines to withdraw support, that there are other providers of assistance or sellers of military goods and services who may be ready to step in—with a variety of ideologies behind them. Granted, many of these other providers may be considered strong U.S. allies (such as Great Britain); however the opportunity may be taken by any number of others which run the broad spectrum of U.S. foreign relations from time to time—France, Russia, China, Pakistan, India, just to name

a few. Countries are very willing, in many cases to “shop around” when their initial preference for support is withdrawn for any reason.

This researcher spent two years as a Security Assistance Officer in Saudi Arabia (1996-1998)—dealing with FMS vice IMET/E-IMET. During that time the Royal Saudi Air Force had offers and took advantage of training provided by some of the other countries mentioned above. This was done even though they would have much rather used U.S. training. U.S. training was not used for a variety of reasons (to include enough quotas not being available, the cost of training being too high, or some training not being available due to releasability/licensing concerns).

Summary

A review of the literature indicates a long thread weaving previous studies together. Dating back over twenty years, virtually all have recognized the need for an evaluation system in place in order to (at least attempt) to document the effectiveness of IMET and/or E-IMET training. In doing so, a primary effort would be required to track previous students progression “through the ranks of their government” years into the future. We’ve done that to an extent in the context of surveying Security Assistance Officers to document international officers that attend U.S. Professional Military Education and subsequently attain substantial rank and influence within their homeland.

Previous studies, and the requirements of the GPRA, would tell us that is not enough. We need also to try to tie positions and stances to policy and actions taken by these future leaders. SAOs are not in a position or necessarily staffed to handle this responsibility, especially in the context of E-IMET—where students may come from other governmental or nongovernmental agencies within the country. Information would,

in theory, need to come from various staff members throughout the U.S. embassy who maintain contacts throughout government and nongovernmental organizations. You'll recall that the INSS conducted in 1995 concluded that ambassadors would need to be involved "country IMET and E-IMET programs are to fulfill their potential" (Cope, 1995, p. 50).

This researcher sincerely hopes to bring these requirements together within the methodology for the current study.

Chapter 3

Methodology

Introduction

In the previous chapters, the rationale for this study has been firmly planted. There is a need to better document the success or failure of United States security assistance programs—keying in particularly on the Expanded International Military Education and Training (E-IMET) program. “Because it is explicitly designed to address human rights and democratic institution issues, E-IMET has a more direct and measurable impact on these questions” (Cope, 1995, p. 38). This chapter will outline the methodology for the study—the process that will be taken in order to reach some conclusions regarding that success or failure. After looking at the basic hypotheses, we’ll answer three basic questions that are key inputs to the process, and then outline the process itself.

Hypotheses

The overall, far-reaching, hypothesis is that E-IMET is furthering U.S. and international human rights goals in the Central American countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. It is conceded at the outset that the answer to this particular question may well be inconclusive—in terms of a cause-effect relationship—due to the opportunity for so many extraneous variables to play a part in contributing to the human rights equation; however, there is value in the contributing hypotheses.

The first contributing hypothesis is that students that have attended E-IMET courses (conducted either in the United States or within their home countries by U.S. mobile teams) in the past are progressing within their governments or within non-governmental organizations to positions of greater responsibility—placing them in a position to affect human rights policy.

The second contributing hypothesis is that human rights laws and policies have been enacted and/or strengthened (in line with “democratic principles”) over the years that these countries have participated in the E-IMET program.

The third and final contributing hypothesis is that human rights abuses have declined during the period that these countries have participated in the E-IMET program.

Why El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua?

Obviously all three are Central American countries. The United States has (rightly or wrongly) long taken variations of interest, responsibility, and participation in the internal dynamics of our neighbors in the western hemisphere—dating back to the Monroe Doctrine. In recent years, the area of human rights has been a sticking point, especially in terms of U.S. military interaction in the training of the military forces of the countries of Latin America (Central and South America). United States’ aid (or lack of it) has been tied to human rights abuse problems linked to many of these countries. In particular, we could cite these three countries as culprits for human rights violations—at least in the eyes of a number of U.S. policy-makers and other organizations that monitor such abuses.

There are numerous similarities between the countries, and these similarities are a primary reason for selecting them for this study. Let's highlight some of them briefly in terms of demographics, geography, economics, and government.

The primary ethnic group is the same (Mestizo). Literacy rate is lowest in Guatemala at 55.6 percent, with El Salvador and Nicaragua both over 70 percent. Life expectancy ranges between 62 to 67 years with El Salvador leading the other two countries. El Salvador also has the lowest infant mortality rate at 28/1000. Guatemala has the highest at 79/1000, with Nicaragua about in the middle at 50/1000. Annual population growth is between two and three percent for all three (DoS, 2001b, 2001c, 2001d).

Obviously, language and religion are areas where these three countries have close ties. However, while Spanish is considered the official and predominant language for all three countries, it should be noted that there are other indigenous languages in all three countries. Forty per cent of Guatemala's population speaks over 20 Amerindian languages (United States Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], 2000a, 2000b, 2000c). Catholicism heavily dominates the region, but there are also Protestants in all three countries (along with some indigenous Mayan beliefs in Guatemala) (DoS, 2001b, 2001c, 2001d).

Geographically, each of the three offers some mountainous as well as coastal terrain. Two of the three countries, Guatemala and Nicaragua, have coastline on both the Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean Sea; however, Guatemala has no natural harbors on its west coast. El Salvador has coastline only on the Pacific. Climates are also similar with tropical to semitropical. (CIA, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c)

In terms of size, El Salvador's area measures over 8,000 square miles (about the size of Massachusetts), with its population of 6.2 million. It is very small compared to Nicaragua—the largest of the three with over 50,000 square miles (comparable in size to the state of New York). It has a population of 4.91 million. The population of Guatemala is significantly larger than the other two countries with 11.5 million while its land area is closer to that of Nicaragua—42,000 square miles (about the size of Tennessee). In real terms, El Salvador is the most densely populated of the three. (DoS, 2001b, 2001c, 2001d)

Affiliated with geography, we should be reminded that volcanoes, earthquakes and hurricanes have devastated parts of Central America over the years. Most recently Hurricane Mitch played havoc (in October, 1998) throughout that region including more than these three countries. This is important, not only because of their tie to aid provided by the U.S. and other countries in recent years, but also because of the pressure placed on governments in dealing with such catastrophe. Additionally, all three face similar environmental problems—those including deforestation, soil erosion, and water pollution. (CIA, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c)

Economically, their respective Gross Domestic Products align in the same order as their populations—although not to scale. Guatemala leads with over 19 billion dollars, El Salvador in next with 12.4 billion dollars, and Nicaragua trails with only 2.3 billion. Annual economic growth rates are fairly comparable, between 2.6 and 5 per cent (with Nicaragua leading and El Salvador trailing. (DoS, 2001b, 2001c, 2001d)

Their respective governments are also very comparable. Historically, all gained their independence from Spain in 1821. Over the years, there were numerous

insurrections, dictatorships, and military rule throughout the region. However, all three are now characterized by the U.S. State Department as “Republics.” All have constitutions dating back to the 1980s. Guatemala and Nicaragua amended their constitutions in the 1990s (Nicaragua also again in 2000) (DoS, 2001b, 2001c, 2001d).

All three countries have Executive, Unicameral Legislative, and Judicial branches of government and are multi-party (Nicaragua and El Salvador with five; Guatemala has four) (DoS, 2001b, 2001c, 2001d).

Lastly, before moving on to country-specific IMET/E-IMET funding, we’ll note the fact that each of these countries has relatively small IMET programs. More details will follow; however, the generality of that statement is important. Part of the goal of this study was to look at a number of countries to better draw a conclusion as to program effectiveness. Smaller IMET programs made it easier for this researcher to do so. Had a country program like Colombia been selected (with IMET program that saw over 600 students trained and an IMET budget of over \$900,000 in FY 99 alone) (DSCA, 1999), it would have been impossible to look at more than one country. Additionally, and just as important, these countries each had periods of time (or may be even currently) limited to no other categories of U.S. military aid. Therefore, selecting these three countries better delineates the impact of IMET/E-IMET. In effect, there are less independent variables to be concerned with.

To better keep the subject in perspective, let’s document the size of each country’s military establishments in terms of personnel in uniform before moving on (see Table 3).

We see, in looking at the most recent figures, that El Salvador and Nicaragua are very similar in both military strength and overall population (with great difference in land area). Guatemala has the significantly larger overall population of the three—while its land area puts it in second place of the three (but only 8,000 square miles less than the 50,000 square miles of land area of Nicaragua) (DoS, 2001b, 2001c, 2001d). There have been significant force reductions over the last 10 years within each country (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000); these will be discussed during the case studies to follow in subsequent chapters of this study.

Table 3

Size of Military & Paramilitary Forces by Country Comparison 1990/1991 vs. 2000/2001

<u>1990/1991</u>			
<u>Total & Breakout</u>	<u>El Salvador</u>	<u>Guatemala</u>	<u>Nicaragua</u>
Total Military	44,600	43,300	63,500
- Army	40,000	41,000	57,000
- Navy	2,200	1,000	3,500
- Air Force	2,400	1,300	3,000
Active Paramilitary	13,400	612,800	1,300
<u>2000/2001</u>			
<u>Total & Breakout</u>	<u>El Salvador</u>	<u>Guatemala</u>	<u>Nicaragua</u>
Total Military	16,800	31,400	16,000
- Army	15,000	29,200	14,000
- Navy	700	1,500	800
- Air Force	1,100	700	1,200
Active Paramilitary	12,000	21,500	0

Note. Active Paramilitary may include National Guard, National Police, Treasury Police, Ministry of Interior Troops, Territorial Militia, or Civil Defense Organizations. Numbers from International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990-1991 & 2000-2001.

It is easy to see the similarities between these countries. They've been highlighted to better tie in the major differences, in terms of this study, regarding the level of involvement that the United States government had with each one in recent years. This will be particularly important in terms of military spending under the IMET program and the restrictions placed on each country with regards to using IMET grant monies for specific E-IMET categorized courses. In other words, although these countries collectively have smaller programs than those of other countries worldwide, they demonstrate varying dollar amounts between them as well as having had varying restrictions placed on their use by U.S. policy-makers.

In previous tables, we've seen the overall shape of U.S. security assistance and IMET programs over the years. Table 4 shows us the number of IMET dollars provided to each of our three subject countries since the inception of E-IMET. (The years of 1950-1989 have been grouped together to provide a relative ranking prior to the E-IMET years.)

We cannot simply look at dollar amounts for each country's IMET funding each year to get the whole story. Those financial allocations came with some strings attached by the U.S. government for a number of years. Starting our discussion first with El Salvador, during the period of FYs 93-95, all IMET dollars had to be used for E-IMET courses (D. Stevens, personal communication, April 19, 2001). More particularly, for example in FY 93, Congress mandated that 75% of the \$1.43M requested for El Salvador be used for E-IMET (Samelson, 1993, p. 15). In the end \$1.4M was authorized; only \$300,000 was used (DSCA, 1999).

Table 4

IMET Totals; Historical Comparison Dollars (in Thousands)/Students Trained (Actual)

Fiscal Year	El Salvador		Guatemala		Nicaragua	
	\$	Students	\$	Students	\$	Students
1950-1989	8,256	25,894	9,660	3,853	11,583	5,740
1990	1,430	168	428	120	0	0
1991	957	109	399	58	0	0
1992	1,354	143	210	10	0	0
1993	300	45	153	19	0	0
1994	400	65	36	5	0	0
1995	404	24	0	0	0	0
1996	535	68	0	0	0	0
1997	455	27	205	29	57	4
1998	512	241	223	83	74	26
1999	491	181	253	103	200	55
2000 ^a	523	143	228	19	194	135
2001 (Estimate) ^a	525	143	250	21	220	140
2002 (Requested) ^a	800	219	350	29	375	200

Note. E-IMET Years were 1991-Present. Dollars & students trained for those years is the sum of both IMET & E-IMET. Information derived from DSCA, 1999, with the exception of that otherwise noted. These student numbers do not include student numbers from in-country METs.

^aInformation for FYs 2000-2001 are estimates only as students may still be in the training pipeline as the end of year snapshot is taken, and exact numbers or are projections for current/out years (K. Judkins, personal communications, July 3, 2001).

In Guatemala's case, it's a storied past. There were some idiosyncrasies dating as far back as the 1970s. More particular in the 1990s, much of the difficulty U.S. government officials have had in funding all military aid programs in the country stem from lack of progress in human rights cases. Because of this, Guatemala is continually subject to special Congressional notification requirements in order to execute its program. Their FY 94 IMET allocation was not released until September of 1994 (with less than 30 days left in the fiscal year)—they spent only \$36,000 of the \$125,000 allocation. In 1995, all IMET monies initially earmarked for Guatemala (amount of \$200,000) were

withheld and reprogrammed to other countries (D. Stevens, personal communication, April 19, 2001).

Things have not changed much in the latter half of the 1990s and in the new century. Late release of allocated funds continued to be the norm through 1998—that and the restriction to E-IMET program courses only. In FY 96, Congress mandated all funds for Guatemala would only be used for E-IMET (DISAM, Spring 96, p. 32); this has continued up to and including the current FY 01 allocation (D. Stevens, personal communication, April 19, 2001). In FY 97, the E-IMET allocation of \$225,000 was released in May. Even with the late release, the country managed to spend all but \$20,000 of the allocation. Beginning in FY 99, Congressional notifications have been made on a timelier basis.

Restrictions can be tailored very specifically within appropriations legislation. For example in FY 98, those funds would only be made available following a 15-day prior notification of the House & Senate Appropriations Committees. Also, the Conference Report reflected the agreement of the conferees that E-IMET for Guatemala “shall be used to support the peace settlement and that qualified non-military personnel should be well represented in such courses to the extent practical” (Samelson, 1998, p. 19). These same provisions were mandated in FY 99 as well (Brandt & Martin, 1999, p. 27). Additionally, as an example, since FY 97 provisions permitted no U.S. Army School of the Americas (USARSA) training could be attended. However, exceptions have been granted since FY 98 on a case-by-case basis to allow attendance at USARSA (now the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, WHINSEC) for

Democratic Sustainment and Command and General Staff courses (D. Stevens, personal communication, April 19, 2001).

To be blatantly obvious, there were definite problems seen in granting aid to Nicaragua for an extended period of time. This country received no IMET allocation from 1980 through 1996 (D. Stevens, personal communication, April 19, 2001). Absolutely no money was granted—the ultimate “sanction.” The U.S. State Department did recommend a \$100,000 IMET allocation for FY 95 and \$200,000 for FY 96; however, Congress did not release these funds. Their FY 97 allocation of \$150,000 was released in late June of 1997—only \$57,000 was expended (the balance was redistributed to other USSOUTHCOM countries). In 1998, Nicaragua’s IMET funding was \$200,000, but the actual expenditure was only about \$74,000 (DSCA, 1999; D. Stevens, personal communication, April 19, 2001).

In looking back, it appears that no formal legislation restricting Nicaragua’s use of IMET monies ever occurred (as was the case in El Salvador and Guatemala). However, the U.S. Ambassador and U.S. State Department did impose internal policies that kept their earliest IMET programs limited to E-IMET and to civilian attendance at U.S. courses (D. Stevens, personal communication, April 19, 2001). The allocation of \$200,000 has been the standard for Nicaragua since FY 98 (Brandt & Martin, 1999; Martin, 2000), even though it only spent \$74,000 that first year (DSCA, 1999; D. Stevens, personal communication, April 19, 2001).

In translating funding to numbers of Nicaraguan students educated, obviously all have gone through education and training programs within the last three to four years—giving them very little opportunity for upward mobility within the Nicaraguan

government or non-governmental organizations. In looking at the various aspects of this study. This makes Nicaragua the closest facsimile of a “control group” possible—potentially providing some data regarding a subject noted earlier in Chapter 2: are sanctions productive in producing outcomes U.S. policy-makers see as favorable? Is the stick, vice the carrot, a viable approach?

The interest by U.S. decision-makers regarding these countries, as stipulated within policy and the accompanying varying degrees of involvement over the years of E-IMET, make these countries extremely viable for this study. Before moving on to the meat of the methodology, let’s look at the E-IMET courses that we’ll be using to narrow down the target audience.

What Courses and Which Students?

Within the context of the overall program goals, there were originally nine courses designated throughout the Department of Defense as E-IMET eligible in 1990/91 (D. Stevens, personal communication, December 1, 2000). Because of the emphasis placed on E-IMET, that list has grown now to 47 core courses. These were developed to specifically support E-IMET or existed previously with subject material overwhelmingly supporting the program. An additional 35 courses can be “carried” by Mobile Education Teams (METs) to individual countries. Furthermore, there are 42 more courses throughout DoD, which meet E-IMET objectives if attended by civilians due to congressional emphasis. Thus the grand total of applicable courses is 117 (DISAM, 2000). (Note that this number is somewhat fluid as courses may be discontinued, revamped, or renamed. Also new courses can come on line as well.)

It would be an insurmountable task to survey all courses within a single study. Because of the specific human rights implications of this study, this researcher started first reviewing all course descriptions—keying on those which contained the words “human rights” within that description. While this process resulted in a more definable list of nine courses, it is likely not the most complete way to design the study’s subjects. It would make common sense that denoting the subject of human rights as a major portion of a course’s content would not be the most effective way to stimulate interest in it from the international community. Therefore, schools may tailor courses with human rights as part of the curriculum, but not “advertise” it as such (Variety of Personal Communications, December 2000-March 2001). Additionally as already noted earlier in this report, the broad direction of E-IMET concentrates on democratization principles in total, and it’s difficult to break those down specifically in terms of delineating courses. Many courses spread subject matter through the entire spectrum to meet those program goals. (Variety of Personal Communications, December 2000 – March 2001.)

After consulting training management personnel within USSOUTHCOM, DSCA, individual schools and U.S. personnel in country (regarding specifics of curriculum and the target audience), three courses were deleted and three additional courses were added to the list. The primary impact of this action was the addition of MET courses (of which none were included on the original list of nine). Thus, the field was rounded out to include both in-resident courses conducted in the United States (CONUS) as well as courses taught by METs in either the home country or Central American region of the trainee. This action served to significantly increase the total number of students (especially civilians) in the pool due to the high number of students that can attend those

METs. The courses range in length from 5 days to 52 weeks, and are done by all military departments. They include institutions such as the Naval Postgraduate School's Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR), the Inter-American Air Force Academy (IAAFA), and the Army's Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC)—formerly the much-maligned School of the Americas. (It should be noted that WHINSEC has/is revalidating all courses in terms of meeting specific E-IMET goals.) The majority of the courses are taught in the Spanish language.

Another factor influencing the final applicability of courses was based on the input of the in-country Security Assistance Officers (SAOs). It was determined to limit the survey pool to military officer and civilian students. No Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) or enlisted personnel were surveyed in an effort to obtain results from the true decision/policy-makers. Thus, one of the three courses eliminated at the outset was the Non-Commissioned Officers Professional Development Course (taught at IAAFA)—with a grand total of 12 students (6 each from El Salvador and Guatemala) (R. Sanchez, personal communication, March 16, 2001).

The courses were initially chosen without the knowledge or regard for attendance by students from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. After receiving attendance data, it was noted that one of the courses (Human Rights Instructor Course taught at WHINSEC) had no attendees from any of the three subject countries. Thus, this course was dropped from the list of nine for this reason.

These eight courses will form the base of this study in helping to determine if the U.S. is achieving desired results—especially in terms of reaching the right people, those that are, or will subsequently be, in position to influence or even make policies that will

further democratic principles to include human rights. This will be carried out via survey of graduates from these selected courses. A listing of the courses included in this study, along with some of their particulars, is included at Appendix F. This appendix provides the breakout of potential respondents by country and course (military and civilians where that information is available). The population size, originally thought to be approximately 556, turned out to be 1178.

The Issue of English Language Training

Although oftentimes not the primary training the student receives, English language training serves a valuable purpose within the E-IMET continuum. Areas such as human rights, military justice, civilian control of the military, and democratization are incorporated into the American Language Course (ALC) taught on the Defense Language Institute (DLI) campus at Lackland Air Force Base, (San Antonio) Texas, as well as distributed worldwide under IMET or FMS purchases for countries to use in English language training centers at home. The ALC, along with some other specialized courses offered by DLI are geared to provide the language skills necessary for the student to effectively participate in the training that their country requires in the U.S.

Not all students attend DLI training—those who score sufficiently on an “English Comprehension Level Exam” (constructed by DLI and administered by U.S. personnel in-country); those who are from native English-speaking countries; or in the case of this study, those who are attending U.S. courses conducted in Spanish; are not required to attend the resident course in San Antonio.

However English language training may be viewed, especially in terms of IMET/E-IMET, as going beyond that when conducted in country. It may be seen as offering a more palatable opportunity—for both the U.S. and the recipient country from which to start receiving and investing grant money. From the U.S. perspective, “winning hearts and minds oftentimes starts with winning tongues” (K. McFarling, personal communication, June 18, 2001).

According to Mr. McFarling, the Programs Division Chief at DLI, the advantages of English language training can extend to conducting training in country. He related the following example which happened to pertain to Nicaragua:

We started coordinating with a previously assigned air attaché/security assistance officer back in the 1998-99 time frame, when it was decided that investment in an in-country ELTP [English language training program] was “safe,” relatively speaking. What transpired next was the purchase of lab equipment, an ELTP survey by DLI personnel [Mr. McFarling’s office], purchase of ALC materials, and was followed by assignment (under IMET funding, with requisite waiver from DSCA) of a DLI ELT advisor/consultant to get things going. In the past two years, we’ve only had three students from Nicaragua at DLI, two of them for instructor/ELTP-related training. (K. McFarling, personal communication, June 18, 2001)

Mr. McFarling also added that in the case of Guatemala, they’ve only had two students at their San Antonio campus within the last couple of years. One of them attended an ELTP instructor course; the other attended language training in preparation for a Staff Judge Advocate course. “He appears to be headed to be the Judge Advocate in Guatemala” (K. McFarling, personal communication, June 18, 2001). El Salvador has sent approximately eight students in the past 18 months—headed on to a variety of technical and professional military education courses to include the Air War College, the

Army's Command and General Staff College, and the Naval Postgraduate School (K. McFarling, personal communication, June 18, 2001).

As, you can see there is value in English language training. However, it will not be included in this study. The primary reason for this: it had minimal input for students included in this study. Because most of the students went to courses conducted in Spanish, very few if any would have been required to meet a minimum English Comprehension Level requirement.

Data Collection

The intent of the study is that each country will be treated independently within a case study format. This is due to differences in the training used, in the amount of training conducted, the timing of that training, and the realization that while the countries are somewhat similar (as we described earlier), they are different. There may be some areas where school results and or other categories may be mixed in order to make alternate conclusions.

The student survey, although a major part, is only a part of the equation. Additionally, documentation regarding human rights issues in all three countries will be thoroughly researched. This will include U.S. government information, other international organizations (to include United Nations), and non-governmental organizations—this in order to get the broadest breadth of perceptions possible. This information will be presented in conjunction with student survey data. In an effort of fairness to all evaluation processes that will follow the return of student surveys, only the information required for the literature review (Chapter 2) was read by this researcher

prior to the building and distribution of the surveys. The additional country information included in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 was read only after the surveys were on their way to the respondents. This was in an effort to eliminate any potential bias in wording or a hidden agenda for the questions.

Because of the privacy of student data maintained by the individual schools, the release of lists of student names to this researcher was not permitted. This was to limit undesired personal contact—should the individual student elect not to participate, and to alleviate potential pressure from the researcher. However, this researcher was permitted to receive information from the schools regarding the total number of students from each of the three countries in applicable classes and the dates that these courses were conducted. Most importantly, the mechanism was provided for the researcher to receive contact from the student via the survey instrument.

An initial letter was sent from a high-level person within the U. S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency to the key person with the military establishments of each of the three countries. (A generic version of this letter is at Appendix G.) The letter was sent via the SAOs working within military group/embassy staffs. The letter solicited and encouraged the support of leadership in having previous students answer the survey. Thus all input was strictly voluntary by the respondent, with no pressure from the researcher.

The surveys would then be forwarded to this researcher via the SAO. It should be elaborated upon that the researcher had the opportunity to discuss the project extensively with all the SAOs—and had terrific support at the outset from each of them. SAOs had no input within the realm of individual student feedback; they are/were simply the best

conduit/mechanism with the trust and visibility from the host government officials to solicit their support. (SAOs were invited to provide any anecdotal data they felt appropriate in terms of progress they had seen during their tenure in country. Some of this was extremely valuable especially within the connotation of the length of that tenure.)

Upon completion of the survey process, all responses will be collected, collated, and evaluated based upon several primary question areas. These questions would be couched in student-provided information as to course(s) attended and dates of attendance and rank or civilian grade. A copy of the survey (in English) is at Appendix H. Because the predominant number of the courses used for the survey is conducted in Spanish (to potentially a great number of persons not having a thorough use of English), the actual survey was conducted in Spanish. A copy of the Spanish version of the Survey is at Appendix I.

One major area is regarding the upward mobility of students. It would address whether the student has moved to a higher-level position since completing the course. Moreover, it will ask them to assess their opportunity now (sometimes within a short period of having attended a course) as well as future opportunities to personally influence policy. Human rights would be prominently placed in a number of questions; however, there is great flexibility in for respondents' answers to focus on other policy arenas.

Another major area would deal with the value of particular aspects of their course assist them in performing the duties they handle each day. It will also address whether there has been any continued contact between the student and school personnel since the course was completed.

Time for respondents to reply would be confined to a specific number of weeks (approximately six). This would permit persons involved in the process—senior in-country officials and SAOs—to fulfill their tasks quickly and not belabor them with extended periods of continuing responsibilities.

Because of the limited student information that could be provided by the schools, a very short, separate survey instrument will be sent to each course director. (A copy of this particular instrument is at Appendix J.) No restrictions would be placed on the numbers of faculty and staff that could answer the survey, as persons may change responsibilities over the years and carry with them a variety of historical knowledge that may be helpful in evaluating effectiveness of courses. The distribution of the survey within each school was left up to each individual course director. The thrust of this survey will address any continuing contact with students, subjects of discussion, and particular anecdotal data that may be available.

Upon receipt of survey data, the information would be reviewed/analyzed.

Measures & Data Analysis

Because of the nature of the data collected, measures would be devised based upon the raw numbers of responses, and trends noted within those answers. While tabulation would be done by country, overall trends could be noted within the review of overall responses as well as by individual courses. A qualitative analysis would be the minimum hoped for and anticipated. The two-pronged approach of reviewing secondary source materials (various human rights reports and the like) as well as conducting the

student survey may provide answers to both the structural and behavioral changes discussed by Calhoun (1998, p. 90).

In Chapter 2 of this report, we discussed at greater length the performance objectives and indicators proposed by Todd Calhoun (refer to Appendix E for the overall list with a bearing on this particular study). There are a number that, hopefully through a review of previous data collected over the years, can be addressed regarding the three target countries of this study. Progress made in developing a more democratically styled legal system along with a professionalism within the ranks of those who are various court officers, revised codes or laws (on the books, and enforced) that precipitate the concern for individual freedoms and principles of human rights, and detention practices are facets that should have documentation already established. Corruption and abuse of power, a historic concern by U.S. decision-makers within this region, should also have reliable documentation—noting progress or lack thereof.

In addition to secondary research, primary research of this study may help document that, at least attempts are being made, to establish a “western style . . . justice system that recognizes the rights of the individual” (Calhoun, 1998). More particular, the presence of training and education programs for officials at various levels as well as trends of civilian control of the military are issues that we should be better able to determine as a result of this study. These are issues that immediately come to mind; others may develop as survey information is tabulated and evaluated.

Presentation

Because of the nature of this project—delving into key issues within each of the three countries a chapter will follow for each case study. While there will be ties between the countries in statements made, this researcher intends to treat each one on its own merit internally within its respective chapter. Because of this, an individual reading each case study in succession may note a degree of duplicated information or redundancy; however, this is necessary to the effort of making each country study fully capable of standing alone.

After completing each country in succession—El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua—Chapter 7 will focus on pulling all the data together perhaps finding some common fabric between the three case studies. Chapter 8 will conclude the documentation with findings in respect of the hypotheses as well as other programmatic findings and recommendations to the security assistance community in hopes of bettering practices and enhancing the capability of future research.

Chapter 4

Case Study: El Salvador

Introduction

As we begin our individual looks at each of the three countries with El Salvador, you'll realize that all three had intense civil strife during the 1980s and 90s. El Salvador's conflict ran from 1980 until January of 1992 (Landau, 1993, pp. xi-xii). This total of 12 years is in the middle (in terms of duration) of the three civil conflicts; Guatemala's was much longer by comparison as it lasted 36 years (1960-1996) (United States Department of State [DoS], 1997b). Nicaragua endured continuous insurrection and guerrilla conflict from 1980 to 1990—10 years (Landau, pp. ix-x). It is actually difficult to date the various conflicts as political unrest has been a consistent occurrence in each of the three countries over the last half of the 20th century. All took their tolls in terms of lives lost and political turmoil accompanied by human rights violations. Each struggle saw violations on both sides of the battle lines—human rights coming to be a major concern in all three peace processes. Notice that all three conflicts were occurring simultaneously during the decade of the 1980s. All three conflicts and succeeding rebuilding periods have at their core land reform issues and strong and very independent military establishments.

A major difference between El Salvador and the other two countries is a much shorter history of U.S. military involvement within the country. You'll note in the succeeding chapters that U.S. involvement in Guatemala goes back to 1920 (Landau,

1993, p. xii); Nicaragua predates the other two significantly in going back all the way to 1853 (Landau, 1993, pp. 13-14). The U.S. did not intervene militarily in El Salvador until the early 1980s (Landau, p. 66). With these facts in mind, let's begin our look at El Salvador's human rights chronology. (There is no significance or major reason that this researcher chose the order of presentation in this dissertation—it simply came down to alphabetical order.) Because of the nature of this project, it's the intent of the researcher to delve into each country individually; that the research for each country may, especially in the long term, be used by succeeding researchers, stand on its own. However, as noted at the end of the previous chapter, some discussion, conclusions, and recommendations may be “lumped together” within the final chapter where similarities exist. It is possible, and indeed likely that there may be more similarities than differences as we weave our way through each of the three subject countries.

The Precursors of U.S. Involvement

As introduced above, there were very little precursors to U.S. military involvement in El Salvador. Intervention/involvement occurred within a year or two of the initiation of armed conflict, as U.S. advisors and funds supporting the government flowed in 1981/1982 (Landau, 1993, p. xi). U.S. interest was already keen in Central America (with concurrent involvement in Guatemala and Nicaragua). Concerns revolved around the threat of communist/socialist governments in the western hemisphere.

Land has been “at the heart of this [El Salvador's] historical struggle” (Brown, 1985, p. 115). And, there's historically been a small number of folks that have had some and many that had none—an upper and lower class with nothing in between (a statement

that could be made regarding a number of countries around the world even today)

(Brown, p. 116). A visiting U.S. Army officer who visited the country in 1931

commented:

There appears to be nothing between these high-priced cars and the oxcart with its barefoot attendant. . . . There is practically no middle class in El Salvador . . . Thirty or forty families own nearly everything in the country. They live in regal style. The rest of the population has practically nothing. (Landau, 1993, p. 67)

In actuality, the

Disorder of the early 1930s grew not only out of the greed and rapacity of the Fourteen Families, members of the super elite, and the military commanders, but also out of world economic conditions, which set the price of coffee (Landau, p. 68).

To make a long story short, for many years as “the majority of Salvadorans voted . . .

showing their preference for democracy and an end to military rule. The Fourteen

Families and the military answered by nominating generals who stole the elections. This pattern continued until 1972” (Landau, p. 74).

In one of the most prominent incidents, Jose Napoleon Duarte was “deprived of victory” the election in 1972 (Brown, 1985, pp. 116-117). To add insult to injury, but subsequently poetic justice, Duarte was “imprisoned, tortured, and sent into exile for seven years. . . . however, joined the junta and, in December 1980, became its president” (Brown, p. 117). Considering the “unchecked authority” of the armed forces, Duarte exercised “little influence” (Brown, p. 117).

It was at this time, with the advent of the first Reagan administration (elected in 1980), that the U.S. got involved supporting Duarte (and the successive government led by Magana) in their fight against insurgents—even in the light of military involvement in

human rights violations. The Carter administration had more reserved financial support of the government due to those human rights concerns (Brown, 1985, pp. 117-121).

Thus, the stage is now set as we look at statistical information in the context of more current events.

Human Rights Abuse Statistics

In looking the most recent accounting of data along the top line (for the year 2000) on Table 5, it's easy to see that the problems in El Salvador are far from over. As will be the case with data displays in similar format for Guatemala and Nicaragua, information can be considered questionable. Even though the sources would appear to be reliable, there is always cause to question. There are many groups interested in human rights—virtually all used for the tables have the best interest at heart, but all may use more stringent or looser definitions of the various categorical terms.

Regardless, something can be drawn from the numbers of human rights abuse complaints or alleged offenses contained on Table 5—in terms of the ebbs and flows, increases and decreases in numbers of “reported” incidents, as consolidated by the U.S. State Department. Because these do not tell the whole story, and need some dialogue as we go from year to year, this researcher will assert comments generated by annual reports from sources such as the U.S. Department of State, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and Freedom House. All are respected for their work in monitoring human rights issues worldwide, with the State Department drawing from a variety of sources for their documentation.

Keep in mind that the Department of State publishes figures (and non-governmental organizations also attempt to monitor and advocate systematic advances) regarding areas such as domestic violence against women and children, labor protections, and other categories of human rights issues. The categories addressed within Table 5 were considered most important by this researcher—especially due to the continuing problems that the U.S. deals with in its relationship with El Salvador and other countries (not simply the three subjects of this study) in the region. This researcher could find no other report better, documenting a range of numerical data from several sources in any form, than the State Department Annual Country Reports for Human Rights Practices. (The Department of State provides these numbers within narrative comments and not in table or graph form.)

To substantiate the viability of these reports, this researcher attempted to find critiques of them. Probably the most telling, in terms of reliability came from Human Rights Quarterly back in 1986—during the second Reagan administration:

While there are serious criticisms of chapters on particular countries, even the critics who scrutinize these most closely agree that the vast majority of the volume reflects a professional effort to report accurately and fairly.

This situation is remarkable because the Reports are produced by an administration whose initial appointees were openly antagonistic to applying human rights criteria in foreign policy and whose current pursuit of human rights policy could be described as reluctant. Many were opposed to embarrassing friendly nations with public critiques. Some disagreed with the basic premise that human rights violations in communist and noncommunist nations should be viewed as comparable. Despite these difficulties, the Reports have actually improved in coverage and consistency during the Reagan years. (Innes de Neufville, 1986, pp. 681-682)

Obviously, in the 15 years since this critique, the George H.W. Bush, Clinton, and George W. Bush have and must continue to be aware of human rights issues in terms of

U.S. foreign policy. While there may be persons who would be critical of these Reagan successors, most would certainly say that the Reagan administration was more lax in weighing human rights concerns in the foreign policy balance than any of them (realizing that much is unknown regarding the new George W. Bush administration).

The State Department's sources for the number of violations shown on Table 5 include the PDDH (El Salvadoran Government's Office of the Ombudsman for the Protection of Human Rights). Also affiliated with the government are two other agencies, the PNC IG and the PNC UID. They are the Inspector General's Office and the Disciplinary Investigative Unit of the National Police (an internal affairs division)—after the organization went through reform measures. This is important in terms of reliability as the PN (national police prior to reform) in El Salvador as in other countries were major contributors to human rights violations during, and in some cases after, the civil war years. ONUSAL, which displays figures within the chart up through 1994 was the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador.

ONUSAL was a temporary initiative by the U.N. to monitor human rights violations by both sides and compliance within an agreement prior to the eventual peace agreement in 1992. ONUSAL was in place with 100 observers in August of 1991 (McColm and the Freedom House Survey Team, 1992, p. 193). The mission was drawn down—as regional offices closed—(now under the name MINUSAL) to approximately a dozen observers and “was responsible for monitoring unfinished commitments in the peace accords, especially land transfers and public security issues” (Human Rights Watch, 1995, pp. 90-91). The Human Rights Division closed down entirely in March of 1995 (Human Rights Watch, 1995, p. 91); the intent was that PDDH would assume the

Table 5

Human Rights Abuses (Complaints or Alleged Offenses) – El Salvador

Year	Extrajudicial Killings	Forced Disappearances	Torture (Violation of Right of Personal Integrity)	Illegal Arrest or Arbitrary Detention (Violations of Personal Liberty)	Estimated % of Incarcerated Awaiting Trial
2000	PDDH – 87 Presidential Commission - 72 (Stats include current & prior years)	Presidential Commission - 12 (At least 12 officers involved in kidnappings)	PDDH – 724 Presidential Commission - 14	PDDH – 181	No Data Available. (Total prison pop/capacity: 7,383/5,794)
1999	No Data Available. “several” cases of reported extrajudicial killings by police.	PDDH - 3	PDDH – 929 PNC IG – 181 PNC UID - 992	PDDH – 225	70 (Number awaiting trial: 4,867) (Total prison pop/capacity: 6,914/6,480)
1998	PDDH – 2	PDDH – 8	PDDH – 849 PNC IG - 96 (Jan-Jun Only) PNC UID – 1,424 (Jan-Aug Only)	PDDH – 287	72 (Number awaiting trial: 5,505) (Total prison pop/capacity: 7,545/5,880)
1997	PDDH – 2	PDDH – 8	PDDH – 1199 PNC IG – 73 (Jan-Jun Only) PNC UID – 1,016 (Jan-Aug Only)	PDDH – 724 (Originally reported as 745 between Jun 96-May 97 with 583 between Jan-Sep 97) PNC IG – 48 (Jan-Jun 97)	74 (Number awaiting trial: 6,167)
1996	PDDH – 2	No Data Available.	PDDH – 861 (Jun 95-May 96) PNC IG – 44 (Apr-Dec Only)	PDDH – 901 (Jun 95-May 96)	80 (pending trial or sentencing)
1995	No Data Available.	No Data Available.	No Data Available.	No Data Available.	80 (pending trial or sentencing)
1994	ONUSAL - 8 (5 by Government or ESAF/3 by PNC; Jan-Oct Only)	ONUSAL – 0 (Investigated several, but all were unfounded)	ONUSAL – 3 (Torture) ONUSAL – 74 (Mistreatment) ONUSAL – 39 (Excessive Force) (All Jan-Sep Only)	ONUSAL – 94 (Jan-Sep Only)	80 (pending trial or sentencing)
1993	A “few” unsubstantiated murder	“Some” Unconfirmed Allegations	ONUSAL - 6 (Jan-Oct Only)	ONUSAL – 185 (Apr-Dec Only)	88 (pending trial or sentencing)

	allegations against government & FMLN		ONUSAL – 120 (Mistreatment) ONUSAL – 45 (Excessive Force) (Final two: Apr-Dec Only)		(Total prison population: 5,500)
1992	No Data Available.	No Data Available.	No Data Available.	ONUSAL – 275 (Jan-Oct Only)	No Data Available.
<p><u>Note.</u> PDDH = El Salvadoran Government’s Office of the Ombudsman for the Protection of Human Rights. PNC IG = National Civilian Police Inspector General. PNC UID = El Salvadoran Disciplinary Investigative Unit of the National Police. ONUSAL = U.N. Observer Mission. Information derived from Department of State Human Rights Reports, 1994-2001.</p>					

role monitoring, reporting, and making recommendations to the government regarding human rights issues (DoS, 1995a; Human Rights Watch, 1993, p.98).

The mission of ONUSAL was very similar to that of the ongoing mission of MINUGUA in Guatemala. Both were/are U.N. missions; however MINUGUA continues to operate under a continuance from the United Nations (likely until 2003) at the request of the Guatemalan government and their opposition. MINUGUA, which initiated its mission in 1994, also came out of an agreement between the two parties prior to the end of the fighting. While ONUSAL’s human rights verification existence lasted only 3-4 years (Human Rights Watch, 1995, p. 91), MINUGUA’s continues, and is coming up on 7 years of activity (G. Fernandez, personal communication, 5 June 2001).

One other organization cited for some of the data for 2000, is the Presidential Commission. This group was tasked to investigate police misconduct.

In one other caveat to Table 5, no specific source was cited within the State Department Reports for the category for those incarcerated, and pending sentencing (and accompanying prison population) statistics. However, they are attributable to government sources, and other human rights organizations published similar numbers within their reports in addressing prison issues through the years.

The table (5) shows a somewhat positive trend—although not stellar as we look at the numbers for the most recent period, the year 2000. Let’s review some of the particulars that also contributed to the events from year to year.

Freedom House Ratings

Over the years Freedom House, a non-governmental human rights organization scores each country around the world in terms of political rights, civil liberties, and freedom status. Table 6 shows the organization’s ratings from year to year for the country of El Salvador (from 1972, when their process was initiated, up to the present).

Table 6

Freedom House Ratings for El Salvador

Year	Country Ratings	Year	Country Ratings
1972-73	2,3,F	1987-88	3,4,PF
1973-74	2,3,F	1988-89	3,3,PF
1974-75	2,3,F	1989-90	3,4,PF
1975-76	2,3,F	1990-91	3,4,PF
1976-77	3,3,PF	1991-92	3,4,PF
1977-78	3,3,PF	1992-93	3,3,PF
1978-79	4,4,PF	1993-94	3,3,PF
1979-80	5,3,PF	1994-95	3,3,PF
1980-81	6,4,PF	1995-96	3,3,PF
1981-82	5,5,PF	1996-97	3,3,PF
1982-83	4,5,PF	1997-98	2,3,F
1983-84	4,5,PF	1998-99	2,3,F
1984-85	3,5,PF	1999-00	2,3,F
1985-86	2,4,PF	2000-01	2,3,F
1986-87	3,4,PF		

Note. From Freedom House, 2001.

To briefly explain the ratings, the characters representing scores for each year are, from left to right, political rights, civil liberties, and freedom status. Each of the first two is measure on a one to seven scale, with the number one representing the highest degree of freedom and seven being the lowest. “F,” “PF,” and “NF” respectively stand for “free,”

“partly free,” and “not free,” Countries whose combined averages for political rights and for civil liberties fall between 1.0 and 2.5 are designated “free”; between 3.0 and 5.5, “partly free”; and between 5.5 and 7.0 “not free.” A more detailed methodology for the Freedom House ratings is at Appendix K.

These ratings will be interwoven intermittently throughout the subsequent discussions as we look at annual events within El Salvador.

Human Rights Initiatives and Developments

Events Prior to 1992.

If we note the Freedom House table (6), we see deterioration, in terms of political right and civil liberties, beginning in the mid and late 1970s as unrest stimulated problems. The downward trend continued as we pick up with the 1980s (Freedom House, 2001).

The decade of the 1980s began with high volatility. “More than one thousand Salvadorans died in 1979 as a result of political violence. This would be the equivalent of 44,000 people dying in the United States. . . . In El Salvador, this was just the beginning of the carnage” (Landau, 1993, p. 83). In addition to deaths, “by the end of the 1980s, some one million Salvadorans, 20 per cent of the population, had moved to the United States” (Landau, p. 103). Most of the civilian members of government had resigned due to centralized military control as January 1980 began. Violence continued to escalate and Duarte’s party (the Christian Democrats—PDC) conditionally joined the government (Brown, 1985, p. 117). No doubt all of these events contributed to Freedom House ratings of El Salvadoran affairs being the lowest recorded during their entire

tenure of conducting such as system. The 1980-81 time frame saw the bottoming out at “6,4, Party Free” (Freedom House, 2001). (Keep in mind that a 7 is the lowest rating available under the rating scheme.)

He was inaugurated as a non-elected president in November of 1980 and “would supposedly stand as a symbol of decency against a military machine and an oligarchy” (Landau, 1993, p. 94). As alluded to earlier in this chapter, Duarte—a Notre Dame University graduate—was an attractive figure for government. It was easy for the U.S. and many of his own people to support due to his personal hardships encountered at the hands of the military (Landau, p. 94, p. 96; Brown, 1985, pp. 116-117).

Although the military was to reorganize and affect other social changes, this never occurred and Duarte’s best of intentions stalled (Landau, 1993, p. 84). Revolutionaries became more and more active against the establishment—to the extent of taking over the Panamanian embassy along with several ambassadors (Landau, p. 84). The FMLN (the Farabundo Marti Front for National Liberation) formed in October of 1980, combining a number of opposition groups. This precipitated the furtherance of armed conflict as the FMLN sought to “undermine the government’s legitimacy” (Landau, p. 96).

A democratic constitution was drafted in 1983, and Duarte was elected in 1984. He assumed office amid the hopes and wishes of many that he would transform the military domination into a true civilian-led democracy; however, this did not materialize. He “could not reform the antiquated structures of the military” (Landau, 1993, p. 138), and both they and the FMLN would continue violating human rights for years to come.

The Carter administration, even with its concern for human rights in the region, supported the government in its attempts to help stabilize it. In doing so it also supported

the oppressive military. Military aid was provided in the form of both money and advisors. This continued with the Reagan administration—continuing to support Duarte, even though Congress did prescribe restrictions to aid as years went by (Landau, 1993, pp. 84-87). Aid grew to \$3.55 billion in 1989, with military forces growing to over 70,000 fighting 6,000 to 12,000 guerrillas (Landau, p. 128).

It's interesting to note that over the Duarte years, Freedom House saw a reasonable, progression within their ratings. Assuming the non-elected presidency in 1980, the ratings began a fairly steady progression from the "6,4, Partly Free" to a "3,3, [still] Partly Free" rating for 1988-89 (see Table 6) (Freedom House, 2001).

President Alfredo Cristiani took office in June of 1989 amid numerous resignations and some killings of officials during the campaign period. The FMLN had threatened "to kill all of the nation's 262 elected mayors unless they resigned. Eight were killed, along with one provincial governor, and over 100 resigned, but the electoral process was not interrupted" (McColm et al., 1990, p. 96). Another important event of 1989, that would have lasting social and political impact upon the Cristiani and subsequent administrations, was the killing of six Jesuit priests (possibly by the military) during a major FMLN offensive the following November (McColm et al, p. 97). (Subsequently it would be determined that the military was responsible for these particular deaths).

Death squads on both sides created havoc. In July of 1990, the government's own "Human Rights Commission protested to the armed forces the 'truly alarming frequency' of human rights violations by civil defense units, including murder, assault, and rape" (Human Rights Watch, 1991a, pp. 155-156). Also we see a dip in the Freedom House

ratings during this period as the civil liberties factor in their equation dropped from a 3 in 1988-89 to a 4 in 1990-91 (where it would remain constant for three consecutive years; refer to Table 6) (Freedom House, 2001). According to Tutela Legal, the Human Rights Office of the Catholic Church:

Political killings committed by the military and right-wing death squads reached 800 per month in 1980-82. . . . The rate had dropped to 8 per month in 1987. The rate rose incrementally in 1988 and 1989. However there was a sharp increase in 1990 in the wake of the big FMLN offensive. In the first half of 1990, rights monitors attributed more than 5 dozen killings to the military and death squads. There was also a sharp increase in reports of torture of detainees in the custody of the police and military. (McColm et al., 1991, p. 155)

Regarding the above numbers, it should be noted that there were some reporting disagreements in later years between ONUSAL and Tutela Legal. ONUSAL felt that some of what Tutela Legal reported for 1993 included common crimes without political motivation (which should not have been included) (Human Rights Watch, 1993, p. 97). Nonetheless, these figures give a frame of reference. Additionally, “the roller-coaster statistics on death squad murders indicated that little had changed in the structures that permit such abuses to occur” (Human Rights Watch, 1991a, p. 156).

In addition to the need for military reforms, the absence of an effective justice system was also contributed to the numbers of abuses.

The judicial system was under-staffed, riddled with corruption, and intimidated by the military and security forces. No military officer had ever been tried or convicted for a human rights violation, despite overwhelming evidence of military involvement in the deaths of thousands of civilians. . . . In 1989, the Cristiani government introduced legislation that would establish an independent commission for selecting judges, increase the number of civil courts, and reduce the number of military courts. However, there was little follow-up on judicial reform in 1990. (McColm et al., 1991, p. 156)

In 1991, there were “a number of advances in respect for human rights” (Human Rights Watch, 1991b, p. 212). These and other events would lead to the end of the armed conflict. The agreement had been reached and ONUSAL had begun operations. Since its arrival, “both the armed forces and the FMLN appear to have taken greater care to avoid civilian casualties” (Human Rights Watch, p. 213). Agreements had also been reached between FMLN and the government for judicial reform as well as the creation of a new national police (McColm et al., 1992, p. 193).

One other noteworthy event in 1991 was the conviction of two officers for the murder of the six Jesuit priests. This was the first time that military officers were held for human rights violations. Impunity is still a part of the equation, and this victory may be overstated as another seven soldiers on trial were acquitted of the charges. This, in addition to

evidence of a military coverup to protect higher-ranking officers and not-guilty verdicts after obvious jury intimidation in other cases, strongly suggested the convicted officers had been used as scapegoats to deflect pressure from international rights organizations and the U.S. Congress. (McColm et al., 1992, p. 193)

The information above is only a short synopsis of what this researcher saw as important events in the grand scheme of shaping future policy and establishing a baseline from which to begin more contemporary events during the period of E-IMET. It’s impossible to sum up scores of years in a country’s history in a few short paragraphs; however, the above information helped to set the tone for the more recent years in terms of progress or the lack thereof.

Events of 1992.

Highlighting the news of this year, the peace accord was signed on the 16th of January, and the cease-fire implemented in February. The basic conditions included the FMLN's agreement to disarm in five stages within the next 10 months. At the same time, the government agreed to a reduction in military strength to half of the current manpower of 60,000 (McColm et al., 1993, p. 216). Additionally some key units were to be eliminated—"the National Guard and Treasury Police, as well as . . . all five Army rapid-reaction battalions (Human Rights Watch, 1992, p. 106).

There was joint agreement on an Ad Hoc Commission of three civilians to review military officer records to implicate and purge participants in human rights offences as well as a Truth Commission to investigate acts of violence during the conflict for the purpose of recommending prosecution. However, much of this effort was for naught as the National Assembly adopted an amnesty law one week after the peace accord was accomplished "covering most political crimes" (Human Rights Watch, 1992, p. 106).

As the time approached for the military reductions on both sides, there were also accusations from both sides of noncompliance. It was on this point that United Nations representatives got involved to secure mutual agreement to a deadline extension to 15 December. The major sticking point was regarding the purge of military officers involved in human rights violations—a list that included some very prominent military leadership. Ultimately, and without knowing how the military would react, President Cristiani agreed to relieve about 100 officers by early 1993 (McColm et al., 1993, p. 217).

The overall situation improved—due to more than the peace agreements.

Although a number of incidents still occurred,

since the beginning of the cease-fire on February 1, 1992, the number of human rights violations . . . greatly diminished” [with a] “part of the reduction . . . clearly attributable to the presence of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL). . . . ONUSAL’s unique position within the country and its unparalleled access to the government and security bodies allowed it to comment with authority on numerous aspects of the human rights situation. (Human Rights Watch, 1992, p. 107)

The PDDH (Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office) was filled by the National Assembly in 1992. “As the only human rights organization specifically established by the Constitution, the Ombudsman’s Office (PDDH) is charged with receiving allegations of human rights abuses committed by government officials, investigating them and, if warranted, lodging official complaints against specific officials” (DoS, 1994a).

It appears that a good start has been initiated as the year closed following the advent of the peace agreement. The FMLN “transformed itself into a political party” (McColm et al., 1993, p. 217). While formal recognition is yet to be received, the group appears to be in the hunt for representation from the next election to be held in March of 1994 (McColm et al., p. 217).

The indicators appeared to be more favorable as Freedom House ratings (see Table 6) moved up a notch, in the civil liberties arena. In the reporting period for 1992-93 the ratings moved back to “3,3, [still] Partly Free” after being 3,4, Partly Free for the previous three reporting periods. Here the rating would remain until 1997-98 (Freedom House, 2001).

Events of 1993.

The State Department characterized progress on human rights issues as “uneven in 1993,” while ONUSAL “found that the human rights situation continued to improve, but noted continued human rights abuses and a serious problem with common crime” (DoS, 1994a). As evidenced by Table 5, ONUSAL is keeping tabs on the human rights situation—the majority of the violations citing the national police. The national police (PN) was in the process of being reestablished (reformed) as the PNC and several of the new units were in place. Training of personnel was “slow and underfunded” (McColm et al., 1994, p. 244). However, human rights, as a part of that training was being provided by U.S.-supported police academy (DoS, 1994a). There were additional concerns over the reported hiring of previous human rights violators from other agencies to fill the ranks of the police. This would be in direct violation of the peace accords (Human Rights Watch, 1993, p. 95).

It’s important to also note that the government had not yet established a solid means to handle human rights investigations on its own as the Human Rights Ombudsman was still up and coming—with a deadline to meet.

Although the office of the human rights ombudsman increasingly made pronouncements on human rights cases, it was faced with the need to improve dramatically its capacity to investigate and respond to cases if it was to fully assume its responsibilities by the time of ONUSAL’s scheduled departure in early 1994. (Human Rights Watch, 1993, p. 98)

Although the PDDH funding will be doubled for the coming year (from its current \$2.5 million level), it’s not enough to cover the amount of reports it received (DoS, 1994a).

The Ad Hoc Commission’s report was acted upon as the “last of 103 officers identified by this commission as responsible for human rights were removed from active

duty” (DoS, 1994a). This was actually done with the help of the Truth Commission’s implication of the minister and vice-minister of defense in the murder of the Jesuit priests in 1989. Minister of Defense Rene Emilio Ponce resigned several days before the release of the Truth Commission’s findings; however, he and several others did not step down until July (Human Rights Watch, 1993, p. 95). In related events, the State Department had “suspended \$11 million in military aid in February, after the army high command refused to implement the purge” (Human Rights Watch, 1993, p. 99).

Also as a part of the Truth Commission’s report, it came to light that the U.S. was more aware than it let on regarding death squad activities during the war. At this revelation, Secretary of State Warren Christopher appointed a panel to review the historical evidence. While some in Congress “labeled [their report] a ‘whitewash.’” the panel found “overall that foreign service personnel had ‘performed creditably’ in advancing human rights” (Human Rights Watch, 1993, p. 99).

The Truth Commission attempted to address problems within the judiciary, recommending “that all fourteen Supreme Court judges be fired. But President Cristiani and the president of the court flatly refused and reforms have been minimal. Most judges do not cooperate with the U.N. mission monitoring human rights and judicial reform” (McColm et al., 1994, pp. 243-244).

Additionally, the Public Defender Law (enacted in 1992) began having an impact. Table 5 shows the decline in complaints of arbitrary detention (from 275 to 185) during this year; however, the real story is in the process of handling detainees.

The police may hold a person for 72 hours before presenting him to court. The practice of obtaining forced confessions during this 72-hour period was reduced through enforcement of the Public Defender Law, which guarantees counsel to indigent defendants from the moment of detention.

Public defenders are now regularly called by the police to provide representation to detained suspects. From March 1992 to February 1993, public defenders freed from incarceration approximately 50 percent of their clients. . . . The public defender's office tripled in size over the last 2 years, but there still was an inadequate number of public defenders. (DoS, 1994a)

In diametric opposition to the purposes of the Truth and Ad Hoc Commissions, the National Assembly passed an law providing amnesty “to those convicted or accused of political and related common crimes during the conflict, including those named in the Truth Commission report” (DoS, 1994a). This amnesty law was passed just 5 days after the Truth Commission's report was released (DoS, 1994a).

Within the mix of positive and negative developments was the downsizing of the military—cut by 50 percent (refer to Figure 1). This effort, accompanying the purge, is important due to the dominant role and impact the military historically carried into the political and human rights arenas.

Events of 1994.

With the 1994 presidential election won in a runoff by Armando Calderon Sol (mayor of San Salvador representing the National Republican Alliance—ARENA) as a backdrop, Human Rights Watch stated that “the human rights situation in El Salvador showed some improvement over the political violence that was seen at the end of 1993” (Human Rights Watch, 1994, p. 90). Also in a related political development the FMLN “emerged from the vote as the country's second political force” (Karatnycky and the Freedom House Survey Team, 1995, p. 231) although they “seemed on the verge of splitting” (Karatnycky et al., p. 233). This election “was the first in which all political groups from right to left were able to participate, a significant step toward consolidating

the peace process following the 1992 accords that ended the civil war” (Karatnycky et al., p. 233). ONUSAL declared the elections as “acceptable” (Human Rights Watch, 1994, p. 90).

The State Department noted that “the Government acted to improve the institutional context for human rights” by addressing the recommendations of the Ad Hoc and Truth Commissions (DoS, 1995a). The actions discussed in the following paragraphs illustrate more moves to provide the mechanism of a system to better address the concerns and ultimately resolve issues. The statistics addressed on Table 5 indicate that that progress was also being made in practice.

New appointees by President Calderon Sol appear to be responsive to human rights issues. The new Vice Minister of Public Security and the PNC Director both agreed to transfer some members out of the PNC and send others to the police academy (Human Rights Watch, 1994, p. 90). These actions would be in response to questions aired over the last year regarding the placement of previous violators on the force. Also referencing the PNC, the government appointed an Inspector General for the organization (DoS, 1995). You’ll notice the input of that office regarding complaints on Table 5 as we review upcoming years.

Other positive actions came in the realm of the judiciary, as all the Supreme Court justices did not receive the votes necessary to retain their seats. (This was the group the were not fired and did not resign upon the Truth Commission’s recommendation the year before.) “The new justices were widely accepted as a great improvement, and immediately began to exercise the kind of independence and professionalism which the previous court lacked” (Human Rights Watch, 1994, p. 91). They immediately appointed

a “competent” director for the Institute of Legal Medicine (their forensic expert), and implemented a review of all judges in an effort to address impunity (Human Rights Watch, 1994, p. 91).

Several riots had broken out in the prison system over the year—with dozens of deaths and injuries—highlighting the major problems. Note on Table 5 the issue of high numbers of inmates that are actually awaiting trial or sentencing. Seventy to eighty percent each year are still awaiting trial, vice serving a sentence for the conviction of a crime—however, the figures do show improvement as we proceed through the years (DoS, 1995a, 1999a).

Events of 1995.

Because of some changes in monitoring persons and agencies during 1995, there is not much data within any reports of human rights abuses for that year. ONUSAL (now known as MINUSAL) was phasing out its operation after having closed its regional offices and only had a dozen on staff by midyear. With its human rights division shut down at the end of March, the overall mission for those that remained was “monitoring unfinished commitments in the peace accords, especially land transfers and public security issues” (Human Rights Watch, 1995, pp. 90-91).

The PDDH was under different management—a new ombudsman having been elected in March. While the election of Victoria Marina de Aviles was termed “perhaps the most encouraging development in the overall human rights situation” (Human Rights Watch, 1995, p. 92), the organization was still lacking in the necessary abilities for investigation (DoS, 1996a). Recall that the abilities (in terms of both experience and

funding) had been a concern over previous years as ONUSAL's projected departure date neared.

Adding to the void of reporting and investigation was another vacancy—that in the PNC Inspector General position between April and October. The Vice Minister of Public Security (who was new having come on board the previous year) had fired the incumbent IG “for poor performance” (DoS, 1996a); this absence of an Inspector General hurt PNC credibility, but the new one was widely regarded as a solid choice” (DoS, 1996a).

In the light of less statistics, Human Rights Watch noted that violations that year “did not take place on the massive scale to which human rights monitors had become accustomed prior to the signing of the 1992 peace accord” (Human Rights Watch, 1996, p. 90). Freedom House took a step further in stating that the “government’s failure to fully implement the 1992 peace accords underscored the continued weakness of the country’s democratic process” (Karatnycky et al., 1996, p. 214). In fact President Calderon Sol continued to promise:

full compliance with the peace accords. But as of December 1995, two months after implementation after implementation of the accords was to have been completed, the U.N. noted that major problems remained regarding the program to transfer land to former FMLN and army combatants, and mounting human rights and corruption with the new National Civilian Police [PNC]. (Karatnycky et al., p. 217)

The issue of the PNC can be considered an important concern as “the formation of a professional, apolitical police force was generally seen as the most transcendent potential contribution of the historic 1992 peace accords” (Human Rights Watch, 1995, p. 91). With only 8,000 of the 20,000-planned PNC officers on the street (the full complement to be in place by the end of 1996) (Human Rights Watch, p. 91), more

needed to be done, and some actions were being taken. Although coming under fire from various groups, President Calderon Sol had ordered the military to help the PNC in conducting patrols in rural areas where rising crime was a concern (DoS, 1996a). Obviously, this is not a great answer to the problem; however, as public perceptions of criminal activity and danger grew, the government had to counter with some action—this is a “catch-22.”

Adding to the problem, there was a rise in vigilante activity—“fighting crime and, in some cases, fighting corrupt public officials” for which the PNC set up a special unit “to investigate political and organized crime in 1994” (DoS, 1996a). The unit was reasonably successful, but still lacked “technical and personnel resources” (DoS).

The judicial end of fighting crime was also battling internal and external factors. Progress had been made as “some 20 judges have been forced to resign since the judicial reform process began, and others were under investigation” (DoS, 1996a). Additionally, the new Supreme Court membership which took the bench in 1994, were “moving deliberately . . . [and] displayed relatively greater energy in judicial reform” (DoS).

Despite this progress:

problems of corruption and incompetence in the judicial system remained. Although judicial salaries are now high enough to attract qualified judges, this is still not the case for prosecutors or defense lawyers. Training programs are insufficient to compensate for inadequate university training, low pay, and poor supervision. While the new laws emphasizing rights represent a marked improvement, they also add to the confusion of requiring new levels of coordination, comprehension, and thoughtful application on the part of court personnel. (DoS, 1996a)

In the best news of the year, “In March, the U.N. Human Rights Commission (UNHRC), citing the reduction in complaints of human rights violations, removed El Salvador from its list of countries subject to monitoring and ended the role of the

UNHRC Independent Expert” (DoS, 1996a). With this group’s departure the U.N. has only one oversight body remaining in the country—that being their Verification Office (ONUV)—whose task it is to oversee implementation of the overall peace process in El Salvador (Amnesty International, 1997). This year is noteworthy in that, it appears at least to this researcher, that the eye of watch-dog organizations turned to other “more important areas of the world.” As the U.N. moved out of its previously significant role, Human Rights Watch also ended its specific coverage of El Salvador, no longer devoting a part of its future annual reports to the country.

Events of 1996.

The State Department summed up activity this year saying, “The Government’s human rights record improved somewhat” (DoS, 1997a). El Salvador’s formal ratification had come from the National Assembly of the U.N. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Amnesty International, 1997). However, there appeared to be some spoilers.

In reviewing the data on Table 5, we see a renewed reporting emphasis to a larger number of reported violations by the PDDH—much higher than those reported by ONUSAL two years earlier. “Many allegations of torture and ill-treatment by the PNC” (Amnesty International, 1997) were accompanied by “a continued increase in violent crime, the resurgence of far-right and leftist paramilitary groups, and corruption” (Karatnycky et al., 1997, p. 227). It’s important to specify that “polls indicate that the PDDH retains a high level of public trust” (DoS, 1997a).

Public demand continued for internal security, leading to the enactment of an Emergency Law against Common and Organized Crime. While the law “won the support of all political parties represented in the Legislative Assembly, except the FMLN” (DoS, 1997a), several critics to include PDDH were challenging its constitutionality, and were awaiting a Supreme Court ruling (DoS, 1997a).

Many other factors noted in the State Departments report for the previous year remain the same this year to include the pay, training and educational issues for court officers.

Events of 1997.

As democracy took a step forward in El Salvador, Freedom House cited that this year’s elections “were a marked improvement over those held in 1994” (Karatnycky et al., 1998a, p. 230):

Political rights improved significantly in 1997, as the . . . (FMLN) nearly equaled the vote of the ruling . . . (ARENA) in March congressional and municipal elections that were generally free and fair. Not only did ARENA accept the loss without threatening extra-legal action; the once-feared army remained neutral and the new National Civilian Police (PNC) enforced election laws in a professional manner. (Karatnycky et al., p. 229)

Although not necessarily tied together, after these elections in March, the U.N. Verification Office was closed in July. Their final report concluded:

Changes to the military forces had transformed them into a professional body functioning according to the mandate given them by the peace accords. The report welcomed advances in establishing a new Supreme Court of Justice, but regretted the slow progress in the purging of dishonest or incompetent judges and judicial officials as provided for in the peace accords. The report also urged the implementation of recommendations towards national reconciliation, such as compensation for victims of human rights violations. (Amnesty International, 1998a)

It was these developments that undoubtedly raised the Freedom House rating for El Salvador for the 1997-98 report (refer to Table 6). The civil liberties side of the equation remained the same as the ratings moved up overall from “3,3, Partly Free” (where it had been since 1992-93) to 2,3 Free (Freedom House, 2001). Note that under the Freedom House formula, this is the first time the country has been rated as “Free” since 1975-76. The ratings have remained at this same level up to their most recent report, released within the last few months (Freedom House, 2001).

Crime, especially in rural areas (Karatnycky et al., 1998, p. 229) continues to be a major concern. And, as we see from the numbers on Table 5, the complaints are a bit mixed; however, in the grand scheme, the PNC received 47.5 percent of all complaints registered by the PDDH in the first nine months of 1997. The only positive signal in that number was that it continued a downward trend from 51.2 and 57.3 percent of the total complaints registered between June 1996-May 1997 and June 1995-May 1996 respectively (DoS, 1998a).

The increase in complaints are very noticeable; however, part of this may be because the public feels more comfortable in raising the issues with the human rights agencies more than ever before. In fact, “despite the high number of human rights complaints, public opinion polls gave the PNC relatively high marks amidst general dissatisfaction with government institutions as a whole” (DoS, 1998a).

The National Police Inspector General’s Office noted several factors in the concentration of complaints:

The PNC’s authority to use force in carrying out arrests; its inexperience (the 1992 Peace Accords created the PNC as a replacement for the old, discredited security forces, and the first PNC deployment occurred in

March 1993); the difficulty of its work in the face of critical, often violent crime levels; and a continuing need for training in human rights. (DoS, 1998a)

Indeed the numbers of police officers both incarcerated on prison rights charges (“nearly 100”) as well as those killed over the past four years since the new force was created (“more than 170”) are troubling (Karatnycky et al., 1998, p. 230).

Conditions in both the judiciary and prison system continue to be of great concern. In a poll conducted by the Catholic University, over 70 percent indicated “little to no confidence” in the judicial systems with 56 percent having “little to no confidence in the Supreme Court” (DoS, 1998a). The prison system was overcrowded with poor conditions—with the government seeking to improve “food, medical care, and rehabilitation facilities” (DoS, 1998a).

Lastly, relating to both legislative and judicial activities, in November 1996, the National Assembly:

Approved a revised Penal Code which reinstated so-called extrajudicial confessions. Such confessions can be made to, among others, members of the National Civil Police when a judge is not available, and are admissible as evidence in court. Although confessions are subject to certain rules, their reinstatement caused concern because of their past association with the use of duress and torture. (Amnesty International, 1997)

“[However] the Penal Code [also] created new offences such as torture and enforced disappearance, and stated that these crimes would not be subject to statutes of limitations. The Codes were due to come into effect in January 1998” (Amnesty International, 1998a).

Events of 1998.

The major development of the year came in the political realm. Only 1 year after it appeared the FMLN had a meaningful opportunity in upcoming presidential elections, based on the 1997 congressional and municipal elections, it:

all but ruined its chances to wrest control of the presidency from the long-ruling . . . (ARENA) in March 1999 elections due to infighting in the opposition. . . . the party split into hardline Marxist and reformist camps. The two factions fought bitterly over who was to control the party, as well as whether it should support an ARENA sponsored project for a national development commission. Although Social Democratic leader Facundo Guardado, himself a former guerrilla leader and a leading reformist, emerged as the party's presidential nominee, the party was under renewed scrutiny by business and social sectors that worried that the party was still committed to social revolution. (Karatnycky et al., 1999, pp. 172-173)

More directly on the human rights scene, accountability of the PNC is still a problem. "Scores of policemen have been imprisoned on rights charges. Some 200 police officers have been killed in the five years since the force was created" (Karatnycky et al., 1999, p. 174).

The Supreme Court took a major step in addressing impunity. With the case stemming from a private citizen, the court declared the General Amnesty Law for the Consolidation of Peace unconstitutional. This law, passed in 1993, "provided protection from prosecution for all those responsible for carrying out or covering up human rights abuses during the civil war, including judicial officials [passed only days after the Truth Commission had released its report]" (DoS, 1994a; Amnesty International, 1999a).

Additional actions included the Penitentiary (Sentencing) Code. This legislation:

stresses criminal rehabilitation and prevention of future crimes and stipulates the provision of humane conditions in prisons as well as the separation of violent offenders and pretrial detainees. . . . The new code also provides alternatives to imprisonment for nonviolent offenders, designed to reduce prison overcrowding. (DoS, 1999a)

The action is already achieving results. “By the end of September, 150 prisoners received paroles under the new code, which has more liberal requirements than its predecessor” (DoS, 1999a).

There was also a change in the Ombudsman’s Office as Victoria Marina de Aviles ended her term. There was a 4-month gap in the appointment of a successor, Eduardo Penate Polanco due to disagreements over the appointment (Amnesty International, 1999a).

The succession at the PDDH came as “the Government’s human rights record improved somewhat; however, there were problems in some areas” (DoS, 1999a). Indeed some of the statistics, as document by the PDDH did show improvement from 1997. This is even more important when considering that the PDDH “from June 1997 to May 1998, . . . found human rights violations in an average of 9.5 percent of all the complaints it accepted for investigation (covering all categories of human rights)” (DoS). This report came at the culmination of a 3-year period when the number of PNC officers grew from 7,100 to over 17,000 (June 1995-May 1998) (DoS).

We see also a continuing downward trend in persons being held awaiting trial or sentencing. The judiciary, among other activities, had been busy hiring more public defenders (up to 279 in 1998 from 113 in 1997—147 percent) (DoS, 1999a). Although inefficiency and incompetence weren’t rectified, and some “criminals convicted of serious crimes were released on parole” (DoS, 1999a),

implementation of new criminal and sentencing codes in April had a significant impact on the problems of violation of due process, prison overcrowding, overburdened court dockets, and trial delays. . . . By August, the courts cleared out 20,000 backlogged cases. The Supreme Court made further progress in increasing the professionalism of the

judiciary, but disciplining or dismissing corrupt or incompetent judges remained a slow process. (DoS, 1999a)

Prisons are still in dire straits; in June a riot involving approximately 1,000 inmates occurred in one prison. Overall prisons stand at 28 percent over capacity (DoS, 1999a).

Although not particularly addressed in previous years by this researcher, similar comments documented that the government also continued to demonstrate:

willingness to discuss human rights issues and problems with international, local, and nongovernmental organizations. . . . Numerous local NGO's operated freely as did various international human rights groups, including migration and other humanitarian and technical assistance groups. International and domestic NGO's were required to register with the Government under the terms of the 1996 NGO registration law. (DoS, 1999a)

While the numbers still indicate problems, it sounds like problems are being addressed—perhaps not as quickly as anyone would like; however, a turnaround appears to be in progress.

One other comment in the State Department's annual assessment is extremely important. In the first time any such statement has been published: "Civilian authorities maintained effective control over the military and security forces" (DoS, 1999a, 2000a, 2001e). In just a few years we've seen the military downsize significantly (well on its way to be one third of its size in 1990), and evolve from "death squads" to become a "professional force" as characterized by ONUV final report (Amnesty International, 1998a).

Events of 1999.

The March 1999 presidential election, termed a "free and fair process" (DoS, 2000a), resulted in Francisco Flores (of the incumbent ARENA party) being "swept to

victory” (Freedom House, 2000a). He took office in June after defeating Facundo Guardado of the FMLN by 22.5 percent in the initial round of voting (Freedom House, 2000a). Although having the splinter problems over the last year, the FMLN still managed to take one third of the legislative seats in the National Assembly. With seven other parties holding seats, the ARENA party holds a one-seat majority (DoS, 2000a).

Flores took office in June (DoS, 2000a), promising “that public security would be a priority issue, in a small country where on average 17 murders are committed each day” (Freedom House, 2000a). He also walked into hotbed issues ranging from allegations of corruption regarding aid provided after Hurricane Mitch (Amnesty International, 2000a) to public sector employee strikes (Freedom House, 2000a).

The State Department’s annual report recorded: “There continued to be some problems in the Government’s human rights record; however, the Government’s performance continued to improve somewhat” (DoS, 2000a). This, during a time when Eduardo Penate Polanco (placed in the office of PDDH in 1998) was facing “strong criticisms . . . made by at least 20 local organizations and hundreds of individual citizens” (Amnesty International, 2000a) in addition to some legislators (DoS, 2000a) stemming from “a marked decrease in the number of reports and recommendations issued and a fall in the number of cases presented” (Amnesty International, 2000a). The Assembly put together a commission to investigate his performance (Amnesty International, 2000a)—he would later resign over misconduct charges in February of 2000 (DoS, 2001e).

Because of these allegations, the numbers showing on Table 5 for 1998/1999 may be less credible than previously entered by the PDDH; however, the additional data coming from both the PNC IG and UID offices show a mixed review of the various

categories. The State Department noted that, “The PNC’s level of professionalism continued to improve, but the force remains understaffed, undertrained, underfunded, and short on practical experience” (DoS, 2000a)—thus, similar issues continue to provide challenges.

The PNC still faces close scrutiny for human rights abuse complaints, but more is at issue as the death toll of officers continues to mount—“some 348 . . . in the six years since the force was created” (Freedom House, 2000a). Training continues to be a priority. “Working together to improve PNC human rights awareness, the PDDH and the National Public Security Academy continued to expand and refine the human rights content of the standard curriculum for the academy’s police officer basic training program” (DoS, 2000a).

Legislation aided the judiciary in facilitating advances in both prosecution and preserving individual rights. The National Assembly legislated changes to the Criminal Procedures and Penal and Penitentiary (Sentencing) Codes. The changes provided for more severe penalties for some crimes while adding new crimes into the code. Reforms also “strengthened the legal protection afforded to children and the disabled” (DoS, 2000a).

Personnel programs within the judiciary are also having an impact. The pay and benefits for court officers (judges, prosecutors and public defenders) increase sufficiently enough to attract well-qualified individuals” (DoS, 2000a)—recall before that pay for prosecutors and public defenders was lagging behind (DoS, 1996a). More public defenders continue to be brought on board. There are now 339 within the Public Defender’s Office. Compared to 279 in 1998 and 113 in 1997, that’s a 200 percent

increase in staffing (DoS, 2000a). “Increased judicial training programs and . . . evaluations and monitoring of judges conducted by the National Judicial Counsel and the Supreme Court” (DoS, 2000a) together are aiding the protection of individual rights within the courts (DoS, 2000a).

Meanwhile the number of prison inmates awaiting trial continues to decrease. Although the flow from 1997 to 1999 shows only a decrease of only 4 percent of the total prison population awaiting trial, the real numbers demonstrate a much better figure. In actuality there are over 21 percent less total inmates in prison still awaiting trial as the actual number declined from 6,167 in 1997 to 4,867 in 1999 (DoS, 2000a).

Although inefficiency is still a concern, these actions seem to provide solid direction in both quality and quantity as the number of backlogged cases continues to reduce steadily—28,539 cases resolved (DoS, 2000a).

Events of 2000.

Politically, the FMLN recovered from the sizable loss of the last presidential race to win a majority of the Assembly seats in what was characterized as free and fair elections in March. ARENA still maintains a “working majority in coalition with the conservative National Conciliation Party” (DoS, 2001e). While some would view this as monumental, others might consider it the normal chain of events as the FMLN has proven to be competitive in previous elections—the difficulties encountered along the way have largely been as a result of internal problems within the party.

As we close out the final year contributing to this study, the State Department stated, “The Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens; however,

there were serious problems in some areas” (DoS, 2001e). As noted earlier in addressing performance questions in 1999, the Ombudsman resigned over misconduct charges in February. He had been charged by the Attorney General “with diverting funds from international donors while he worked in a previous job, and the Legislative Assembly was preparing to remove him for negligence. During the search for a replacement, the deputy has stepped in as an interim, but lacked authority without the formal confirmation of the Assembly as the Ombudsman (DoS, 2001e). A search for a replacement was still ongoing as of the end of 2000, and this researcher could not find any source that could provide an update to include in this report.

Statistics still assert the PNC still has human right abusers within its ranks. In addition to those kept by the PDDH are numbers recorded by a special presidential commission looking specifically into police misconduct. This commission proposed “reforms to PNC regulations to expedite discipline and dismissals, including the establishment of special courts to review cases of alleged misconduct” (DoS, 2001e). The results appear to be mixed, and it’s difficult to know what events occurred during the current vice previous years. (It’s especially difficult within the category of extrajudicial killings.)

Special measures have been authorized for the PNC Chief to combat the misconduct, coming out of the recommendations of the president’s commission:

In August the Assembly approved a temporary measure that allowed the chief of police for 120 days to remove officers charged with crimes or inadequate performance following an internal PNC investigation by the office of the Inspector General. In December, the Assembly extended the measure for an additional 45 days. By year’s end, the police force had dismissed more than 1,500 persons under special decree and preexisting disciplinary procedures, and the special police courts had acquitted more than 200 persons. (DoS, 2001e)

In comments regarding these actions, “some assembly deputies and the press questioned the transparency of the process and the fairness of its application and charged that high ranking officers remained immune from scrutiny” (DoS, 2001e). Thus, questions still remain. Another piece of legislation “strengthened the role of the of the PNC Inspector General’s office, making it a quasi-independent body within the PNC, charged with investigating allegations of police misconduct and reporting directly to the chief” (DoS, 2001e). While there may be some controversy, we see the potential for a more effective mechanism to be in place to break down impunity. Human rights awareness training continues to be a part of police officer basic training (DoS, 2001e).

There was a dark shadow cast over the judiciary as it appeared that “almost 450 prosecutors and judges might have falsified their credentials or obtained them illegitimately, and another 83 persons might have been involved in nepotism” (DoS, 2001e). The Attorney General was investigating these allegations, along with others that included the potential leaking of information by prosecutors’ offices, which may have tainted investigations, preventing prosecutions (DoS, 2001e)—no update on this situation was available as this report went to print. The assembly passed a measure similar to that giving special dispensation to the police chief to the attorney general—giving him the authority to expedite the removal of undesirable employees. This dispensation was authorized for use during a 120-day period, again similar to the PNC authority (DoS, 2001e).

Prison conditions, especially regarding overcrowding remain poor. With the advent of the new codes previously discussed, the prison population had fallen

significantly between 1997 and 1999. However, it was on the rise with overcrowding in both men's and women's facilities (DoS, 2001e).

Although not reminded throughout this chronological accounting, the military has continued to support the PNC conducting rural area patrols, stemming from a presidential decision in 1995. Although considered professional, and under the effective control of civilians, this goes directly against the mission of the military mission—to maintain external security (DoS, 2001e). In a separate action in March of this year, the President directed units from all three military services (Air Force, Navy, and selected Army) to work with the police as Joint Tasks Groups in antinarcotics operations (DoS, 2001e).

In one other event which appears negative on the surface, but for which only time will tell the story, the Supreme Court declared the controversial General Amnesty Law from 1993 unconstitutional.

The court ruled that the law was constitutional but that in cases involving military personnel or civil servants involved in crimes which contravened the Constitution and had been committed between 1989 and 1994, it should be judicial officials who decide whether to prosecute or not. Although the decision would allow some cases to be prosecuted, the majority of human rights violations committed during the armed conflict, including massacres in which hundreds of civilians were killed, took place before 1989. (Amnesty International, 2001a)

The outcome of this legislative decision will be dependent upon the way the court officers carry out their discretion in deciding what crimes to prosecute. We may see, as we've seen in Guatemala, that certain amnesty provisions were "narrowly interpreted," and "high profile" offenders not granted immunity under the law (DoS, 1998b).

This concludes the historical narrative. As will be noted at the conclusion of the review for each country involved in this study, admittedly there is no way to cover all events over a 10-year plus period in a totally comprehensive manner. This researcher has

attempted to take major contributing activities, positive and negative, in the context of human rights issues. These are intended to provide indications of trends in the human rights climate within each country.

Now let's look at couple of sidelights that bear a special look prior to throwing student survey data into the pool.

Additional Information

Overall Aid Perspective.

It was noted earlier, in the first chapter of this study, that there are many more types of aid in addition to military assistance, which the U.S. government may provide to a specific country through a variety of agencies. While the countries involved in this study were selected, among other reasons, because of the limited military assistance provided during the decade of the 1990s, that is not to say that there were not additional U.S. dollars flowing in under a variety of programs.

In the case of El Salvador the aid package has been substantial. Table 7 offers information regarding the types and amounts of aid provided by year and program. The chart cites economic and military assistance and totals that year to year; the final column on the far right denotes additional funding specifically for rule of law assistance. The rule of law data is provided from a GAO study that looked at that category of assistance for the specific 6-year period of 1993-98 (GAO, 1999a). As an additional fact for the period of time encompassed by this study, El Salvador (with \$40.7 million) and Haiti (with \$137.9 million) accounted for "just over 50 percent of the regional total [for rule of law funding]. . . . Haiti was a special case [during that period as the U.S.] provided large

amounts of assistance . . . to restore order and democracy after a coup in 1991” (GAO, 1999a, p. 10).

Table 7

U.S. Economic & Military Assistance to El Salvador, FY '90-01 (Dollars in Thousands)

Year	IMET ^a	DA	CSD	ESF	PL 480	Peace Corps	FMF	FMS Grants	Total	Rule of Law Assistance
1990	1,430	67,800		180,000	39,763			97,000	385,993	
1991	957	64,118		180,000	39,886		90,000		374,961	
1992	1,354	55,000		120,000	32,812		85,000		294,166	
1993	300	55,000		160,000	30,000		40,000		285,300	9,177
1994	400	44,000		90,000		664	2,700		137,764	3,030
1995	404	--	--		--	--		--	404	12,506
1996	535	41,604				1,023			43,162	9,207
1997	455	835							1,290	4,198
1998	512	34,033		1,000	1,623	1,478			38,646	2,598
1999	491	20,050	11,378			1,771			33,690	
2000	523	19,358	10,645			2,049			32,575	
2001										
(E)	525	23,297	10,138	1,500					35,460	
2002										
(R)	800	19,403	9,700	21,000		2,355	3,500		56,758	
Total	8,686	444,498	41,861	753,500	144,084	9,340	221,200	97,000	1,720,169	40,708

Note. Dashes indicate information not available. IMET = International Military Education & Training. DA = Development Assistance. CSD = Child Survival & Diseases. ESF = Economic Support Fund. PL 480 = Public Law 480; Food Assistance. FMF = Foreign Military Financing. FMS Grants = Foreign Military Sales Grants. (E) = Estimate. (R) = Recommended. ^aInformation derived from DSCA (1999); remainder of table from Personal Communication from S. Duncan (DoS) derived from various annual Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ): Foreign Operations.

To be clear, the rule of law funds came from a variety of sources—“at least 35 entities from various U.S. departments and agencies”—including DoD (GAO, 1999a, p. 2). USAID supplied approximately 64 percent of these funds (GAO, 1999a, p. 2), and oftentimes funds within DA and ESF categories incorporate rule of law funding (G. Thome, personal communication, July 2, 2001). All or some of these funds may be

included within other categories shown on Table 7. Therefore they are listed as a separate category/column and not included in the “Total” column within the chart.

This, in no way, is presumed to be the total amount, but should be a significant portion of the aid provided through official government channels. It is intended to provide a better idea as to the variety of funding sources and potentially extensive dollar amounts that could be granted.

You may note that the largest year of rule of law assistance, 1995 was a year when apparently little other economic and military assistance source of funding was granted. The numbers may be a bit deceiving as good source data could not be found to confirm the lack of funding for the categories designated with dashes in Table 7. (The same lack of information was true for 1995 in looking at Guatemala and Nicaragua.) The political decision-making environment could be implied; however, potentially most valuable would be the assessment that the variety of funds permits the U.S. government to specifically target areas of concern for aid programs. While this may be considered a good feature of grants, it does not preclude the country (in this case El Salvador) from short-funding other programs for which grants are provided and using internal dollars for other budgetary issues (fungibility) (Nice & Fredericksen, 1995, pp. 64-65). You will recall that it was specifically cited that ESF funds “enable a recipient to devote more of its own resources to defense and security purposes [or other national priorities] than it could otherwise do without serious economic or political consequences” (Samelson, 1994, p. 648).

In comparing El Salvador to Guatemala and Nicaragua in terms of the overall amount of aid coming in from the U.S. over the years, El Salvador wins that contest

hands down—doubling to almost tripling the other two (which between them are on fairly equal footing). (There are comparable tables for the other countries respectively in Chapters 5 and 6.) IMET dollars have been more easily acquired by El Salvador, especially in the early 1990s, but keep in mind that Nicaragua received/used no IMET funding whatsoever between 1990 and 1996. Guatemala continues to have special conditions placed formally on use of IMET funds, and recent years' funding provide almost twice the amount of education and training for El Salvador than either Guatemala or Nicaragua. All three receive comparable amounts in Child Survival and Diseases (CSD), and Guatemala and Nicaragua receive more Peace Corps funding. Regardless of the differences in actual dollars, in terms of trends, all three countries within this study have faced substantially less economic support from the United States (easy to see when comparing Table 7 with Tables 12 and 17).

Funding for El Salvador has remained fairly constant by category in most recent year (since 1998). There is a proposed substantial increase proposed for FY 2002 in Economic Support Fund (ESF)—an increase from only \$1.5M in 2001 to \$21M in 2002. Bear in mind that this is only in the proposal stage as of this time. Additionally, closer to home within the context of this study, El Salvador will go from \$525,000 in 2001 to \$800,000 in 2002 should the proposals go through the budgeting process. The overall IMET funding proposal for 2002 would increase overall IMET funding from \$57,875,000 to \$65,000,000.

In the long term and in the context of this study, the emphasis needs to be placed on the fact that the variety of packages that further democratization, rule of law, and human rights issues, make it difficult to truly evaluate any single program on its own

merits. In essence, they provide more variables to be considered influencing the outcomes of all programs.


Military Strength.

The country of El Salvador experienced a massive military draw down over the decade of the 1990s. This is extremely important considering the major role the military played in human rights violations at the beginning of that period, as civil conflict neared an end in 1992. As noted in narrative information above (during the 1997-98 time frame), the military was pronounced a “professional force” within the ONUV final report (Amnesty International, 1998a). One year later, the State Department evaluated: “Civilian authorities maintained effective control over the military” (DoS, 1999a). This comment was reiterated in the annual reports for 1999 and 2000 as well (DoS, 2000a, 2001e). Figure 1 provides a visual perspective of the military’s downsizing, and the transformation of the National Police.

All branches have absorbed the drop in military manpower over the last decade. The Navy has cut manpower by almost two-thirds (2,200 to 700), and the Air Force by over one half (2,400 to 1,100). However, the extremely large size of the Army in 1990 has resulted in the large raw numbers of manpower losses—40,000 to 16,800—almost two-thirds (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990 & 2000).

Actual numbers and comparison with Guatemala and Nicaragua are contained in Table 3. In comparing the three countries, El Salvador and Nicaragua are similar in that the most dramatic cuts have come from the formal military. While Guatemala has made

substantial military cuts, the paramilitary organizations have been disbanded, causing the most significant impact.



E-IMET Student Survey Information/Data

El Salvador Survey Response.

The survey of previous E-IMET students was the cornerstone of this research. As stated in Chapter 3, survey data was sought from attendees of specific courses that incorporated human rights issues within course objectives. Within the list of eight

courses, El Salvadoran students had attended five of them over the years; survey responses were received from students representing all five courses. The bulk of the students attended between 1995 and the present.

All but one of the schools provided this researcher with the dates and number of attendees to the courses that they sponsored prior to the release of the survey. The one exception was the Center for Civil-Military Relations, which provided limited dates and student numbers (for course P309070) at the outset, but was able to provide a full accounting after the surveys had been returned to the researcher. Thus, some of the student numbers included in this report were provided within days of the report's conclusion. Due to this agency's lack of an electronic data base and time for the staff to research after-action reports for each class, this data was difficult for the school provide. However, students from their course were sought, and provided a significant response—almost half of the respondents from El Salvador had attended this course.

To reiterate Chapter 3, no names of students were provided to this researcher to ensure that participation was strictly voluntary. Table 8 depicts the numbers of students that attended each course each year since the inception of E-IMET.

With the class information from the Center for Civil-Military Relations, the overall percentage of responses for El Salvador was accurately calculated at 8.5 percent. While this researcher would have desired a much better return rate, those that were returned provided meaningful data. Be aware that of the three countries participating in this study, El Salvador provided the greatest response to the survey in numbers of returned questionnaires (66 respondents who attended 68 courses). Nicaragua provided the highest rate of return at 24 percent, even though it had the smallest number of

attendees (146). Guatemala had little participation in the survey with a return rate of 5.2 percent (of 231 attendees). This issue will be addressed in Chapter 5. General conclusions and comments derived from the overall response will be addressed in Chapter 7.

Table 8

Course Attendees/Survey Respondents Comparison—El Salvador

Year	B171801		B171425		P309051		P309061		P309070		Total Students by Year	
	Att	Resp	Att	Resp	Att	Resp	Att	Resp	Att	Resp	Att	Resp
1991			2	0							2	0
1992			2	0							2	0
1993			1	0							1	0
1994									35	0	35	0
1995					62	5			50	0	112	5
1996			2	0			80	0			82	0
1997			2	1			80	0	77	0	159	1
1998	1	0	2	2			84	0	62	3	149	5
1999			2	2					91	3	93	5
2000			2	0					75	1	77	1
2001	1	0							88	23	89	23
Unknown Date ^a		2						6		8		16
Unknown Course ^b												12
Total Students by Course	2	2	15	5	62	5	244	6	478	38	801	68
Response Rate %	100		33.3		8.1		2.5		7.9		8.5	

Note. Attendee numbers were available/obtained from all schools. Of the students who attended P309070, one also attended B171425 and another one also attended P309051. Thus 2 students attended multiple courses.

^aNumbers in Unknown Date row specifies respondents that indicated no particular year of the course attended, but did indicate the course. ^bThe number in the Unknown Course row specifies respondents that indicated no particular course or dates that they attended.

Within El Salvador, the response rates for the courses conducted in the United States were very commendable (100 percent for B171801 and 33.3 percent for B171425); however, realize that it's easier to maintain records (in the electronic data base) for those

courses. For the courses conducted by Mobile Education Teams (METs) in-country, after-action reports were the primary source of data used to contact students—and the in-country advisors were largely “on their own” based on the records they maintained internally. For P309070, internal record keeping was even more important as this researcher could not provide any significant information regarding the dates or student attendees of this particular course. All things considered, this researcher believes the in-country contacts for El Salvador did a great job in obtaining the varied and all-inclusive response.

One major input that El Salvador provided to this study was the significant number of non-military respondents. Confirmed military respondents were only 12 percent of the total (8 of the 66). This is not to say that none of the other 58 were military as 5 (7.6%) did not disclose their status, and an additional 30 (45%) only noted that they were assigned within the Ministry of Defense (MDN). Some of these could have also been military; however, a great number should be considered civil service employees. When queried, the Security Assistance Officer stated that the block of 30 MDN employees should be considered civilian; that military personnel would have annotated their rank on the form (T. Espinosa, personal communication, July 11, 2001). Regardless, almost a third of the respondents from El Salvador were either non-Defense Ministry civil servants (16.7%), affiliated with NGOs (9%) or elected officials in government (6%).

Overall Survey Evaluation Synopsis.

The findings were very interesting. Generally it can be said that there were very minimal differences in the responses between the countries—especially El Salvador and Nicaragua, which supplied the predominant amount of data. Additionally, there were no course-dependent differences with the exception of one, which dealt specifically with the Informational Program (discussed in Chapter 2). The IP applies only to courses conducted in the United States, and this particular question will be addressed separately later in this discussion. With that exception, and due to the sometimes small number of respondents from some courses in particular and the lack of disparity in the ratings/comments between courses, the general questions addressed in the survey will be addressed in the context of the overall response in Chapter 7.

Lastly, because of the nature of the survey, the most valuable information comes strictly from the frequency of answers to the survey. The survey in English is at Appendix H (in Spanish at Appendix I). The codebook for responses is at Appendix L and the frequency tables for all responses from El Salvador are at Appendix M. (The frequency tables for Guatemala and Nicaragua are at Appendixes N and O respectively; frequency tables consolidated by question for all three countries is at Appendix P.)

Survey Findings.

Table 9 delineates the responses to the key questions, and compares them with the overall findings when all three countries are evaluated jointly. You'll note that there were extremely minimal differences within most answers between El Salvador's

respondents and the overall statistics. General perceptions and answers did not vary much at all between the countries.

Table 9

Survey Responses—El Salvador/Overall Survey Comparison

Survey Question and Description	El Salvador Response	Overall Survey Response (All Respondents)
ID Data: Contact Method	12% provided e-mail addresses	17% e-mail
2. Respondent still in same organization.	89% still in same organization.	91% still in same organization
3. Respondent moved to higher level position since attending the course.	36.4% moved to a higher level position since attending the course.	38% moved to a higher level position since course
4. Respondent anticipates a move to higher level position in the future.	66.7% anticipate moving to a higher level position; 25.8% within the next 5 years.	67% anticipate moving; 38% within 5 years.
5. Does the respondent currently have the opportunity to impact policy.	72.7% currently can impact policy; 56% impact in the areas of military, human rights, or military justice policy.	75% currently impact; 61% impact the specified areas.
6. Respondent expects to be in a position to influence policy in the future.	66.7% expect to be in a position to influence policy in the future; 54% in areas noted in question 5.	63% expect to be in a future position; 54% in the specified areas.
7 & 8. Respondent recalls human rights discussions during the course.	80.3% recall human rights discussions; 81.8% consider personal freedom & human rights more than previously.	81% recall human rights discussions; 86% consider the areas more than before.
9. Course discussions have been helpful for student's leadership abilities or duty performance?	71.2% believed that their course had been helpful in providing leadership capabilities or enhanced duty performance.	80% believed the course helpful in duty performance.
10. Respondent's subsequent contact with school faculty.	Virtually no student noted any contact with the school since course completion. 4.6% didn't know how to contact the school.	4% of students had some contact with school since course completion. 4% didn't know how to contact the school.
11. Rating course aspects using Likert Scale (0-5):		
11a. Knowledge of US systems.	71.7% rated helpful to very helpful.	77% rated helpful to very helpful. Mean: 4.0.
11b. IP Program.	87.5% of applicable students (only those attending CONUS courses) rated helpful to very helpful.	91% rated helpful to very helpful. Only CONUS students that responded to the survey were from El Salvador and Guatemala.
11c. Interaction with US personnel.	74.2% rated helpful to very helpful.	76% rated helpful to very helpful.
11d. Interaction with other personnel within home country.	74.2% rated helpful to very helpful.	77% rated helpful to very helpful.

11e. Interaction with personnel from other countries.	59.1% rated helpful to very helpful (18.2% rated as N/A—likely due to no other countries involved in the course).	64% rated helpful to very helpful (21.7% N/A).
11f. Professional skills enhanced.	71.2% rated helpful to very helpful.	76% rated helpful to very helpful.
11g & h. Additional helpful knowledge or skills	Only 25% provided inputs to these questions, with no large consensus on any particular response. Approx 11% of all respondents specifically noted civil-military relations.	44% provided inputs. Civil-military relations and military justice each received 11-12%, another 8% cited legal procedures as areas of insight.

Much discussion has occurred over the issue of the target audience over the years of security assistance training. Are we reaching the students that need the training—those persons with significant levels of responsibilities, either currently or forthcoming, who can impact policy? The survey response would indicate that the E-IMET program is doing so in El Salvador. Approximately three-fourths of those responding saw themselves in positions to impact policy currently, while two-thirds expected to be in an even better position to impact policy in the future. Most of these perceived their impact in the areas of military, human rights, and military justice policy or issues.

When asked if they remembered human rights-related discussions during their courses, 80.3 percent did recall discussions. Slightly more than those who recalled the discussions, 81.8 percent went a step further to acknowledge that they considered personal freedoms and human rights more than they had prior to their courses. These numbers are telling, not only that students remember curriculum areas, but also moreover tend to apply them. (Note that this percentage, would tend to dispute the findings of the GAO in 1992 cited earlier in Chapter 2; however, the students involved in the GAO study were primarily attending technical skill-related training as opposed to PME or other programs with the human rights emphasis of E-IMET. The focus on human rights would

likely have not been as intense in those technical courses.) In the grander scheme of things the 81.8 percent that consider these areas more than previously may be also be deceptive as some of the respondents may have marked no because they work in areas where those concerns are constantly considered.

Almost three out of every four respondents felt that the course was ultimately helpful to them in performing their duties after their return—helping them in the area of leadership or enhancing duty performance. This input was further reinforced by the 71.2 percent believing the course was helpful to very helpful in building their professional skills (in question 11f).

In all four of the closed-ended (Likert scale) questions (11a, 11c, 11c, and 11e) within the survey applicable to all students, responses would indicate many U.S. target areas for IMET and E-IMET are being addressed and perhaps met. Those include building and enhancing relationships between U.S. and home-country officials as well as providing an environment for dialogue between the civilian and military communities within each country. Almost three out of four answered those facets as being helpful to very helpful. Just as important, very few failed to express an opinion regarding those subjects—less than 10 percent for each question.

The question (11e) addressing enhanced relations between officials of various countries also received a significant response of over 59 percent. This is still likely a solid indicator based on the fact that many of the courses would have included persons only within the country where it was conducted. Although multi-country course participation was not particularly addressed in this survey due to the desire of the researcher to keep the survey brief, the courses conducted in the United States would

have had multiple countries participating. Some of the Mobile Education Teams also could have had a regional flavor—with one country hosting the team and attendees from other countries in Latin America.

The IP program (question 11b) received favorable reviews with 87.5 percent of those attending CONUS courses (which would have been the only ones for whom this question would have been applicable). Those students rated the IP as helpful to very helpful segments of the course.

Questions 11g and 11h were left open-ended by this researcher to expressly provide the opportunity for respondents to provide a more detailed response and/or add any additional comments as to how they saw the course as beneficial. Although only a little over 25 percent of the respondents chose to answer these questions, the answers contained in these, and other “fill-in-the-blank” areas within other questions reinforced each other. Students generally saw the areas of civil-military relations, human rights, legal issues military justice as heavily related to the courses they attended. The answers also indicated that it’s difficult to segregate many of the principles of democratization—subjects such as economics, public safety, social concerns all received attention and were recalled by respondents.

The diversity of some of these answers was the only difference noted between the responses of El Salvador and the other countries—due directly to the diversity of the respondents. As already noted, there were more civilians (among a wide variety of disciplines) that took part in the study from El Salvador. This diversity would also indicate the ease of such courses to integrate a wide variety of topics in consideration of the audience for the course at each conduct.

One other comment to register regarding the student survey is that 12 percent from El Salvador—indicated the availability of e-mail. This is noteworthy, especially in the context of the continuing growth of e-mail as a means of communication and the virtual lack of contact noted between the respondents and the schools that conducted their courses. E-mail may very well hold the key in terms of ease of contact between the two and will be addressed in Chapters 7 and 8.

School Course Director/Instructor Survey Information/Data

The key input that would have come from this instrument was the opportunity provided by each school for additional student contact following their course attendance. Of primary interest is the means of contact. The approximate volume and subjects of discussion for those contacts were also sidelight questions, realizing that it is likely that the schools may not have a tracking system of inquiries of previous students.

Only one response was received between the eight course directors for the courses included in this study. This was from the Center for Civil-Military Relations. Based on the lack of student-noted follow-up contact with the schools, it's likely a reasonable assumption that there was very little basis for each school to respond. Because of the importance of this information, an additional request for responses was dispatched specifying that a negative response was more valuable to the research than the lack of a response from their agency. Still no additional inputs were received.

The lone respondent, CCMR, provides a web site to encourage contact. The degree of its use would also be dependent upon the availability of Internet and e-mail connectivity of course attendees. Although no timing was requested or provided by the

respondent, an approximate total of 15 contacts were noted from El Salvador. Based on the bulk of classes being conducted since 1996, that would lend itself to an average of three contacts per year.

In other comments from CCMR, there appears to be solid support from U.S. embassy officials as they proceed with METs in El Salvador. This was underscored by comments by GAO in a recent study that key embassy officials, including the Ambassador, were heavily involved in planning and coordinating activities. Recall that this was a concern within the Cope/INSS study cited earlier in Chapter 2 (Cope, 1995, p. 50).

Again, the lack of school responses to the short survey requesting their information, along with the void of contact noted within the student responses, would indicate little information to provide.

Conclusion

In beginning the study, this researcher selected El Salvador (as well as Guatemala and Nicaragua) due to the perceived “limited” amount of aid it had received over the years—especially military aid. While “limited” aid may have been applied by some standards, humanitarian assistance through a variety of programs still assisted the country in its development and cannot be discounted (never the intent of this researcher). It is in this context that we must base any and all conclusions.

Although records would indicate that El Salvador had the largest use of IMET/E-IMET between the three countries included in this study, it is difficult to conclude that it (as a stand-alone program) has had a dramatic input into the human rights/rule of law

areas of growth within the country. However, it would be remiss to discount the value of the program based on the information available to us based on the audience it targets and accesses in the overall scheme of U.S. grant programs.

As of this date, under \$9 million dollars of IMET/E-IMET have been provided since the inception of the Expanded IMET program—and it's a very small percentage of U.S. aid going to El Salvador during that same period. While it's difficult to come up with the total aid package due to so many sources, for those supplied to this researcher by the U.S. State Department contacts, it would appear that less than one percent of all aid to El Salvador over the last 10 years came in the form of IMET/E-IMET.

During the previous decade and into the year 2001, the world's perception is that of progress within the human rights arena for El Salvador, especially since the Peace Accords were signed in 1992. Although it may be "minimal" progress from year to year, we've seen the pull out of the United Nations observers (human rights workers in 1995, and the remaining part of the group in 1998), and the solidification and gradual rise in the ratings provided by Freedom House. These have been accompanied by a (perhaps arguable) decline in human rights abuse incidents accompanied by a rise in the airing of complaints to authorities of previous incidents.

As this researcher attempted to provide a concise "blow by blow" account of progress and setbacks year to year, it can be said that laws and other mechanisms to include government and non-governmental agencies have been put in place to facilitate future progress. Reforms have been accomplished in the areas of legal/judicial procedures, civilian police activity, education and training of officials (GAO, 1999b).

The E-IMET program really kicked in as the country was about halfway through its military downsizing effort—at the time (recall between 1993 and 1995) when restrictions were placed on El Salvador forcing it to use IMET money specifically for E-IMET courses. The downsizing in subsequent years has remained on track and the military is seen as a professional force.

E-IMET has provided—especially in El Salvador (based on the numbers and variety of students, and what can be observed from student surveys) a viable avenue to support a variety of democratization efforts. The biggest human rights concern is not necessarily the military, but moreso the National Civilian Police (PNC). However, E-IMET permits officers of the court to attend such courses. Realize also that, although not desirable from most standpoints, the military still provides support for PNC patrols in rural areas (DOS, 2001e). The impact of IMET and E-IMET programs on military that may be supporting these efforts could be important.

It would appear—and would be worthy of further study—that E-IMET has the opportunity to make an impact on current and up-and-coming leadership in the areas of human rights, civil military relations, and rule of law. These were the subject areas of the courses included in this study. In countries such as El Salvador, as well as others in Latin America, the opportunity to further democratization and enhance the relationships between the military, civilian government officials as well as leadership in other government or non-governmental agencies are worthwhile endeavors. Again, the results of the student survey provide favorable indications that E-IMET provides an avenue to do so.

Perhaps some of the most valuable evidence of value of IMET/E-IMET is this research in conjunction with the GAO study concluded in 1999, which looked at rule of law assistance in five Latin American countries (including El Salvador and Guatemala). The GAO found “no instances of duplication of activities and efforts among the U.S. agencies” (GAO, 1999b). This would help substantiate IMET/E-IMET’s viable and valuable target audience and course materials. The real questions involve how fast can we expect countries with the historic difficulties (in some cases tracking back to previous U.S. involvement) to affect real change, how much money and other resources to we (the U.S.) want to put into such programs, and the ultimate related question—do we really need to be there? GAO also noted:

In each of the countries we visited host country government and civil society representatives noted that the presence of the international community particularly the United States was needed, not only for the resources it provides, but also to help encourage government officials to devote the necessary resources to enact, implement, and sustain needed reforms. (GAO, 1999b)

Additional comments and recommendations will be provided in Chapter 7; however, this researcher felt it was important to address particulars of all the variety of data particularly for El Salvador prior to moving on to Guatemala.

Chapter 5

Case Study: Guatemala

Introduction

In considering Guatemala, it must be remembered foremost that on December 29, 1996, a peace accord was signed between the government and the UNRG (Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity) ending 36 years of civil strife. (Coming only 5½ years ago, this is the most recently acquired peace within the three countries composing this study.) Human rights were a key ingredient in this agreement, which took over 6 years of negotiations. Prior to looking at results of the survey information, it's important for us to review what human rights developments that occurred during the years immediately preceding and during the E-IMET program.

The Precursors of U.S. Involvement

In a brief historical view, the United States played a serious role within the initial stages and continuing developments within Guatemala's civil war. The early involvement of U.S. military goes all the way back to 1920, when (using the Monroe Doctrine as rationale) troops stayed in Guatemala for 18 days in order to protect American interests during a period of insurgency (Landau, 1993, p. 149).

In 1945, after a democratic step forward—the first presidential election after a long line of dictatorships brought Juan Jose Arevalo into power. U.S. officials were concerned with his pursuit of land reform as President Arevalo envisioned a series of

reforms that would have dramatically and negatively affected the assets of the United Fruit Company (UFCO) (Landau, 1993, p. 152). This company owned: Not only some 40 percent of the country's most fertile soil, thereby making it difficult for potential banana-growing competitors, but also the nation's railroad and communications systems as well as the port facilities. . . . While the majority of the rural population owned only 4 percent of the total land. . . . [an] absurd class division. (Landau, 1993, p. 152)

The impact of these initiatives would have been felt by U.S. citizens with financial interests in UFCO. Additionally, it was also perceived as a link to communism “in the minds of both the Cold War Democrats under Truman and the crusty Republicans who comprised Eisenhower's cabinet in 1953” (Landau, 1993, p. 149). The situation was even further exacerbated in 1951 as Jacobo Arbenz was elected president, and he continued a trend started by Arevalo of placing communist in posts within the government. The political necessity of doing so (within coalitions), was not taken well as “this scenario ran foul of a primary tenet of Cold War rules and regulations as set by the United States: communists were not allowed to participate in governments” (Landau, p. 149). The objective of the Arbenz reforms “was not to punish the UFCO, but to settle 100,000 people on the land--and assert national sovereignty” (Landau, p. 149).

In 1954, the Eisenhower administration desired the overthrow of the Arbenz presidency; a CIA destabilization campaign culminated with a coup, which brought a military dictatorship into power under President (Colonel) Castillo Armas (Landau, 1993, pp. 156-159). These activities set the tone for U.S. relations—especially military relations—in the coming years. They are important, now as we look back close to 50

years, as land reform could very well be as central an issue as it was before. Landau further referred to:

One State Department official, who served during the Carter years, bemoaned the day that President Eisenhower had made the decision to intervene and rudely and bloodily interrupt the dynamics of Guatemalan history. “The tragedy”, the official intoned, “will endure for many decades more.” (p. 203)

Between 1954 and 1986, it can be said without little argument, that “army-dominated regimes that have ruled Guatemala . . . [used] political terror . . . as a principal means of governance” (Brown, 1985, p. 180). Several of these enjoyed U.S. patronage (Brown, pp. 180-181). It was not until 1985 that a new Constitution brought about an elected civilian government—culminating a return to a cornerstone principle of democracy.

This patronage inevitably precipitated continued U.S. involvement to include CIA links to human rights violators. Most particularly a Guatemalan military officer paid by the CIA had been involved in “two extrajudicial executions, including the 1990 murder of American citizen Michael Devine” (Human Rights Watch, 1995, p. 68). Furthermore, the CIA was cited by non-governmental organizations for an “unwillingness to declassify documents related to human rights (which) also limited prosecutors’ work in Guatemala” (Human Rights Watch, 1996, p. 77).

Additionally in 1996, the United States Army School of the Americas (USARSA) came under fire:

The release in September by the Defense Department of excerpts from training manuals used by the School of the Americas in courses for Latin American military officers until 1991 confirmed critics’ assertions that the school instructed its officer students to violate human rights. The manuals

recommended assassinations and torture against guerrillas. In October, U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry apologized for the instructions and promised to review the school's curriculum. (Human Rights Watch, 1996, p. 77)

Realizing that these issues are open for discussion by persons within both of these agencies, these are two of the major incidents that shape current national leadership's, as well as the civilian community's, perceptions of these organizations. Apologies were made by senior officials, including President Clinton's personal apology during a visit to Guatemala in March 1999, for "previous U.S. support for abusive military forces" (Human Rights Watch, 2000).

Non-governmental organizations may not believe that enough corrective actions have been taken. However, the Clinton administration in dealing with the CIA, "announced several executive branch inquiries to deal with the crisis, disciplined several CIA officials, expanded a review of its foreign agents, and began writing new rules governing their recruitment" (Human Rights Watch, 1995, pp. 68-69). In addressing the USARSA issues, then-Defense Secretary Perry "promised to review the school's curriculum" (Human Rights Watch, 1996, p. 77). The review was done, and is ongoing again. It's currently underway in conjunction with reorganization at the school, as it has become the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation and reevaluation of courses for their fit under the (Expanded) International Military Education and Training Program (J. Leuer, personal communication, May 14, 2001).

Let's now turn our attention to data and developments in dealing with human rights issues in Guatemala.

Human Rights Abuse Statistics

The human rights questions are far from being over in the country of Guatemala. Much can be drawn from the numbers of human rights abuse complaints or alleged offenses contained on Table 10—in terms of the ebbs and flows, increases and decreases in numbers of “reported” incidents, as consolidated by the U.S. State Department. Because these do not tell the whole story, and need some dialogue as we go from year to year, this researcher will assert comments generated by annual reports from sources such as the U.S. Department of State, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and Freedom House. All are respected for their work in monitoring human rights issues worldwide, with the State Department drawing from a variety of sources for their documentation.

Keep in mind that the Department of State publishes figures (and non-governmental organizations also attempt to monitor and advocate systematic advances) regarding areas such as domestic violence against women and children, labor protections, and other categories of human rights issues. The categories addressed within Table 10 were considered by this researcher as the most important—especially due to the continuing problems that the U.S. deals with in its relationship with Guatemala and other countries in the region. (This researcher could find no other report that better documented numerical data in any form than the State Department Annual Country Reports for Human Rights Practices. The Department of State provides these numbers within narrative comments and not in table or graph form.)

Table 10

Human Rights Abuses (Complaints or Alleged Offenses) – Guatemala

Year	Extrajudicial Killings	Forced Disappearances	Torture	Illegal Detention	Estimated % of Incarcerated Awaiting Trial
2000	PDH – 13 MINUGUA – 21 (Oct 99 thru Jun 00)	PDH – 10 MINUGUA – 2 (1 credible report attributed to PNC & SIC Forces)	PDH – 0 MINUGUA – 13 (12 confirmed)	PDH – 46 MINUGUA – 31 (23 confirmed from Oct 99 thru Jun 00)	61
1999	PDH – 16 (3 confirmed) MINUGUA – 39 (Jan thru Sep 99) (Investigated 18; Confirmed 13 by Dec 99) ODHAG – 5	PDH – 12 (4 attributed to government forces) MINUGUA – 1 (It was unconfirmed)	PDH – 9 MINUGUA – 24 (22 confirmed; Aug 98 thru Nov 99) ODHAG – 4 (These 4 included in the 5 Extrajudicial Killings)	PDH – 20 MINUGUA – 89 (85 confirmed from Jan thru Sep 99)	62
1998	PDH – 32 MINUGUA – 35 (Confirmed 13 by end of the year) ODHAG – 61	PDH – 18 MINUGUA – 1 ODHAG – 0	PDH – 2 MINUGUA – 9 (Confirmed 3 by end of the year; some complaints may relate to acts committed in prior years.) ODHAG – 0	PDH – 18 MINUGUA – 68 (Confirmed 40 by end of the year; some complaints may relate to detentions carried out in prior years.) ODHAG – 7 (All were confirmed.)	70
1997	PDH – 134 MINUGUA – 40 (Confirmed 40, but many of those confirmed were from 1996.) ODHAG – 118 (Only 9 Confirmed.)	PDH – 30 MINUGUA – 3 (PDH & MINUGUA confirmed only 1 disappearance from 1996.) ODHAG – 0	PDH – 1 (It was unconfirmed) ODHAG – 0	No Data Available.	30 (Awaiting Sentencing) 70 (Sentenced)
1996	PDH – 173 MINUGUA – 69 (Jan thru Jun 96) (Confirmed 6 by end of the year.) ODHAG – 120	PDH – 47 ODHAG – 0	PDH – 12 ODHAG – 4	No Data Available.	30 (Awaiting Sentencing) 70 (Sentenced)
1995	PDH – 216 MINUGUA – 103 (Feb thru Aug 95 Only) ODHAG – 215	PDH – 77 ODHAG – 10	PDH – 9 ODHAG – 5	No Data Available.	30 (Awaiting Sentencing) 70 (Sentenced)
1994	PDH – 287 ODHAG – 355	PDH – 60 ODHAG – 41	PDH – 18 ODHAG – 17	No Data Available.	71
1993	PDH – 160 (Includes confirmed and cases under investigation.) ODHAG – 248	PDH – 31 (Includes confirmed and cases under investigation.) ODHAG – 46	PDH – 7 ODHAG – 18	No Data Available.	No Data Available.

1992	PDH – 366 (Includes confirmed and cases under investigation.) ODHAG – 204	PDH – 72 (Includes confirmed and cases under investigation.) ODHAG – 11	No Data Available.	No Data Available.	No Data Available.
<p><u>Note.</u> PDH = Guatemalan Government’s Office of Human Rights Ombudsman. MINUGUA = U.N. Verification Mission. ODHAG = Archbishop’s Office of Human Rights. Information derived from Department of State Human Rights Reports, 1994-2001.</p>					

The State Department’s sources for Table 10 include the PDH (Guatemalan Office of Human Rights Ombudsman). These figures are compiled “based on personal interviews with victims and their families” (DoS, 2001f). MINUGUA, the United Nations’ Verification Mission in Guatemala, was established in 1994 in accordance with an agreement between the Guatemalan Government and the UNRG on human rights. rights division was discontinued in 1995, after 3-4 years of operation (Human Rights Watch, 1995, p. 91), while MINUGUA continues to operate today. Both U.N.-sponsored organizations came out of agreements between the two warring parties prior to the end of fighting. The prognosis for MINUGUA will be discussed later in this chapter.

The mission of MINUGUA was very similar to that of the shorter-lived mission of ONUSAL in El Salvador. Both were/are U.N. missions; however ONUSAL’s human The third agency is ODHAG, the Archbishop’s Office of Human Rights. Note that in classifying murders as extrajudicial killings, the ODHAG applies a broader definition than the PDH or MINUGUA, including many cases in which state agents were not suspected” (DoS, 1999b). On the other hand, ODHAG uses a more restrictive definition than the PDH for forced disappearances (DoS, 1998b). In relation to the mechanics of tracking these allegations, they are input on the date received. As we move away from the civil war years, allegations continue to come in—thus the numbers don’t always reflect the actual number of offenses that occurred in a particular year.

Other acronyms are used within the chart. The PNC is the National Civilian Police; SIC is the PNC's Criminal Investigations Service. This is important, not only from the standpoint that there are complaints against the police, but moreover that an increase in reported violations may well indicate the public's willingness to report offenses. "Strong anecdotal evidence suggested that the public was less afraid and more willing to bring complaints against the PNC than against its predecessor [the PN]" (DoS, 2000b).

For other categories listed on the table, there also need to be some caveats. Regarding torture, many bodies were found in various parts of the country bearing signs of severe disfigurement or mutilation. "It was difficult to determine those responsible, in part because authorities do not have the capacity to undertake serious investigations" (DoS, 1997b). Additionally sources indicate, "there are no comprehensive, reliable data on the number of arbitrary detentions, although most accounts agree that the security forces routinely ignored writs of habeas corpus in cases of illegal detention" (DoS, 2001f). Lastly:

The law sets a limit of 3 months for pretrial detention; however, longer detentions still occurred routinely. Prisoners often were [and are] detained past their legal trial or release dates. Prisoners sometimes were not released in a timely fashion after completing their sentences due to the failure of judges to issue the necessary court order or other bureaucratic problems" (DoS, 2001f).

As we move from year to year, virtually all sources point out that the human rights situation has steadily improved—especially since the end of the civil war in December of 1996. (That date also needs to be factored in when considering the data within the table.) In fact, the verbiage of most of the annual State Department Reports specified that "the

Government [of Guatemala] generally respects the human rights of its citizens in many areas; despite improvements in some areas, serious problems remain in others” (DoS, 2001f).

Lasting concerns stem from continuing military dominance within the government (Freedom House, 2000b); “the climate of impunity” for previous human rights violators (especially acts during the civil war) (DoS, 2001f). This climate of impunity contributes to the lack of progress and acts of intimidation in resolution of human rights cases—investigations and judicial proceedings (Amnesty International, 2000b); and the continuing (oftentimes increasing rate) of “threats, harassment, and targeted violence against human rights organizations and activists” (Human Rights Watch, 2001b).

Freedom House Ratings

Over the years Freedom House, a non-governmental human rights organization scores each country around the world in terms of political rights, civil liberties, and freedom status. Table 11 shows the organization’s ratings from year to year for the country of Guatemala (from 1972, when their process was initiated, up to the present).

To briefly explain the ratings, the characters representing scores for each year are, from left to right, political rights, civil liberties, and freedom status. Each of the first two is measure on a one to seven scale, with the number one representing the highest degree of freedom and seven being the lowest. “F,” “PF,” and “NF” respectively stand for “free,” “partly free,” and “not free,” Countries whose combined averages for political rights and for civil liberties fall between 1.0 and 2.5 are designated “free”; between 3.0

and 5.5, “partly free”; and between 5.5 and 7.0 “not free.” A more detailed methodology for the Freedom House ratings is at Appendix K.

Table 11

Freedom House Ratings for Guatemala

Year	Country Ratings	Year	Country Ratings
1972-73	2,3,F	1987-88	3,3,PF
1973-74	2,2,F	1988-89	3,3,PF
1974-75	4,3,PF	1989-90	3,3,PF
1975-76	4,3,PF	1990-91	3,4,PF
1976-77	4,3,PF	1991-92	3,5,PF
1977-78	4,4,PF	1992-93	4,5,PF
1978-79	3,4,PF	1993-94	4,5,PF
1979-80	3,5,PF	1994-95	4,5,PF
1980-81	5,6,PF	1995-96	4,5,PF
1981-82	6,6,NF	1996-97	3,4,PF
1982-83	6,6,NF	1997-98	3,4,PF
1983-84	6,6,NF	1998-99	3,4,PF
1984-85	5,6,PF	1999-00	3,4,PF
1985-86	4,4,PF	2000-01	3,4,PF
1986-87	3,3,PF		

Note. From Freedom House, 2001.

These ratings will be interwoven intermittently throughout the subsequent discussions as we look at annual events within Guatemala.

Human Rights Initiatives and Developments

Events Prior to 1992.

We’ll move from year to year (starting in effect with 1992) chronicling important internal Guatemalan human rights developments and placing any other individual factors that may have a bearing on human rights abuse statistics. However, let’s take a few snapshots from the 1980s. These were terrible years of violence within the civil war period—just to help put the more recent data in perspective that “the problems occurring now are NOTHING like what happened in the early 80s (P. Ball, personal

communication, May 28, 2001). For starters, “in the early 80s, 200 or more people a month were slain” for political expression (McColm and the Freedom House Survey Team, 1993, p. 252).

These facts are easily substantiated within the Freedom House ratings (Table 11), as they bottomed out in 1981-84 (total of three) rating periods, with “6,6, Not Free” rating (Freedom House, 2001). Again, in addition to the “Not Free” characterization, bear in mind that a rating of 7 is the lowest on the scale. The rating would improve steadily (impressively) from the 1984-85 to 1986-87 (5,6; 4,4; 3,3 respectively). It would remain at “3,3, Partly Free” until the 1990-91 rating period (Freedom House, 2001).

The first elected president in a many years (President Vinicio Cerezo) took office in 1986 for a 5-year term, with constitutional prohibition for reelection. On the 9th of May of 1989, there was an aborted coup. In August of 1989, there were “nearly three dozen deaths attributed to political violence . . . over twice as many in September” (McColm and the Freedom House Survey Team, 1990, p. 116). Additionally at that time, the police “are not independent of the military, are poorly trained, and have inadequate resources” (McColm et al., p.116).

In 1990, the Guatemalan Attorney General’s Office on Human Rights reported “276 political murders and 145 disappearances in the first nine months of the year, and stated that ‘the government lacks the political resolve to protect people’s human rights’” (McColm and the Freedom House Survey Team, 1991, p. 180). A “dysfunctional judicial system and corruption-plagued police force” were cited for the government’s failure, as was the fact that the security forces “retained a monopoly over criminal investigations” (McColm et al., 1991, p. 180). Of limited encouragement regarding concerns of the

safety of the indigenous Indian population, it was noted that “although mass killings of Indians during army anti-guerrilla sweeps have dropped since 1985, they have not stopped” (Freedom House, 1991, p.180). Other 1990 events, important within the U.S., was the murder of Michael Devine (a U.S. citizen) as well as anthropologist Myrna Mack—the latter of which was believed linked to government sources (DoS, 1994b).

In the first half of 1991, the PDH documented 116 extrajudicial executions; another 172 cases are listed . . . as under investigation.” In that same period, PDH showed 27 forced disappearances (with 34 more under investigation) (Human Rights Watch, 1991b, p. 232).

Politically in 1991, the second elected president in recent history, President Jorge Serrano came into office “blasting critics of Guatemala’s human rights record, including the U.S. government, and declared that his administration would bring peace to Guatemala through direct negotiations . . . with the URNG” (McColm and the Freedom House Survey Team, 1992, p. 224). He took office after a campaign in which:

Over a dozen political party figures were killed, and more than half the presidential and legislative candidates received death threats. . . . Disappearances and political killings occurred at the rate of approximately two a day in 1990, increasing to three a day in the first eight months of 1991” (McColm et al, 1992, p. 225)

In addition to the previously noted dysfunctional judicial system and corruption-plagued police force, McColm, et al., designated the military—again the dominating agency in the government—as the “principal human rights offenders” (1992, p. 225). “Violent persecution of human rights activists” was also a major concern (Human Rights Watch, 1991b, p. 249).

The events of these last two years contributed to declines in both the political rights and civil liberties factors of the Freedom House ratings (on Table 11). From the “3,3, Partly Free” of 1989-90, the rating went to “3,4, Partly Free” in 1990-91 and “3,5, Partly Free” in 1991-92 (Freedom House, 2001). The downward trend would continue in the upcoming year.

Events of 1992.

Similar comments were made in 1992 as the “situation remained bleak” (Human Rights Watch, 1992, p. 112). Human Rights Watch noted the army’s domination of the police. Additionally, reported statistics on violence maintained by PDH showed a decrease in extrajudicial executions and disappearances during the first half of 1992 versus the same period in 1991 (Human Rights Watch, p. 112). The PDH kept all in the context, of the “civil government without the power to stop impunity” (McColm et al., 1993, p. 252). The Ombudsman at that time was Romero de Leon Carpio—you’ll see that name later on. Another important factor noted as we move along the time line was the belief that “fear prevents many victims and witnesses from reporting abuses” (Human Rights Watch, p. 112).

President Serrano had begun peace talks with the URNG in 1992, but they had become deadlocked that same year. One interesting fact is that he (Serrano) declined the assistance of Guatemalan Indian leader Robert Menchu, who won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1992, within the context of the peace talks (McColm et. al., 1993, p. 252).

This information demonstrates that the situation was at rock bottom as we began the decade of the 1990s. Indeed with the events of this year, Freedom House ratings

(refer to Table 11) also went to what would be the lowest since the early 1980s. The rating of “4,5, Partly Free” was designated for 1992-93, and would remain for the next three reporting periods.

Before moving on it must be recognized that many believed the relationship between an ultimate peace and human rights issues is profoundly important. Human Rights Watch put it this way:

The issue of human rights has become an integral part of the search for solutions, as the mediators and warring parties have realized that a lasting peace cannot be achieved until violations that fuel the conflict are brought under control (Human Rights Watch, 1992, p. 77).

Indeed, in the case of Guatemala, “democratization and human rights are only the first of 11 points on the agenda that the two sides [the Government and the URNG] drew up [during peace talks] in 1991” (McColm et al., 1993, p. 251).

As we now move to the time frame more closely related to this study, it’s first important to realize that the Constitution of Guatemala guarantees many of the rights of a democracy. Individual protections for all groups from murder, torture or other inhumane treatment or punishment, arbitrary arrests or detention, right to privacy and inviolability of home, and prohibition of excessive force on the part of law enforcement are guaranteed. Additionally, freedom of speech and press, assembly, religion, respect for political rights are also spelled out. The key ingredient of the judicial system, as we’ve already noted, leaves much to be desired (DoS, 1994b).

The judicial system is ineffective and often unable to ensure a fair trial. The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary composed of a Constitutional Court, a Supreme Court, appeals courts, and several courts of special jurisdiction, such as labor courts. However military courts have jurisdiction over military personnel, including military commissioners who commit crimes while on official business, thus limiting the availability of civil courts to prosecute persons under military control in

human rights abuse cases. PAC (Civil Defense Patrol) members are civilians and not under military jurisdiction.

Civilian trials are public after the first 15 days, which are dedicated to an initial investigative phase that is closed. Defendants have the right to be present at trials and to legal representation. An appeals court automatically reviews convictions. The Criminal Procedure Code is being changed to introduce legal proceedings (in both Spanish and indigenous languages) open to the public and to establish a viable public defender program. To allow for more training and compliance, however, in December the effective date of the new Criminal Procedure Code was postponed until July 1994.

Most human rights violations are not investigated; security force personnel are reluctant to investigate cases involving colleagues. Police are also relatively few in number and lack resources and training. Judges are susceptible to intimidation and corruption and suffer from low pay, bad working conditions, and low morale. The Supreme Court and some lower court judges came under public pressure to resign for corruption and politicization of the legal system. (DoS, 1994b)

Events of 1993.

The positive trend of any human rights activity is very negligible. The Department of State (1994b) noted, “improvements in the human rights situation in 1993, serious abuses occurred frequently.” While both security forces and guerrilla groups were at fault, the State Department particularly noted that “Civil Patrols [PACs], military and police continued to commit a majority of the major violations, including extrajudicial killings, political kidnappings, and death threats” (DoS, 1994b).

After Serrano’s failed self-coup (when he attempted to dissolve the Congress and fire the Supreme Court), Ramiro de Leon Carpio (the former Human Rights Ombudsman—the PDH) was selected by the Congress as the new president to fulfill the remainder of Serrano’s term (DoS, 1994b). The military, which originally supported Serrano, backed off in its support of his actions “amid mass protests and threats of

economic isolation by the U.S. and Organization of American States (OAS) that frightened conservative economic elites” (McColm and the Freedom House Survey Team, 1994, p. 282).

De Leon Carpio had his own problems as the Congress and the military worked to undermine his reforms (McColm, 1994, p. 282). Regardless, he did make some personnel changes within the defense establishment to include two defense ministers—also naming more trusted individuals as Minister of Interior and National Police Chief (Human Rights Watch, 1993, p. 101). Some positive results were documented by NGOs; however, disappointments included police failures in “executing arrest warrants for members of the police and civil patrols accused of human rights violations” (Human Rights Watch, p. 101).

On a positive note in that same regard, a former government security agent, Noel de Jesus Beteta Alvarez was sentenced to 25 years in prison for the 1990 murder of Myrna Mack. This was done employing 13 different judges during the proceedings; several were excused due to receipt of death threats. Although the conviction was being appealed, Beteta escaped from custody, but was recaptured within hours. (DoS, 1994b.)

Additionally, that same year, Captain Contreras, of the Guatemalan army, was sentenced to 20 years for planning the kidnapping of Michael Devine. The appellate court that performed that sentencing also confirmed the 30-year sentences of six enlisted men involved in the act. The captain escaped in May of 1993, with the complicity of other military members. (DoS, 1994b; DoS, 1996b.)

In one of the higher profile crimes of 1993, President De Leon Carpio’s cousin, Jorge Carpio Nicolle, was murdered by unknown attackers on July 3rd. He was also

politically active, a journalist having been a former presidential candidate in 1990 (McColm et al., 1994 p. 282; Karatnycky and the Freedom House Survey Team, 1995, p. 276).

Events of 1994.

Virtually all categories of human rights issues demonstrated a substantial increase in activity in 1994—“the worst levels . . . in five years” (Karatnycky et al., 1995, p. 273)—as verified by the increase on Table 10. The rates appeared to decrease between 1992 and 1993, but jumped up to a higher level in 1994. Again, the numbers may be deceptive as the figures don’t spell out for what years the violations were reported. According to the State Department, even with peace talks (moderated by U.N.) ongoing, “Guatemala’s armed internal conflict entered its 34th year and continued to be a major cause of [‘serious’] human rights violations by both government and guerrilla forces” (DoS, 1995b). The annual DoS report attributed the continuance in politically motivated killings to “the lack of political will and law enforcement resources [and that] with few exceptions the Government failed to investigate them fully or detain or prosecute the perpetrators” (1995b).

Again, the judicial system was viewed as “ineffective and often unable to ensure a fair trial” (DoS, 1995b). However, in positive action, the new Criminal Procedures Code (mentioned earlier) did take effect on July 1st of 1994, making possible “significant” changes in the conduct of criminal trials; however there were limiting conditions:

These include new provisions for a public defender to provide legal counsel to the accused, especially important in the new oral trial setting. The new Code also modified the Military Code of Justice to extend jurisdiction by civilian courts over military personnel for offenses “not

essentially military in nature.” These reforms will be phased in once the Government drafts specific implementing rules or regulations. Prior to the Code’s enactment, military courts retained jurisdiction over military personnel, including military commissioners who commit crimes while on official business, thus limiting the ability of civil courts to prosecute persons under military control in human rights abuse cases.

The following factors hampered the Code’s implementation: A lack of funding for education, political differences between the executive and judicial branches, intransigence by many members of the criminal bar, constitutional challenges, and inadequate preparation by law enforcement agencies. As of early December, only three oral trials had been conducted, as required under the new procedures. Meanwhile the backlog of criminal cases continued to mount. (DoS, 1995b)

In political moves, the constitution was amended decreasing the presidential term from five to four years—still prohibiting re-election. Additionally, and very importantly, the installation of the United Nations Verification Mission (MINUGUA) came to fruition—this “raised hopes for significant improvement” in the year’s “deteriorated” human rights situation (Human Rights Watch, 1994, p. 93). This occurred during the same period when a new Interior Minister (Danilo Parrinello Blanco) “abandoned cooperation” with the Human Rights Ombudsman—the PDH (Human Rights Watch, p. 94). This was a dramatic departure, believed to have an impact on subsequent events, from his predecessor’s (Ortiz Moscoso) attitudes (Human Rights Watch, p. 94).

Human rights organizations continued to call for the “strengthening of civilian control of the military,” seeing the year as one in which “the government shrank from all meaningful reforms that threatened the army’s power” (Human Rights Watch, 1994, p. 93). With regards to the military, President De Leon Carpio suspended enforcement of the Conscription Law. This meant that “forced recruitment and recruitment of minors all but ceased” (DoS, 1995b).

In terms of high profile cases, there was still no resolution in the murder case of former presidential candidate Jorge Carpio Nicolle (Karatnycky et al., 1995, p. 276). Four PAC members were released due to insufficient evidence while arrest warrants were not served on six other PAC members thought to be involved. Unknown perpetrators killed one PAC member in June, while the police chief that had ordered the arrest of the four PAC members was also murdered (DoS, 1995b).

Within the long-term backdrop of the Myrna Mack and Michael Devine murders, the Supreme Court upheld the 25-year sentence of Beteta as well as the 30-year sentences of the enlisted men involved in each respectively. Captain Contreras, found guilty of the Devine murder, was still at large after having escaped in May of 1993 (DoS, 1995b).

Events of 1995.

The situation in Guatemala was characterized as “remaining deeply troubling” by Human Rights Watch (1995, p. 93) for the year of 1995. Some of the statistics, particularly the drop in torture (and most of the reported numbers), appear to be encouraging. However, “politically motivated killings continued with disturbing frequency” while all 10 of ODHAG’s forced disappearances were “believed to be politically motivated” (DoS, 1996b).

It’s important to realize, in conjunction with the statistical data, that with MINUGUA’s new involvement, an additional “200 observers in thirteen offices across the country conducted a more comprehensive study of the human rights situation than had been possible in the past and helped pinpoint the sources of violations” (Human Rights Watch, 1995, p. 93). Actually during 1995, MINUGUA became “fully staffed”

with 305 personnel (DoS, 1996b). According to Human Rights Watch it was believed that MINUGUA's extensive presence "had a dissuasive impact on human rights violations and provided some protection for the beleaguered domestic human rights community" (p. 93). This was not without cost as MINUGUA noted a "pervasive attitude" by military officials "that human rights activists were really subversives tied to the URNG" (DoS, 1996b).

While the peace talks continued, with no comprehensive agreement reached between the Government and the URNG, some human rights issues did take effect during this year as result of the dialogue (DoS, 1996b). Overall, MINUGUA documented "some positive developments, including minor improvements in the administration of justice, a more aggressive Police Department Office of Professional Responsibility, the successful suspension of military conscription, the factual end of forced recruitment, and the decommissioning of military commissioners" (DoS, 1996b).

The decommissioning of military commissioners was seen as controversial due to their being viewed as the "eyes and ears of the army in remote areas and played a central role in forced recruitment prior to the virtual abolition of that practice" (DoS, 1996b). Additionally, in the political scene, President De Leon Carpio replaced the Minister of Government/Interior (who was under fire with allegations of corruption) and the Director of the National Police. These were both viewed as positive developments, with a respected attorney taking over as Government/Interior Minister (Human Rights Watch, 1995, p. 94). In another move, by appointing a civilian as Vice Minister of Government, the president reduced military control over the police force as the position had been held previously by an army colonel (DoS, 1996b).

In the continuing saga of the murder of former presidential candidate Jorge Carpio Nicolle, “an appellate court ruled in April that, due to serious irregularities in the case against the six imprisoned defendants charged with the 1993 murder . . . proceedings had to begin anew” (DoS, 1996b). The army captain (Contreras) found guilty in the Devine murder remains a fugitive (DoS, 1996b). Thus, there are several ongoing difficulties.

Events of 1996.

The year of 1996 saw “marked improvement in the overall human rights situation, as demonstrated by a decrease in the number of serious violations;” however, the DoS annual report continued to record that “problems remain in several areas” (1997b). Statistically, the year initiated a downward trend (in those major categories) that has continued over more recent years. Again, MINUGUA’s presence and activity is credited with “the decline in politically motivated human rights abuse, by almost guaranteeing international scrutiny to those abuses that occurred” (Human Rights Watch, 1996, p. 98).

Politically speaking, there was a transition in government as De Leon Carpio left office upon the election of President Alvaro Arzu—who took office in January. At the end of the year (December, 29th) as a result of 6 years of talks, came a negotiated end to the long (36 years) civil war (DoS, 1997b).

Concerns still surrounded politically motivated killings, which “continued with disturbing frequency, albeit at lower levels than in recent years” (DoS, 1997b). A variety of sources were seen contributing to these numbers to include military (also PACs) and extremist groups (DoS, 1997b). President Arzu, shortly after assuming office, made changes within the military. He forced “the early retirement of generals linked to drug-

trafficking” (drugs becoming an ever-increasing concern) and dismissed two colonels that had been linked to killings involving Americans (Karatnycky et al., 1997, p. 261). By the end of the year, he had also demobilized the PACs with their estimated 200,000 members. Keep in mind that the PACs were formed in 1982 to combat civil insurgency—with the war over, the true mission was overcome by events. This, while it did not eliminate their hold on rural areas, was a start as the government initiated actions to rebuild a professional national police to carry out law enforcement responsibilities. The current national police organization was under military authority for all practical purposes (Karatnycky et al., 1997, p. 262).

Corruption was addressed by the Arzu administration. In efforts to combat the problem, over 100 National Police and 25 Treasury Police officers have been dismissed with over 100 of them facing charges. A six-month training program is in place for newly hired National Police officers which “includes instruction on human rights given by the PDH and Casa Alianza and was developed with the assistance of MINUGUA and other international organizations” (DoS, 1997b).

In terms of fighting the long-term overarching concern, the “National Congress, over opposition protests, approved a controversial amnesty law in December which freed government officials, military members, and rebels of any responsibility for political and other crimes committed during the conflict” (Karatnycky, 1997, p. 260). This National Reconciliation Law implemented peace accord provisions dealing with reintegration of the URNG into political life. This was after the Congress had set the important precedent in June by approving the “channeling (of) all trials of common crimes committed by the military to civilian, rather than military courts” (Human Rights Watch, 1996, p. 98). The

amnesty law may not be as bad as it sounds on the surface, although its existence leaves room for concern in light of history of lack of prosecutions and investigations.

MINUGUA termed it as “consistent with international standards” (DoS, 1997b) and went on to say that it actually:

provides amnesty for political crimes directly related to the war. However, it states that those who committed serious human rights violations—torture, forced disappearance, genocide, illegal treatment of prisoners, and those crimes not subject to a statute of limitations or to amnesty by domestic law or international treaty—do not receive relief from criminal responsibility. The law provides for a special review by the Appeal Court, on a case-by-case basis, for common crimes committed in connection with war-related acts to determine if any exemption from prosecution applies (DoS, 1997b).

Thus the amnesty action may be perceived as positive or negative, dependent upon the person questioned. The discussions on this subject emphasize the continuing concerns for a threatening environment for various officials and organizations. “Other high-ranking officials working in the fields of human rights and jurisprudence complained privately of receiving threats stemming from their interest in resolving cases related to human rights violations, official corruption, and drug trafficking” (DoS, 1997b).

This is underscored by the lack of progress in the Jorge Carpio murder prosecutions. “In November the prosecuting attorney announced he was quitting and going into voluntary exile because of continuing threats and harassment. At year’s end the case continued under a different attorney” (DoS, 1997b).

Extremely important to human right organizations, and worthy of note is that Guatemala became the first country in Latin America, outside the Caribbean and Guyana to administer the death penalty. It came for the first time in ten years, with two persons

being killed via firing squad for their convictions of rape and murder of a 4-year-old girl. The most important factor as documented by Human Rights Watch is that the request for delay to the executions was rejected. Concerns existed in the international community as the defendants had no attorney for several weeks after their arrest, and when they were given defense, it was performed by a law student and not an attorney (1996, p. 99). It would appear that a valid mechanism was not in place to handle such cases—again focusing on a lacking judicial process. [At the end of 1999, there were 32 people on Death Row in Guatemala (Amnesty International, 2000b).]

All of the positive actions noted for the year, drove the Freedom House ratings (see Table 11) up on both factors from the “4,5, Partly Free” (which had held constant over the previous 4 years) to “3,4, Partly Free.” It has remained at that rating to this day, including the 2000-01 ratings, which were released within the last couple of months (Freedom House, 2001).

Events of 1997.

As the statistics seemed to decrease in the major human rights categories through 1997, this is overshadowed by several other factors. Guatemala “faced soaring criminal violence, an incomplete police reform, continued impunity for human rights violations as well as common crimes and profound uncertainty over the post-conflict role of the military” (Human Rights Watch, 1998).

“There were isolated allegations of politically motivated killings during the year; however, none of these were confirmed” (DoS, 1998b). Note that this is simply a statement; it does not discount the significant number of extrajudicial killings. There

were still long-running concerns of the military's influence over the police (much due to current actions to be discussed in upcoming paragraphs) and impunity for human rights violations.

Judicial ineffectiveness—especially in the context of the amnesty law which “raised the possibility that judges could grant amnesty for crimes deemed to have occurred in the context of counterinsurgency”—was viewed as a potential problem (Human Rights Watch, 1998). However, its application was “narrowly interpreted by the courts” as amnesty was denied “to several high profile defendants, including the convicted murderers of U.S. citizen Michael Devine and the army officers accused of ordering the murder of Myrna Mack” (DoS, 1998b). Amnesty was granted only in the case of six URNG members “accused of transporting weapons and using false documents.” The law was upheld in October by the Constitutional Court (DoS, 1998b.)

Human rights organizations (like MINUGUA, the PDH, and ODHAG) were gaining in credibility and the “blessing” of governmental leadership. They “continued to enjoy widespread public support and respect. . . . While many international human rights organizations do not enjoy formal legal status, they continue to operate freely and openly” (DoS, 1998b). This is the general trend over the previous two years, although individual persons holding organizational and/or governmental leadership still received threats at various times (DoS, 1997b; DoS 1998b). Continuing the trend of following mandated peace accords, a newly initiated Truth Commission (The Historical Clarification Commission or Comision de Esclarecimiento Historico, CEH) “began receiving tens of thousands of complaints of rights violations,” coming from the civil war period (Karatnycky et al., 1998, p. 261).

The more pressing problems involve a void in current law enforcement left when President Arzu's administration created the National Civilian Police to replace the "discredited internal security forces" (Karatnycky, 1998, p. 260) in January. This initiative was in the building stages, with the goal of 20,000 operational by late 1999. However, at this time, only its first 1,200 officers had completed their initial training. Because of the void, President Arzu "ordered the army to support the police" in combating crime (DoS, 1998b). While it would have been better had other alternatives been available, Arzu had little choice given the state of affairs. As "common crime soared, including car thefts and kidnappings carried out by rings in which members of security forces were reportedly involved," citizens reached a point of desperation, feeling that they had "no recourse against lawlessness, and insecurity that prompted dozens of cases of lynchings" (Human Rights Watch, 1998). The lynchings even included "suspected petty criminals and others" (Amnesty International, 1998b).

Criminal issues aside, as important as they are, it appears that the real power base is beginning to shift even so slightly. According to Karatnycky et al.:

Efforts by President Arzu to reduce the armed forces' ability to restrict constitutional powers granted to civilian administrations appeared, at the end of two years, to have taken hold. However, the rule of law is undermined by the systemic corruption that afflicts all public institutions, particularly the legislature and the courts. (1998, pp. 261-262)

Events of 1998.

One event in 1998 overshadowed the "hopes for an end to impunity and respect for human rights" (Human Rights Watch, 1999). The assassination of Auxiliary Bishop Juan Jose Gerardi, became "a test of the government's willingness to control the armed

forces and to hold accountable those who abuse human rights” (Karatnycky, 1999, p. 206). Bishop Gerardi was the Coordinator of the Archbishop’s Office on Human Rights—the ODHAG. He was murdered two days after he delivered the Recovery of Historical Memory Report. This report covered human rights abuses committed during the long civil war implicating the military and civil patrols for roughly 80 percent of the wartime violations (DoS, 1999b). Therefore political motivation for the murder was suspected, and the government established a high-level commission in support of the investigation. According to the Department of State annual report (1999b), persons initially detained, arrested, and/or charged had been released with the exception of Father Mario Orantes. The priest, who had been the Bishop’s assistant and parish house co-occupant, was charged on October 1st with murder. A motive for the murder remained to be established, although there were also complaints that the prosecutor had not investigated all leads. Earlier, in August, the ODHAG had filed a criminal complaint against the prosecutor’s office, and in December the lead prosecutor withdrew from the case and had been replaced (DoS, 1999b). In reading reports filed by other human rights organizations, there appeared to be “errors and negligence” in handling of the crime scene, while the “government went to great lengths to dismiss the notion that the crime was politically motivated” (Human Rights Watch, 1999).

The bombshell of Bishop Gerardi’s murder, and the accompanying scrutiny of the investigation, dominated the continuing problems (with some new slants) as well as perceived statistical drops in numbers of some categories of human rights violations. Impunity for previous human rights violators, of crime and violence (especially in the

light of military interaction with the National Police for internal security matters and corruption), and lynching were also issues during this year (DoS 1999b).

While impunity was an issue, a number of court proceedings were noted within State Department and NGO reports. Slow progress through the courts seems to magnify the problem; and the list doesn't get shorter of cases in progress, as many cases linger on the docket. Inefficiency and corruption continue, as do low salaries. It's difficult to attract well-qualified personnel with the low salaries (DoS, 1999b), and low salaries make corruption more susceptible due to bribery opportunities.

Crime prevention/fighting has everyone's attention. Contributing to the factors noted for 1997 of the lack of trained new National Police officers, is a "loophole" allowing for the hiring of previous security force agents who very well could have been responsible for past human rights violations. In an effort to meet manpower requirements (culminating with a 20,000 target by late 1999), perhaps entrance requirements were relaxed too much. Some former military members applying for the PNC were not subject to competitive selection and upon selection did not attend all required training. Some observers complained that the retraining course for previous National Police (PN) members under the old system, "was insufficiently rigorous and that relatively few members of the PN were screened out during retraining, ensuring the incorporation of some poorly qualified PN members into the new PNC" (DoS, 1999b).

Corruption is continuing as a problem within the PNC, with credible reports of officer involvement. "However, police authorities appeared to be taking stronger actions against officers found to have been engaged in illegal activities, referring some . . . to the criminal justice system rather than simply imposing administrative punishments" (DoS,

1999b). Realize too that as time goes on, more and more police are in the field giving a higher pool in a no-tolerance business.

Even amid the concerns, it appeared that the population considered the PNC better than the old PN:

Strong anecdotal evidence indicated an improvement in the probity and effectiveness of the PNC in comparison with the PN. Other reports suggested that crime rates declined in some municipalities where the PNC was deployed. Some local government officials expressed eagerness for the PNC to begin operations in their communities. As of mid-year, the ODHAG reported receiving few complaints against PNC personnel than had been received in prior years against members of the PN. (DoS, 1999b)

Projections at this time, made it appear that resource constraints could limit the number of National Police officers to about 18,000 through the year 2000—thus under the goal (DoS, 1999b). It's important to note that, due to the indigenous population of the country, language issues have to be considered in PNC assignments—another limiting factor (DoS, 1999b).

Lynching continued an upward trend in terms of citizens taking the law into their own hands. “MINUGUA registered approximately 70 lynchings and attempted lynchings during the year, in which over 50 persons died. Generally, victims were killed by mobs, usually for property-related crimes” (DoS, 1999b). The government did pursue prosecution with regard to some of the attacks; two defendants were found guilty and began serving long jail sentences for their actions. Others followed suit later on in the year (DoS, 1999b).

As an important sidelight, there may be some disagreement as to the degree of cooperation between Human Rights NGOs and governmental officials; however, it definitely appears that the relationship is strained—likely due to the Bishop Girardi

investigation. Department of State notes that the “Government generally cooperated with its (MINUGUA’s) investigations but cited occasional isolated incidents in which government officials or institutions had obstructed its efforts” (1999b). Human Rights Watch used as an example that the Guatemalan Truth Commission Chief, Christian Tomushchat, “denounced the lack of cooperation from the military in providing documents and interviews to its investigators, in violation of the accords setting up the commission” (Human Rights Watch, 1999). Amnesty International had another slant, noting that “local human rights monitors expressed disappointment at what they saw as a diminished emphasis on human rights monitoring by the U.N. Verification Mission for Guatemala (MINUGUA), while government officials criticized MINUGUA for interference in matters outside its mandate” (Amnesty International, 1999b). With respect to MINUGUA, the United Nations extended the mandate of the mission to the end of the year 2000 (Amnesty International, 1999b). When MINUGUA’s mission expires, the PDH is to assume the human rights verification function (DoS, 1999b).

It’s interesting, that in the light of the murder of Bishop Gerardi, Freedom House provided the same comment in assessing the current situation in Guatemala:

Efforts by President Arzu to reduce the armed forces’ ability to restrict constitutional powers granted to civilian administrations appeared to have taken hold. However, the rule of law is undermined by the systemic corruption that afflicts all public institutions, particularly the legislature and the courts (Karatnycky, 1999, p. 206).

With what has already been discussed in terms of the rule of law; that is obviously an area that must be continually addressed. Note this is almost identical to the words from the previous year’s report. While the rule of law issue is important in the negative sense,

so the reduction of influence by the armed forces a positive development. That part of the equation is very important.

Events of 1999.

Once again, the same recurring issues raised their head from previous years. The Truth Commission's findings opened the year, correlating strongly with ODHAG's Recovery of Historical Memory Report the previous year. The Truth Commission found that "state security forces had been responsible for 93 percent of human rights abuses committed during the civil war, which claimed as many as 200,000 lives, and that high-ranking officials had overseen 626 massacres in Indian villages" (Freedom House, 2000b). The URNG were shown to be responsible for 3 percent, while 4 percent were attributed to unknown parties (Human Rights Watch, 2000). This renewed the calls against impunity and brought the issue back to the forefront. In an additional development, on May 20th, several human rights organizations jointly released a military logbook reportedly smuggled out of Guatemalan military files revealing the fate of over 180 persons (by name) who disappeared by Guatemalan security forces in 1983-1985 (Human Rights Watch, 2000).

These documents were released at a time when "the number of extrajudicial killings continued to decline significantly" (DoS, 2000b) as documented within Table 10. Again, the concern turned to impunity as "in several high profile cases, courts overturned, annulled, or reversed prior convictions against human rights abusers" (DoS, 2000b).

While issues existed regarding the status of the National Police and the absence of effective law enforcement, President Arzu's administration had done much over the years

in terms of the military—which was now down to a little over 30,000 members from its approximately 45,000 as late as the mid-90s. This does not signal the final end to military dominance (keeping in mind the Freedom House Reports’ comments over the previous 2 years), even in the light of increasing freedoms. Indeed there are still recommendations from the Truth Commission for “purging of senior military commanders involved in atrocities” (Freedom House, 2000b). Again, legal action comes slowly. Related to comments regarding the hiring and training of PNC officers, MINUGUA found that “virtually all PNC had been recycled [from other organizations], with only a three-month training course” (Human Rights Watch, 2000).

Lynchings appear to have increased, even though not always carried out. To get the whole picture, some 250 occurred since 1994; however, only two were under investigation for 1999 (Human Rights Watch, 2000).

Risks still are a part of life for officials and human rights advocates, and journalists. This is a major part of the story in continuing process of justice for the murderers of Bishop Girardi (Human Rights Watch, 2000). It would appear that a major “musical chairs” has occurred dating back to 1997 as the prosecutors, and even a judge, in the case were pressured or threatened in the way they should carry out activities. In 1999, Judge Monroy resigned and fled the country, later to say that he had been approached by the then-Secretary of Strategic Planning in the Arzu administration (Howard Yang), suggesting that “Father Orantes was the most likely suspect and that the investigation should focus on him” (DoS, 2000b). The prosecutor who took over at the end of 1997 resigned and also fled the country. Others, with an interest in securing

justice in the case, have reported intimidating acts committed towards them (Human Rights Watch, 2000).

In other case-related developments, DNA testing was used on 17 suspects, including Father Orantes and 12 active or former military members. These were compared with crime scene evidence--with no link found. As the government's commission took no action and was "defunct by year's end" (DoS, 2000b), the total progress was nil in this important case which would give the government a solid opportunity to prove itself. Impunity appears to be the word of the decade, and the numbers of cases and situations that come to light regarding them make the allegation impossible to negate.

Events of 2000.

The Arzu administration ended as President Alfonso Portillo assumed office. It was reported: "Human right issues received unprecedented official attention following the January 2000 inauguration" (Human Rights Watch, 2001b). To be specific, within two months, he declared a national day of honor for the civil war victims, ratified the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearances, and even admitted state-responsibility for past human rights violations in front of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR). The latter admission included involvement in the murder of Myrna Mack in 1990. He called the investigation into the murder of Bishop Juan Girardi a "national embarrassment" (Human Rights Watch, 2001b). These acts drew praise from IACHR.

As we ended the year, Amnesty International was critical of President Portillo, stating that he had not fulfilled promises made as he took office (2001). However, other organizations did cite positive actions. In a particular overview of the situation, Mr. Guillermo Fernandez-Maldonado, Chief of MINUGUA's Human Rights Area stated:

The pace of implementation of the Guatemalan Peace Accords has stagnated during the past two years, making it necessary for the Government and the URNC to jointly revise the original timetable. In November 2000 they agreed to extend the timetable until the year 2003. (G. Fernandez, personal communication, 5 June 2001)

In conjunction with that stagnation, and among human rights initiatives taken, President Portillo, asked the United Nations to extend MINUGUA's stay (Human Rights Watch, 2000). As a result of this request:

On December 2000 the UN Secretary General presented to the General Assembly a comprehensive phase out plan and timetable to extend MINUGUA's presence in accordance with the new calendar (see UN Doc. A/55/389). Additionally, both the Government and the URNG asked the UN to continue to give support to the peace process until 2003 (ibid. par.9). On December 2000 the General Assembly voted and approved Resolution 177, renewing MINUGUA's mandate until December 31, 2001 (see UN doc. A/55/177). Additional extension should be considered during the 56th period of sessions of the General Assembly by the end of year 2001. (G. Fernandez, personal communication, 5 June 2001)

Several important statements regarding the effectiveness of MINUGUA came out during the extension discussions. The U.N. delegate from Mexico (a co-sponsor of the initiative), Gustavo Albin's comments perhaps sum them up best:

The presence of MINUGUA had been very positive. Guatemalan society had recognized that the United Nations had given certainty and trust to the process of implementation of the peace agreements. There was a consensus among the co-sponsors of the need for MINUGUA to remain in the country until 2003, he said. He underscored that MINUGUA was the key instrument in promoting peace. Guatemala was a success story of the United Nations, and the parties had borne clear witness to the undertaking of the peace process. The international community had witnessed many positive changes in Guatemala, but there were still challenges to

overcome. The co-sponsors of the resolution trusted that the General Assembly would renew its commitment to Guatemala. (United Nations, 2000)

Thus, it appears that MINUGUA is on track to stay and provide additional monitoring capability.

One major initiative taken was an attempt to name a civilian Minister of Defense; this was struck down as unconstitutional. The President, as Commander in Chief, cannot name a civilian to that post (DoS, 2001f). A very telling civilian appointment, which has continued through two presidential administrations, is that of Mr. Arquitecto Guillermo Pacheco Gaitan. Brigadier General Tulion Espinosa appointed Mr. Pacheco as Civilian Advisor to the Minister of Defense (MOD) (within the Arzu administration). He has now served three MODs (R. Phares, personal communication, May 30, 2001). In terms of the civilianization of other positions, President Portillo has been slow to carry out his commitment to dissolve the Presidential Military Staff, and have its duties taken over by civilians (DoS, 2001f).

Like most of his predecessors, Portillo inherited ineffective law enforcement and judiciary, as well as a high incidence of common crime and vigilante justice. Human rights issues were generally characterized by the U.S. State Department within this statement: “The government generally respects the human rights of its citizens in many areas; despite improvements in some areas, serious problems remain in others” (2001f). However this is diluted by an environment where “the climate of impunity is a serious problem” (DoS, 2001f). All in all, it’s about the same comment made in previous years—again, demonstrating the slow, pain-staking process of such changes.

Mr. Fernandez of MINUGUA commented that in the overall scheme of things,

The initial positive signals [by the Portillo administration] do not constitute a comprehensive strategy: progress has been confined to the international arena where, at the initiative of the Presidential Human Rights Commission (COPREDEH), Guatemala accepted responsibility on a number of cases before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights for violations committed during the internal armed conflict and has ratified certain international human rights treaties. (G. Fernandez, personal communication, 5 June 2001)

He also noted in a very recent related development that the COPREDEH President, Mr. Victor Hugo Godoy was dismissed in May of 2001—making “very difficult the prospects for further advances in the implementation of progressive human rights policies” (G. Fernandez, personal communication, 5 June 2001).

The National Police draw attention as some of their officers committed extrajudicial killings (DoS, 2001f). However, it appears that positive changes (which have been anticipated before) may be forthcoming. The U.S. State Department documented the following after credible reports of some incidents of police involvement in forced disappearance, and torture and mistreatment of detainees:

Despite greater numbers of police officers on duty throughout the country, and less public apprehension about filing complaints against the police, the total number of such complaints remained roughly the same as the previous year. Arrests and administration sanctions against police officers remained high. In May the Secretariat for Strategic Analysis (SAE), the President’s Peace-Accords-mandated civilian think tank, announced that it had discovered a database containing the names and other personal information of over 650,000 persons given to the SAE by Military Intelligence; the database appeared to have been compiled several years earlier. (DoS, 2001f)

The Portillo administration took a more proactive role in combating lynching. In conjunction with increased PNC actions, the government conducted antilynching campaigns (assisted by MINUGUA) with over 50 workshops that targeted the areas

where lynchings had previously occurred. The initiative appears to be a success as the towns involved had not had any recurrences (DoS, 2001f).

Judicial system reform measures are being undertaken—even as legal officials continue to receive threats on occasion. Admittedly, much remains to be done within the rule of law. One area noted is the courts lack of determination to use their discretion in dismissing “frivolous or patently invalid motions” (DoS, 2001f).

Initiatives underway include a new law on legal careers which:

establishes a system to regulate income, terms of office, promotion, training, disciplinary measures, and other activities of judges and magistrates, as well as their support for professionalism and independence.” The new law was designed to speed up trials and reduce corruption by recognizing and protecting competent judges while creating mechanisms to remove incompetent or corrupt ones (DoS, 2001f).

A second initiative is the creation of “Justice Centers.” These bring together the various players within the legal system—to include judges and other officers of the court, police, military officers, and civil society—in a “team approach to dispute resolution and problem solving” (DoS, 2001f).

In the case of the murder of Bishop Girardi, additional, seemingly more credible arrests have been made which include two military officers and a former presidential military staff member. The State Department’s annual report (2001f) termed the investigation as “nearing conclusion.”

In a most recent update (as of June 10, 2001), “in a landmark decision, Guatemalan courts convicted three military officers and a priest for the killing” (Latin America Working Group [LAWG], 2001) of Bishop Gerardi. Colonel Disreal Lima Estrada was the senior official (a former chief of military intelligence). “He was accused . . . of masterminding the killing to keep the bishop from testifying against the military in

future trials” (LAWG, 2001). A captain and a sergeant, along with the colonel received 30-year prison sentences. Father Mario Orantes (an original suspect) “received 20 years for participating in a cover-up” (LAWG, 2001).

This decision marks an enormous step forward for justice in Guatemala. . . . To get to this point, judges, prosecutors and witnesses involved in the case endured numerous death threats and attacks, including grenade attacks against one of the judges. But the difficulties are not over. The defense may still appeal the verdict. Moreover, Judge Jose Eduardo Cojulun, the head of the three-judge panel, announced that he has received numerous death threats since the sentence. . . . In a surprising move, the prosecutors urged at the end of the trial that new cases be pursued against other military officers higher up the chain of command for their involvement in or cover up of the bishop’s murder. (LAWG, 2001)

In a final note, related to Guatemala, Eduardo Stein (a former Minister of Foreign Affairs for Guatemala) led a mission which “conducted a forthright, transparent, and proactive observation of the electoral process” (Human Rights Watch, 2001a) in Peru. It is significant (at least to this researcher) that a Guatemalan was selected to head such a delegation. This should indicate progress in the overall democratic process in Guatemala, but was a passing comment within a single report—that of Human Rights Watch (2001a).

Additional Information

Concerns Regarding General Jose Efraim Rios Montt.

Although not addressed in the chronology of events, due to the early period of his presidency (March 1982 to August 1983), General Rios Montt’s continued involvement in government is a apprehension to human rights organizations in Guatemala. His power base appears to be increasing as he currently serves as the President of Congress and was the founder of President Portillo’s political party (Amnesty International, 2001b), and in fact, is Portillo’s father-in-law (Freedom House, 2000b). Montt was constitutionally

restricted from the presidential election in 1995, subsequently won by Arzu, and Portillo has been susceptible to the accusation of being Montt's surrogate (Freedom House, 2000b).

This researcher will not go into a lot of previous details, but rather simply document the matter with some facts stemming from his stint as president. Even though "today many Guatemalans consider the former general a savior who brought the open conflict with guerrillas to a close" (Ball, Kobrak, & Spierer, 1999, pp. 38-39), the short period of his presidency saw the highest rates of murders and disappearances occurring during any single administration. Clearly when the numbers of murders and disappearances for the Rios Montt presidency are combined with those of his predecessor (Lucas Garcia, who served from 78-82), these were the bloodiest years (Ball et al., 1999, pp. 37-39).

In overall numbers, the Lucas Garcia presidency saw approximately 9,000 such casualties, while over 12,000 occurred during the Rios Montt Regime. (Rios Montt assumed power in a coup, and lost it the same way to Mejia Victores.) The International Center for Human Rights Investigations (CIIDH) database tallied nearly 18,000 killings and disappearances in 1982. "Though the intensity of the killing declined in 1983, by then the country had become almost entirely militarized. . . . Violence became more rural and less discriminating" (Ball et al., 1999, pp. 24-37). The numbers actually spiked from under 4,000 in 1982 to less than 2,000 in 1984 (Ball et al., 1999, p. 24).

Rios Montt has continued to be active politically since his presidency ended; however it's the resurgence of his formal power that has observers most concerned. His previous actions continue to bring him under close scrutiny under the issue of impunity

for previous wrongdoers. The Center for Legal Assistance in Human Rights (CALDH) and ODHAG are reportedly preparing genocide cases to be brought against Montt and his regime. A similar lawsuit was filed on May 2nd of 2000 by CALDH for similar crimes against former President Lucas Garcia and others within his administration (DoS, 2001f).

Again, to further update in early June 2001:

More than 300 members of Guatemala's indigenous communities filed a suit against . . . Montt, charging him with genocide for massacres carried out under his rule . . . in the early 1980s. Another case has been filed against ex-President Romeo Lucas Garcia, who preceded Rios Montt. As in the Gerardi case, the communities, lawyers, and others involved in these suits are at tremendous risk. (LAWG, 2001)

Overall Aid Perspective.

It was noted earlier, in the first chapter of this study, that there are many more types of aid in addition to military assistance, which the U.S. government may provide to a specific country through a variety of agencies. While the countries involved in this study were selected, among other reasons, because of the limited military assistance provided during the decade of the 1990s, that is not to say that there were not additional U.S. dollars flowing in under a variety of programs.

In the case of Guatemala the aid package has been on an overall decline, especially analyzing the most recent years (since 1998). This looks to continue in FY02, should the Congress approve the agency requests. The primary cuts will come in Development Assistance (DA) and Economic Support Fund (ESF) allocations. Over the long term, we can note that the total package, within the categories provided within this research, that aid has dramatically declined over the last 10-12 years from almost \$160M in 1990 to \$51M in 2001.

Note that Guatemala has received an additional category of funding not provided to El Salvador or Nicaragua—that of International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE). Table 12 offers information regarding the types and amounts of aid provided by year and program. The chart cites economic and military assistance and totals that year to year; the final column on the far right denotes additional funding specifically for rule of law assistance. The rule of law data is provided from a GAO study that looked at that category of assistance for the specific 6-year period of 1993-98 (GAO, 1999a).

Table 12

U.S. Economic & Military Assistance to Guatemala, FY '90-01 (Dollars in Thousands)

Year	IMET ^a	DA	CSD	ESF	PL 480	Peace Corps	FMF	FMS Grants	Narc/ INC/	Total	Rule of Law Assistance
1990	428	35,275		87,000	26,843			9,000		158,546	
1991	399	34,295		60,000	25,542	4,257	5,000			129,493	
1992	210	28,225		30,000	23,909	2,560	2,000			86,904	
1993	153	21,000		10,000	24,839	2,748			3,000	61,740	3,578
1994	36	19,278				2,608			2,500	24,422	1,291
1995		--	--		--	--			2,100	2,100	357
1996		31,152			9,784	3,413			2,550	46,899	1,760
1997						2,862			2,000	4,862	5,721
1998	223	23,338		25,000	12,481	3,104			2,000	66,146	2,359
1999	253	16,400	11,135	25,000		3,219			3,000	59,007	
2000	228	13,150	7,810	20,000					3,000	44,188	
2001											
(E)	250	20,330	7,810	20,000					3,000	51,390	
2002											
(R)	350	16,210	8,500	10,000		3,835			4,000	42,895	
Total	2,530	258,653	35,255	287,000	123,398	28,606	7,000	9,000	27,150	778,592	15,066

Note. Dashes indicate information not available. IMET = International Military Education & Training. DA = Development Assistance. CSD = Child Survival & Diseases. ESF = Economic Support Fund. PL 480 = Public Law 480; Food Assistance. FMF = Foreign Military Financing. FMS Grants = Foreign Military Sales Grants. (E) = Estimate. (R) = Recommended. ^aInformation derived from DSCA (1999); remainder of table from Personal Communication from S. Duncan (DoS) derived from various annual Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ): Foreign Operations.

Realize also, in terms of IMET, that Guatemala has been restricted to using those dollars for E-IMET-specific training, complicated by late release of funding and Congressional notification requirements for most of the period of time covered by Table 12 (D. Stevens, personal communication, April 19, 2001). IMET has remained constant (between \$225,000 and \$250,000 since 1996) and is projected to go up to \$350,000 in FY 02 should the budget request make it through the entire approval process. Of additional importance is what restrictions might be placed on Guatemala in using those funds. Will they be held to E-IMET courses only, or will they be permitted to secure other military training?

To be clear in addressing rule of law funds, they came from a variety of sources—“at least 35 entities from various U.S. departments and agencies”—including DoD (GAO, 1999a, p. 2). USAID supplied approximately 64 percent of these funds (GAO, 1999a, p. 2), and oftentimes funds within DA and ESF categories incorporate rule of law funding (G. Thome, personal communication, July 2, 2001). All or some of these funds may be included within other categories shown on Table 12. Therefore they are listed as a separate category/column and not included in the “Total” column within the chart.

The rule of law assistance, for the overall funding for this 6-year period covered by the GSA report, did not come close to the level that El Salvador received. Guatemala received just over \$15 million compared to El Salvador’s \$40.7 million. The political decision-making environment could be implied; however, potentially most valuable would be the assessment that the variety of funds permits the U.S. government to specifically target areas of concern for aid programs. While this may be considered a good feature of grants, it does not preclude the country (in this case Guatemala) from

short-funding other programs for which grants are provided and using internal dollars for other budgetary issues (fungibility) (Nice & Fredericksen, 1995, pp. 64-65). You will recall ESF funds “enable a recipient to devote more of its own resources to defense and security purposes [or other national priorities] than it could otherwise do without serious economic or political consequences” (Samelson, 1994, p. 648).


This, in no way, is presumed to be the total amount of U.S. assistance, but should be a significant portion of the aid provided through official government channels. It is intended to provide a better idea as to the variety of funding sources and potentially extensive dollar amounts that could be granted. Additionally, in terms of trends, all three countries within this study have faced substantially less economic support from the United States (easy to see when comparing Table 12 with Tables 7 and 17).

The following statement made in conjunction with El Salvador in the previous chapter also rings true for Guatemala. In the long term and in the context of this study, the emphasis needs to be placed on the fact that the variety of packages that further democratization, rule of law, and human rights issues, make it difficult to truly evaluate a program on its own merits. In essence they provide more variables to be considered influencing the outcomes of all programs.

Military Strength

Throughout the discussion of Guatemala, the military—due to its dominance in control of government and its size during the civil war—was at the heart of the issue. The downsizing of the military is noted; Figure 2 provides a more graphic picture of the measures taken.

The story in Guatemala is the dramatic drop in the paramilitary forces over the downsizing of the formal military establishment. The paramilitary Civil Defense Patrols, noted earlier throughout this chapter—and historic human rights offenders, have dropped from close to 613,000 members in 1990-1991 to nonexistence. They were disbanded in 1996.



The decline of military forces has been virtually totally absorbed by the Army. In fact over the last 10 years, the Navy has grown by 50 percent (going from 1,000 to 1,500 members. The Air Force has been cut almost in half (1,300 to 700), while the Army has dropped in strength from 41,000 members to a little over 29,000 (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990 & 2000). Actual numbers and comparison with El Salvador and Nicaragua are contained in Table 3.

E-IMET Student Survey Information/Data

Guatemala Survey Response.

The survey of previous E-IMET students was the cornerstone of this research. As stated in Chapter 3, survey data was sought from attendees of specific courses that incorporated human rights issues within course objectives. Within the list of eight courses, Guatemalan students had attended all of them over the years. The bulk of the students attended between 1997 and the present.

Two courses received no response within the returned student surveys: D173036 (Civil-Military Strategy for Internal Development) and P309051 (Defense Institute of International Legal Studies). The former, a course conducted with regional attendance at Hurlburt Field, Florida had only 2 attendees for a class conducted in 1998. Guatemala was the only one of the three subject countries that had participated in this particular course. Thus the study received no input for this one of the eight subject courses. The latter course, P309051, had 34 attendees for an in-country Mobile Education Team conducted in 1994. This was the only conduct of this course in Guatemala over the years; however, there were a total of 12 respondents from El Salvador and Nicaragua

where other iterations of the course were conducted in 1995 and 1999 respectively. Thus the study did receive input for that particular course.

All but one of the schools provided this researcher with the dates and number of attendees to the courses that it sponsored prior to the release of the survey. The one exception was the Center for Civil-Military Relations, which provided limited dates and student numbers (for course P309070) at the outset, but was able to provide a full accounting after the surveys had been returned to the researcher. Thus, some of the student numbers included in this report were provided within days of the report's conclusion. Due to this agency's lack of an electronic data base and time for the staff to research after-action reports for each class, this data was difficult for the school provide.

To reiterate Chapter 3, no names of students were provided to this researcher to ensure that participation was strictly voluntary. Table 13 depicts the numbers of students that attended each course each year since the inception of E-IMET.

The overall percentage of responses for El Salvador was accurately calculated at 5.2 percent. Based on the total population of 231 potential respondents, this researcher was anticipating a substantially better return rate. However those that were returned provide some very meaningful data—particularly in a couple of areas. Be aware that of the three countries participating in this study, El Salvador, covered in Chapter 4, provided the greatest response to the survey in numbers of returned questionnaires (66 respondents who attended 68 courses—an 8.5 percent response rate). Nicaragua, covered in Chapter 6, provided the highest rate of return at 24 percent, even though it had the smallest number of attendees (146).

Table 13

Course Attendees/Survey Respondents Comparison—Guatemala

Year	B171801		B171425		D171032		D176006		P309061		P309070		Total Students by Year	
	Att	Resp	Att	Resp	Att	Resp	Att	Resp	Att	Resp	Att	Resp	Att	Resp
1991			6	0									6	0
1992			7	0									7	0
1993													34	0
1994													0	0
1995											10	0	10	0
1996													0	0
1997	1	0			2	0					43	2	46	2
1998					4	1	8	2	43	1			57	4
1999			1	1							63	1	64	2
2000			3	2	4	0							7	2
2001														
Unk Date ^a		1										1		2
Total by Course	1	1	17	3	10	1	8	2	43	1	116	4	231 ^b	12
Resp Rate %	100		17.6		10.0		25.0		2.3		3.4		5.2 ^b	

Notes. Attendee numbers were available/obtained from all schools. Both of the students that attended D176006 attended an additional course (one attended D171032/one attended P307090). The student that attended P309061 also attended P309070. Thus 3 students attended multiple courses. Att = Attendees. Resp = Response(s).

^aNumbers in Unknown (Unk) Date row specifies respondents that indicated no particular year of the course attended, but did indicate the course. ^bThe total number of attendees, and the overall percentage of respondents factors in the 2 non-respondents from D173036 and 34 non-respondents from P309051. Both of these courses showed a 0% return rate, and were eliminated from the table for reasons of space.

This researcher did query the Security Assistance Office (SAO) regarding the low response. Among potential complications was this project's timing—coming at a time when key Guatemalan personnel were also working other important projects. It was noted that there had been a number of personnel moves over recent days, making it more difficult to get the instrument to those who should participate. Lastly, record keeping may have played a part, especially for the P309070, as the SAO had only a list of names with no additional data to work from (F. Santizo, personal communication, July 11,

2001). Regardless, this researcher appreciates the much time spent by the SAO in following up and providing information as it became available.

General conclusions and comments derived from the overall response will be addressed in Chapter 7. This is where Guatemala's input is most important as it's consolidated with that of El Salvador and Nicaragua.

Guatemalan officials fared much better in contacting students that had attended courses conducted in the United States. They were successful in reaching the one student that had attended the National Defense University (B171801) and three of the four students that had attended the Command & General Staff Officer Course (B171425) since 1998. The latter course also had 13 students in 1991-1992, but no responses came from those early attendees. Responses also came from 3 of the 18 students that had attended the two courses offered by the Inter-American Air Force Academy (D171032 and D176006). On the other hand, only 5 of the 193 students that had attended in-country courses taught by Mobile Education Teams responded.

For the courses conducted by Mobile Education Teams (METs) in-country, after-action reports were the primary source of data used to contact students—and the in-country advisors were largely “on their own” based on the records they maintained internally. For P309070, internal record keeping was even more important as this researcher could not provide any significant information regarding the dates or student attendees of this particular course. This, without a doubt based on SAO comments impacted their effort.

One third of the respondents represented NGOs, and two of them had attended more than one course. Five of the nine respondents were military and the other respondent was a civil service employee in the ministry of defense.

Overall Survey Evaluation Synopsis.

The limited survey response from Guatemala negates this researcher from making any generalizations; however the responses, in most areas shadow those of El Salvador and Nicaragua. As with El Salvador, there were no course-dependent differences with the exception of one, which dealt specifically with the Informational Program (discussed in Chapter 2). The IP applies only to courses conducted in the United States, and this particular question will be addressed separately later in this discussion. With that exception, and due to the small number of respondents from these courses in particular and the lack of disparity in the ratings/comments between courses, the general questions addressed in the survey will be addressed in the context of the overall response in Chapter 7.

Lastly, because of the nature of the survey, the most valuable information comes strictly from the frequency of answers to the survey. The survey in English is at Appendix H (in Spanish at Appendix I). The codebook for responses is at Appendix L and the frequency tables for all responses from Guatemala are at Appendix N. (The frequency tables for El Salvador and Nicaragua are at Appendixes M and O respectively; frequency tables consolidated by question for all three countries is at Appendix P.)

Survey Findings.

Table 14 delineates the responses to the key questions, and compares them with the overall findings when all three countries are evaluated jointly. You'll note that there were extremely minimal differences within a number of answers between Guatemala's respondents and the overall statistics. Within the case studies of El Salvador and Nicaragua, the discussion centered on the survey's implications in meeting E-IMET goals; but because of the small number of responses, there will be limited discussion of the survey's findings for this country—especially in that regard. However, there are a couple of areas worth highlighting.

The areas of interest include the use of e-mail in Guatemala, which appears to be more significant than El Salvador or Nicaragua. The other issue is contact with the school by the previous students subsequent to the course.

Three-fourths of the respondents from Guatemala had access to e-mail. This is significantly higher than the 11-12 percent of those in El Salvador and Nicaragua. (Obviously e-mail access may/will vary greatly from country to country.) Again, due to the low response rate, it's important not to make too much of this. However, because of this, I inquired with the SAO regarding the use of e-mail in Guatemala. In actuality, even though response lagged, the SAO was able to send the survey instrument to approximately 15 people who had attended the subject courses. (One of those students responded.) Those dispatched were based only on the persons for whom the SAO had e-mail addresses, not the fact that others do/do not have e-mail capability. It's the belief of the SAO that most of the persons that would have participated in IMET/E-IMET courses would have e-mail access currently. In fact, that office has added the opportunity for the

Table 14
Survey Responses—Guatemala/Overall Survey Comparison

Survey Question and Description	Guatemala Response	Consolidated Survey Response (All Respondents)
ID Data: Contact Method	77.8% provided e-mail addresses	17% e-mail
2. Respondent still in same organization.	88.9% still in same organization.	91% still in same organization
3. Respondent moved to higher level position since attending the course.	66.7% moved to a higher level position since attending the course.	38% moved to a higher level position since course
4. Respondent anticipates a move to higher level position in the future.	66.7% anticipate moving to a higher level position; 55.6% within the next 5 years.	67% anticipate moving; 38% within 5 years.
5. Does the respondent currently have the opportunity to impact policy.	77.8% currently can impact policy; those 77.8% impact in the areas of military, human rights, or military justice policy.	75% currently impact; 61% impact the specified areas.
6. Respondent expects to be in a position to influence policy in the future.	55.6% expect to be in a position to influence policy in the future; 44.4% in areas noted in question 5.	63% expect to be in a future position; 54% in the specified areas.
7 & 8. Respondent recalls human rights discussions during the course.	100% recall human rights discussions; 88.9% consider personal freedom & human rights more than previously.	81% recall human rights discussions; 86% consider the areas more than before.
9. Course discussions have been helpful for student's leadership abilities or duty performance?	88.9% believed that their course had been helpful in providing leadership capabilities or enhanced duty performance.	80% believed the course helpful in duty performance.
10. Respondent's subsequent contact with school faculty.	44.4% of the students had made some contact with the school since course completion. (Guatemala is the only country whose students had made contact with their schools.)	4% of students had some contact with school since course completion. 4.4% didn't know how to contact the school.
11. Rating course aspects using Likert scale (0-5):		
11a. Knowledge of US systems.	100% rated helpful to very helpful.	77% rated helpful to very helpful.
11b. IP Program.	No applicable students from Nicaragua.	Only CONUS students that responded to the survey were from El Salvador and Guatemala.
11c. Interaction with US personnel.	100% rated helpful to very helpful.	76% rated helpful to very helpful.
11d. Interaction with other personnel within home country.	100% rated helpful to very helpful.	77% rated helpful to very helpful.
11e. Interaction with personnel from other countries.	88.9% rated helpful to very helpful .	64% rated helpful to very helpful.
11f. Professional skills enhanced.	100% rated helpful to very helpful.	76% rated helpful to very helpful.
11g & h. Additional helpful knowledge or skills	33.3% provided inputs to these questions, with no large consensus on any particular response. Specifically noted were 22% citing military professionalism.	45% provided inputs. Civil-military relations and military justice each received 11-12%, another 8% cited legal procedures as areas of insight.

student to annotate an e-mail address on an internal information form which is maintained for future reference (F. Santizo, personal communication, July 20, 2001).

School contact appears to be another area in which Guatemala may have some deviation with the other two countries. Almost half of the students responding (four of the nine) stated that they had made contact with course officials at some time following the conclusion of the course. Of those four respondents, all four cited the use of e-mail or fax as the means of contact, and three of the four noted their e-mail address within their identification data for the survey. Additionally, of the four, all of them provided a date (month and year of their contact) and two of them provided the name of the person with whom they had interacted—thus more ably documenting a viable contact.

Another area that may be worthwhile to note is the IP program (question 11b). It received favorable reviews from all five students for which it was applicable. There were only 7 respondents with the 66 from El Salvador and no respondents from Nicaragua for which the IP had any part of their training regimen. Within Guatemala, all students who attended CONUS courses (which would have been the only ones for whom this question would have been applicable) rated the IP as helpful to very helpful segments of the course.

School Course Director/Instructor Survey Information/Data

The key input that would have come from this instrument was the opportunity provided by each school for additional student contact following their course attendance. Of primary interest is the means of contact. The approximate volume and subjects of

discussion for those contacts were also sidelight questions, realizing that it is likely that the schools may not have a tracking system of inquiries of previous students.

Only one response was received between the eight course directors for the courses included in this study. This was from the Center for Civil-Military Relations. Based on the lack of student-noted follow-up contact with the schools, it's likely a reasonable assumption that there was very little basis for each school to respond. Because of the importance of this information, an additional request for responses was dispatched specifying that a negative response was more valuable to the research than the lack of a response from their agency. Still no additional inputs were received.

The lone respondent, CCMR, provides a web site to encourage contact. The degree of its use would also be dependent upon the availability of Internet and e-mail connectivity of course attendees. Although no timing was requested or provided by the respondent, an approximate total of 6 contacts were noted from Guatemala. The first CCMR course for Guatemala was conducted for 10 students in 1995; the most recent was held in 1999. Thus it's likely that one to two contacts per year (on average) may come from this country back to course officials. Of particular interest (coming from the survey data), one of the respondents noted a contact with the course director of the CCMR in January 2001. This person had attended the course in August of 1997.

Again, the lack of school responses to the short survey requesting their information, along with the void of contact noted within the student responses, would indicate little information to provide.

Conclusion

In beginning the study, this researcher selected Guatemala (as well as El Salvador and Nicaragua) due to the perceived “limited” amount of aid it had received over the years—especially military aid. While “limited” aid may have been applied by some standards, humanitarian assistance through a variety of programs still assisted the country in its development and cannot be discounted (never the intent of this researcher). It is in this context that we must base any and all conclusions.

As with El Salvador, it is difficult to conclude that E-IMET (as a stand-alone program) has had a dramatic input into the human rights/rule of law areas of growth within the country. For Guatemala, it’s easier to delineate E-IMET over IMET due to restrictions placed in applicable/available courses for their students. But again, it would be remiss to discount the value of the program based on the information available to us based on the audience it targets and accesses in the overall scheme of U.S. grant programs.

As of this date, approximately \$2.5 million dollars of IMET (but predominantly E-IMET) has been provided since the inception of the Expanded IMET program—and it’s a very small percentage of U.S. aid going to Guatemala during that same period. While it’s difficult to come up with the total aid package due to so many sources, for those supplied to this researcher by the U.S. State Department contacts, it would appear that easily less than one percent of all aid to Guatemala over the last 10 years came in the form of E-IMET.

During the previous decade and into the year 2001, the world’s perception is that of progress within the human rights arena for Guatemala, especially since the Peace

Accords were signed in 1996—only 4-5 years ago. The statistics covered in Table 10 definitely demonstrate the decline in incidents of abuse. Even with the caveat that these statistics may not be totally accurate, they are the ones viewed by policy-makers in Washington who determine not just the amount of aid that Guatemala will receive each year, but (as we've seen) to a great degree how it specifically can be used. All indications corroborate there is no comparison with how things are in Guatemala now compared to the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Unlike El Salvador, the U.N. Verifications Mission (MINUGUA) is staying on considerably longer—at the request of all parties in Guatemala. But then again, the indicators show that Guatemala may be about where El Salvador was in the early 1990s (based on the current Freedom House ratings). Additionally, it could be argued that Guatemala had further to go after a much longer civil war than either El Salvador or Nicaragua. Moreover, perhaps in the minds of some, ONUSAL was pulled out a year or two prematurely in El Salvador, thus ultimately slowing the real progress in years since the withdrawal.

As we, in this study, attempted to provide a concise historical account of progress and setbacks year to year, it can be said that laws and other mechanisms to include government and non-governmental agencies are continuing to be put in place. A number of very high profile murders have overshadowed much of the progress, and the issue of impunity for past crimes is a major issue for Guatemala as it is for a number of countries in the region while a key question remains regarding the future of General Rios Montt's continuing impact on the country's politics. However, most recent progress in justice for the killing of Bishop Gerardi is encouraging.

Reforms have been accomplished in the areas of criminal codes, the training of justice officials and civilian police (GAO, 1999b). In addition the establishment of Justice Centers is seen as a key initiative in resolution of civil issues and availability of legal advice.

The E-IMET program was initiated several years prior to the end of the civil war. Although the country did not require the military downsizing needed within El Salvador and Nicaragua, the “reeling in” of the national civilian police and disbanding of the paramilitary Civil Defense Patrols (in 1996) have been key initiatives. Granted it’s going a bit slower than outsiders (and likely a number of insiders) desire in putting trained personnel in place.

Based on continuing progress, and what we can take away from aspects of this research, even without the generalization of survey data, it would appear that E-IMET has a place in the scheme of aid for Guatemala. The opportunity to further democratization and enhance the relationships between the military, civilian government officials as well as leadership in other government or non-governmental agencies are worthwhile endeavors.

As with El Salvador, perhaps more important evidence of the value of IMET/E-IMET is this research in conjunction with the GAO study concluded in 1999, which looked at rule of law assistance in five Latin American countries (including Guatemala and El Salvador). The GAO found “no instances of duplication of activities and efforts among the U.S. agencies” (GAO, 199b). This would indicate that IMET/E-IMET has a viable and valuable target audience and course materials. The real questions involve how fast can we expect countries with the historic difficulties (in some cases tracking back to

previous U.S. involvement) to affect real change, how much money and other resources to we (the U.S.) want to put into such programs, and the ultimate related question—do we really need to be there? GAO also noted:

In each of the countries we visited host country government and civil society representatives noted that the presence of the international community particularly the United States was needed, not only for the resources it provides, but also to help encourage government officials to devote the necessary resources to enact, implement, and sustain needed reforms. (GAO, 1999b)

Additional comments and recommendations will be provided in Chapter 7; however, this researcher felt it was important to address particulars of all the variety of data—especially in the absence of survey data for Guatemala.

Chapter 6

Case Study: Nicaragua

Introduction

Nicaragua as with the other countries in the region, has had more than its fair share of U.S. interaction within her affairs over the years. As we've looked at El Salvador and Guatemala in the two previous chapters, we'll do the same with Nicaragua—dealing with a “stroll down memory lane” in terms of human rights-related events over the years, keying in on the preceding decade. We'll follow that with the results of survey data derived from previous E-IMET students from Nicaragua.

The Precursors of U.S. Involvement

Nicaragua is similar to the other two countries parlayed in this study in that it also endured a long civil war that ran from 1979/1980 to June of 1990. To cite this window of time is very deceptive as periods of unrest were so common during the mid to late 1970s (Landau, 1993, p. ix), but the ten-year period, as stated is generally accepted coming in the post-Somoza era.

U.S. military involvement in Nicaragua dates back to 1853 when President Franklin Pierce sent in troops “to protect American lives and interests during political disturbances” (Landau, 1993, pp. 13-14). However, it went beyond protection of assets as he went on to authorize “U.S. Naval forces to destroy the town of San Juan del Norte

‘to avenge an insult to the American Minister to Nicaragua’” (Landau, p. 14) the next year. The crux of the matter was Nicaragua’s plan to build a transportation line which would take passengers between the two oceans—which would have proven to be a direct competitor one owned by Cornelius Vanderbilt (Landau, p. 14).

Continued interests were high in the 1890s as “U.S. forces invaded Nicaragua three more times. . . . to ‘protect American interests during political unrest’. . . ‘protecting lives and bridges’” (Landau, 1993, p. 14). In 1909, another U.S. incursion was precipitated by then-Guatemalan President Jose Santos Zelaya. He aligned with European and Japanese interests in a concept that would link the two oceans. Realize that the Panama Canal was completed in 1914 (Landau, p. 15). The administration subsequently was toppled as U.S. marines again landed, and Adolfo Diaz assumed the presidency. The marines actually remained in Nicaragua from 1912 to 1933 (in and out from 1925-1926, returning due to further internal problems), supporting Diaz (Landau, pp. 16-17). Diaz, who had served as president on two previous occasions, had internal struggles, and actually left office in 1929, but did remain somewhat politically active (MacLeod, 1998, para. 1). The marines were pulled out in 1933 when Congress “refused to appropriate money for the continuation of the U.S. expeditionary force” (Landau, p. 17) after training the Nicaraguan National Guard to fulfill their role in maintaining order (Landau, p. 17).

Perhaps the reference earlier to the Vanderbilt financial interests sounds a bit like the vested U.S. financial (United Fruit Company) interests in Guatemala that initiated U.S. reservations and subsequent actions against the Arevalo and Arbenz administrations of the 1940s and 50s (Landau, 1993, p. 152). In actuality United Fruit joined forces with

the U.S. government, “donating \$1 million toward the overthrow of the Zelaya government” (Landau, 1993, p. 15).

Years of turmoil and guerilla actions (both counter and promotional of United States interests) culminated with the Somoza “dynasty” assuming power in 1934. The family—father and two sons—with “total loyalty to the United States” (Landau, 1993, pp. ix, 18-19), ruled from 1934 until 1979 through dictatorship and repressed elections (Landau, 1993, p. 24). An earthquake (after which the Somoza family and military leadership stole aid contributions) and the Carter administration’s push for human rights were the last straws for the regime. After bitter fighting in 1978 and 1979, the family left the country, leaving the Sandinistas in control (Landau, 1993, pp. 32-33). It’s at that point, we pick up with more recent history that includes the U.S. (CIA and military advisory) support of the Contra insurgency against the Sandinista government (led in the 1980s, the 90s, and even currently by Daniel Ortega). The facts also include the Contras use of guerrilla tactics out of Honduran base camps to wage a war of attrition (Landau, 1993, p. 61).

The numerous (16) years of war ended in 1990 having had a dramatic price tag on the Nicaraguan people—in terms of lives, money, and other resources as well as the “spread corruption and cynicism” (Landau, 1993, p. 62). Largely because of the discredit the U.S. had brought to bear through financial blockade of resources, Nicaraguans elected Violeta Barrios de Chamorro as their new president. It could have been or could appear that she was elected not because she “could deliver a meaningful program . . . but because the war and suffering had tired them” (Landau, 1993, p. 64).

In 1993, three years after her election victory, Mrs. Chamorro faced a divided nation, divided not between Sandinistas and Contras, but between

the old elite and the affluent middle class on the one hand, and the vast majority of Nicaraguans on the other, who were not only dirt poor but deprived of the benefits that the revolution provided. There were sparse health and education funds available in the budget, and Washington even withheld some of the promised \$325 million in aid until Mrs. Chamorro complied with new demands. The State Department stipulated that she purge Sandinista members from the ranks of the officer corps of the armed forces and return the lands confiscated over the ten years of revolution to their former owners. . . . [Although not fully complying] She did . . . diffuse a looming conflict with Washington by offering compensation to former owners. (Landau, 1993, p. 65)

Indeed, even today, the Sandinistas continue to be a political force (as we'll note further in the upcoming review of annual events)—Daniel Ortega is alive and well, having run for the presidency of Nicaragua again in 1996, losing to current President Arnoldo Aleman (DoS, 1998c; Freedom House, 2000c).

As a closing note, before moving on the next task, throughout the course of these three country studies, this researcher has included aspects of U.S. foreign policy which, dependent upon the eyes of the beholder, could be taken as positive or negative. It should be remembered that, regardless of the perception of the reader, military intervention and/or security assistance (as discussed in earlier chapters) is an element used to pursue U.S. national policy and interests. It is in that respect, that much of the credit or blame (as it may sometimes be affixed as either), is placed on the administration sitting in the White House at the time. In the instance of Nicaragua, whether it's President Pierce or Reagan, much is to be considered from perceptions at the time. This researcher had the opportunity to spend the fall of 1984 in Honduras—due to security issues, tension was high at that time as Soviet-built military hardware was entering the region. Regional stability was a verbalized concern of the Reagan administration.

In terms of security assistance, again, remember that it “began primarily in response to events that threatened U.S. interests—for the most part, threats to friendly states from neighbors supported and encouraged by the former Soviet Union” (GAO, 1992, pp. 13-14). In Latin America during the 1990s, “Nicaragua was the second largest recipient of Soviet Arms” (Military News, 2001) following obviously behind Cuba. In both countries, deliveries “were quite large . . . [involving] hundreds, if not thousands of units of armored, tank, and aviation equipment” (Military News, 2001).

Realizing that it’s always easier to look back with 20/20 hindsight, let’s now turn our attention to data and developments in dealing with human rights issues in Nicaragua over the most recent decade—essentially since the end of the civil war.

Human Rights Abuse Statistics

Reviewing available human rights “statistics” for Nicaragua quickly becomes murky. Much less can be drawn from the numbers of human rights abuse complaints or alleged offenses contained on Table 15—in terms of the ebbs and flows, increases and decreases in numbers of “reported” incidents, as consolidated by the U.S. State Department that what we could deduce from the same reports from El Salvador and Guatemala. There is little standardization of data, which makes categories of information difficult to compare from year to year. In many cases, little to no information is available.

Also most noteworthy is the lack of an international agency keeping track of any numbers of incidents. In both El Salvador and Guatemala, you’ll recall, there were U.N. missions (ONUSAL and MINUGUA respectively) monitoring events throughout the

Table 15

Human Rights Abuses (Complaints or Alleged Offenses) – Nicaragua

Year	Extrajudicial Killings	Torture	Illegal Arrest &/or Arbitrary Detention	Estimated % of Incarcerated Awaiting Trial
2000	Nat'l Police Inspector General (IG) – 6 (These are instances in which a police officer killed an alleged criminal. Additionally, there were 35 instances where police seriously wounded criminal suspects while attempting to arrest them.)	ANPDH – 70; PPDDH – 40 Nat'l Police IG – 177 (Nat'l Police figures include those submitted by ANPDH & others; 50 of the 177 had merit) Nat'l Police - 863 (Complaints of illegal detention & police abuse including those from Office of Civil Inspection for Primary Responsibility (IG found that 177 of these had merit)	ANPDH – 155 Of the cases sent to the Nat'l Police by ANPDH & other organizations, 28 were investigated. Of these 2 were determined to be without merit & 26 were continuing investigation at year's end.	Per government statistics only 4% of the prison population had been in jail for 6 months or longer awaiting trial (Total prison population – 4903)
1999	Nat'l Police IG – 18 (These are instances in which a police officer killed an alleged criminal. Additionally, there were 2 instances where police seriously wounded criminal suspects while attempting to arrest them)	ANPDH – 70 Nat'l Police IG – 94 (Nat'l Police figures include those submitted by ANPDH & others; 26 of the 177 had merit) Nat'l Police – 529 (Complaints of illegal detention & police abuse including those forwarded by the Office of Civil Inspection for Primary Responsibility (IG found that 155 of these had merit)	ANPDH – 113 Of the cases sent to the Nat'l Police by ANPDH & other organizations, 13 were investigated. Of these 9 were determined to be without merit & 13 were continuing investigation at year's end.	As many as 33% jailed 6 months awaiting trial. (Total prison population – 5,298)
1998	Nat'l Police IG – 23 (These are instances in which a police officer killed an alleged criminal.; 11 of these were deemed improper)	Nat'l Police – 870 (Complaints of illegal detention & police abuse including 388 forwarded by the Office of Civil Inspection for Primary Responsibility (IG found that 309 of these had merit)	Nat'l Police – 120 (Illegal detention complaints coming from individuals, as well as organizations such as ANPDH & CPDH)	More than 33% jailed 6 months awaiting trial. (Total prison population – 5,570)
1997	No Data Available.	Few allegations of torture by authorities. (However, the Office of Civil Inspection for Primary Responsibility received 360 formal allegations of illegal detention & police abuse. 323 cases were investigated, 42 were deemed human rights cases)	ANPDH – 94 (Complaints received Jan-Jul only for illegal or arbitrary detention by the National Police and army)	35.6% jailed for 6 months or more awaiting trial. (Total prison population – 3,946)
1996	No Data Available.	Isolated incidents of torture by authorities. (However, the Office of Civil Inspection for Primary Responsibility received 192 formal allegations of illegal detention & police abuse through September only.	ANPDH – 77 (Complaints received Jan-Jun only for illegal or arbitrary detention by the National Police and army)	No Data Available. (Total prison population – 3,752)

		98 cases were investigated, 25 were deemed human rights cases)		
1995	No Data Available.	No confirmed reports of torture by authorities; however, there were credible reports of abuse by police, often to obtain confessions. (The Office of Civil Inspection for Primary Responsibility received 194 formal allegations of illegal detention & police abuse through September only. 33 were deemed human rights cases)	ANPDH – 171 (Complaints received Jan-Nov only for illegal or arbitrary detention by the National Police, out of a total of 377 police-related complaints received during that period)	CPDH – nearly 50% awaiting trial for 6-24 months (Total prison population – 3,299)
1994	No Data Available.	ANPDH – 118 cases of inhuman or degrading treatment (The Office of Civil Inspection for Primary Responsibility received 360 formal allegations of abuse of power, illegal detention & negligence. 85% of these were against police/20% against prison guards, immigration officials, & other enforcement authorities)	ANPDH - 183	CPDH – nearly 50% awaiting trial for 6-24 months (Total prison population – 2,900)
1993	No Data Available.	Numerous credible reports of beatings & other physical mistreatment by police, often to obtain confessions	CPDH – Estimated illegal detentions in the hundreds	CPDH – nearly 50% awaiting trial for 6-24 months
<p><u>Note.</u> ANPDH = Nicaraguan Association for Human Rights. PPDDH = Nicaraguan Government Ombudsman's Office for the Defense of Human Rights. CPDH = Nicaraguan Permanent Commission for Human Rights. Information derived from Department of State Human Rights Reports, 1994-2001.</p>				

country in efforts to sustain negotiated peace accords. Even though no numbers are infallible—and ONUSAL and MINUGUA drew criticism—it would be easier to accept them from an agency that would have no theoretical ties to either government or other national organizations. In the case of Nicaragua, there are five principal organizations which provided data accepted by the U.S. State Department and integrated into their annual reports.

The first organization is the National Police—obviously a government agency. In terms of the real law enforcement issues (the categories of extrajudicial killings, torture, and illegal arrests/arbitrary detention), their figures consistently stand out. Credibility of those figures will be addressed in looking within our year-to-year review, but overall the judgment of the reader is still an important ingredient.

The second agency is also from the Nicaraguan government, covering a wide scope of human rights indicators. The Office of Civil Inspection for Primary Responsibility (formerly called the Civil Inspection Unit of the Ministry of Government) is shown within the table (15) due to its all-encompassing numbers and the opportunity for those statistics to provide insight.

The third agency is the Nicaraguan Association for Human Rights (ANPDH)—an NGO. Although the ANPDH seems to be an organization that's on the up-and-up, their figures largely become a part of overall National Police statistics that show a much higher incidence rate than does the ANPDH on its own.

The same can be said regarding the Nicaraguan Ombudsman's Office for the Defense of Human Rights (PPDDB). (This governmental agency would be equivalent to the PDH in Guatemala.) This agency is cited only once within the DoS reports, in the 2000 edition. Again, as with the ANPDH, the number of reported incidents is so small compared to those cited within the National Police (for torture), causing question.

Lastly, the Nicaraguan Permanent Commission for Human Rights (CPDH) appears to have been most active in the early 90s in the single arena of prison reform. This is also a governmental organization. Although further indications are provided in later years for that statistic, no actual office is cited within the DoS report.

A few other human rights organizations will be mentioned later within this segment of the report, but they were not major players in the DoS synopsis of major categories.

Because these numbers do not tell the whole story, and need some dialogue as we go from year to year, this researcher (as done in the previous two chapters) will assert comments generated by annual reports from sources such as the U.S. Department of State, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and Freedom House. All are respected for their work in monitoring human rights issues worldwide, with the State Department drawing from a variety of sources for their documentation.

Also as before, keep in mind that the Department of State publishes figures (and non-governmental organizations also attempt to monitor and advocate systematic advances) regarding areas such as domestic violence against women and children, labor protections, and other categories of human rights issues. The categories addressed within Table 15 were considered by this researcher as the most important—especially due to the continuing problems that the U.S. continues to deal with in its relationship with Guatemala and other countries in the region. (This researcher could find no other report that better documented numerical data in any form than the State Department Annual Country Reports for Human Rights Practices. The Department of State provides these numbers within narrative comments and not in table or graph form.)

A major difference in the format of Table 15 covering Nicaragua from that of El Salvador (Table 5) and Guatemala (Table 10) is that there is not a column for the category of “Forced Disappearances.” Forced disappearances were not shown on this

chart, since no significant data was provided within DoS (annual) Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.

The simple statement made in the reports from 1994 through 2000 (1995c, 1996c, 1997c, 1998c, 1999c, 2000c, 2001g) was: “There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances.” For 1993, the DoS annual report (1994c) stated, “Official forces are not known to have been responsible for disappearances during the year, and there are no reliable accounts of other groups having been responsible for such actions.” While the column simply omitted to provide the best use of space within the table for other data, it is important to note the coverage and verbiage of the DoS reports with respect to forced disappearances.

Freedom House Ratings

Over the years Freedom House, a non-governmental human rights organization scores each country around the world in terms of political rights, civil liberties, and freedom status. Table 16 shows the organization’s ratings from year to year for the country of Nicaragua (from 1972, when their process was initiated, up to the present).

To briefly explain the ratings, the characters representing scores for each year are, from left to right, political rights, civil liberties, and freedom status. Each of the first two is measure on a one to seven scale, with the number one representing the highest degree of freedom and seven being the lowest. “F,” “PF,” and “NF” respectively stand for “free,” “partly free,” and “not free,” Countries whose combined averages for political rights and for civil liberties fall between 1.0 and 2.5 are designated “free”; between 3.0

and 5.5, “partly free”; and between 5.5 and 7.0 “not free.” A more detailed methodology for the Freedom House ratings is at Appendix K.

Table 16

Freedom House Ratings for Nicaragua

Year	Country Ratings	Year	Country Ratings
1972-73	4,3,PF	1987-88	5,5,PF
1973-74	5,4,PF	1988-89	5,4,PF
1974-75	5,4,PF	1989-90	5,5,PF
1975-76	5,4,PF	1990-91	3,3,PF
1976-77	5,5,PF	1991-92	3,3,PF
1977-78	5,5,PF	1992-93	4,3,PF
1978-79	5,5,PF	1993-94	4,5,PF
1979-80	5,5,PF	1994-95	4,5,PF
1980-81	5,5,PF	1995-96	4,4,PF
1981-82	6,5,PF	1996-97	3,3,PF
1982-83	6,5,PF	1997-98	3,3,PF
1983-84	6,5,PF	1998-99	2,3,F
1984-85	5,5,PF	1999-00	3,3,PF
1985-86	5,5,PF	2000-01	3,3,PF
1986-87	5,6,PF		

Note. From Freedom House, 2001.

These ratings will be interwoven intermittently throughout the subsequent discussions as we look at annual events within Nicaragua.

Human Rights Initiatives and Developments

Events Prior to 1992.

In opening the discussion regarding Nicaragua, we can note that the worst periods were prior to the primary timing for this study. Nicaragua was never as high in the Freedom House ratings (see Tables 6, 11, and 16) in the early years as either El Salvador or Guatemala—again, indicating greater difficulty in the grand scheme of democratization. (This will become more evident in subsequent paragraphs.) However,

the scores bottomed out around the same period of time as the other two countries. Nicaragua reached its all-time low with “6,5, Partly Free” ratings for the three rating periods between 1981-1984. It has fluctuated a bit more than either El Salvador or Guatemala, but hovering around “5,5”—moving to “5,5” between 1984 and 1986; to “5,6” in 1986-87; to “5,5) in 1987-88; to “5,4” in 1988-89; and back to “5,5” in 1989-90. (All were rated “Partly Free” during each of those periods.) It has not been that low since (Freedom House, 2001). In 1990-91, it moved significantly to “3,3, Partly Free” (Freedom House, 2001), but has continued to fluctuate as we’ll see in upcoming comments.

Recall as we moved into the 90s, the end of an excruciatingly painful and costly civil war. President Daniel Ortega, a president who won the 1984 election with 67 percent of the vote (McColm et al., 1990, p. 184), lost his formal position in government to President Chamorro in 1990 by 15 percent of the vote (55 to 40 percent) (McColm et al., 1991, p. 279). Much of the early and late 90s can be characterized by the Sandinista’s continued control—even though not in elected power. However, it’s important to view the constitutional, legal, and political conditions that the Chamorro government inherited by going back a bit in time.

In January of 1987, the Assembly (legislative branch) of Nicaragua put together a constitution that suspended civil liberties due to the country’s state of emergency—in place due to the conflict with the Contras. There was “no clear separation between the FSLN party and the state, and it institutionalizes the Sandinista army as the national military” (McColm et al., 1990, pp. 184-185). It also allowed the executive branch to “dominate” the other branches of the government, as the “real source of authority in the

country remains the three commissions—executive, military, and governmental—of the FSLN National Directorate” (McColm et al., 1990, p. 185). The United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO) was the primary political opposition of the FSLN—a coalition of fourteen parties “ranging from Marxist left to conservative right” (McColm et al., 1990, p.185).

The worst of the civil war was over in 1988 as the U.S. pulled its aid which had been going to support the Contras only a month after the Sandinistas lifted the state of emergency. “The Sandinistas declared a unilateral ceasefire two months later when talks with the Contras failed to achieve a definitive ceasefire agreement” (McColm et al., 1990, p. 185). It was somewhat quiet, although the Sandinista government followed up on its commitment to other countries in the region to reform its electoral code and move up the scheduled national election from November to February of 1990 (McColm et al., 1990, p. 185). Although UNO did not agree to all the reforms,

[In July of 1990] UNO agreed to support the government’s proposal for demobilizing the Contras, a majority of who had returned to their bases in Honduras. In exchange, the FSLN government agreed to: suspend military conscription until after the elections; rescind laws allowing police to sentence detainees for up to six months without a trial; move up the inauguration of a new government to April 1990; and allow opposition parties to review voter registration lists and monitor vote-counting. However, key UNO demands were turned down, among them: an immediate amnesty for all political prisoners; permission to establish a private television station; and a restructuring of the five-member FSLN-dominated electoral council. (McColm et al., 1990, p. 185)

These negotiating points also serve to illustrate conditions as election day approached. In essence, it’s fair to say “individual rights, civil liberties, and the right to free expression are so narrowly defined and qualified [by the 1987 constitution] as to often make them inapplicable in practice” (McColm et al., 1990, p. 186).

The UNO, and its candidate Violeta Chamorro subsequently won in 1990. The president “delegated comprehensive executive authority to her Presidency Minister and son-in-law, Antonio Lacayo” (Dos, 1994c). Even before taking office, the administration immediately began making policy concessions to the Sandinistas. Lacayo, under threats from the Sandinistas to “govern from below” and without the knowledge of UNO leadership, agreed for Humberto Ortega (Daniel’s brother) to remain in charge of the Nicaraguan military (McColm et al., 1991, p. 279). Additionally, just as important:

Before leaving office, Daniel Ortega had secretly decreed a military law, made public in mid-1990, which makes it virtually impossible to remove Gen. Ortega from his command and grants him complete control over the military’s internal and external affairs. The national police, while part of the interior ministry, remained under the direct command of a longtime Sandinista militant. Finally, Gen. Ortega secretly transferred the state security apparatus from the interior ministry to the army. In sum, the new government took office with no control over the military, the police, or the state security forces. (McColm et al., 1991, p. 279)

There was little power or authority and absolutely no control to be had by the Chamorro administration as the Sandinistas held most of the cards. Various initiatives came and went with the administration having to “cave in and suspend . . . reforms” (McColm et al., 1991, p. 279). The Freedom House annual assessment: “her [President Chamorro’s] administration continues to be overmatched by the extortionist tactics of the Sandinistas . . . and the country continues to be threatened by further upheaval” (McColm et al., 1992, p. 345).

As one example in the human rights policy arena, in 1990, the Chamorro administration government declined to investigate killings supposedly carried out by the Sandinista army and state security forces uncovered by ANPDH (the Nicaraguan Association for Human Rights). Instead they “petitioned the Inter-American

Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States to do so” (Human Rights Watch, 1991a, p. 228). Meanwhile, there were “continuing reports by Nicaragua’s independent human rights organizations of intimidation, false arrest, and torture during interrogation. . . . directed primarily against demobilized Contras and UNO supporters” (McColm et al., 1992, p. 348). Although this researcher is not excusing actions, it appears that the administration was in a “Catch 22.” The hostilities were freshly over, which in itself “removed a major source of human rights violations by both sides” (Human Rights Watch, 1991a, p. 225); however, it was forced to passively handle events as the Sandinistas controlled the base of power. Meanwhile the United States, had resumed some aid packages, but was “disturbed by President Chamorro’s conciliatory policy toward the Sandinistas” (Human Rights Watch, 1991a, p. 229).

The UNO attempted to fight the Sandinistas within the Assembly (where they held the majority) by passing a bill:

requiring the return of an estimated \$1 billion in government property appropriated by the FSLN before leaving office. . . . [However, in response] Daniel Ortega called for a popular uprising and FSLN militants carried out a series of bombings, attacks and armed labor strikes. (McColm et al., 1992, p. 347)

Again, the Chamorro administration was forced to back off. There was a veto of the UNO bill, and agreement to negotiate a new property law. If the political woes weren’t enough “Re-Contra” organizations were also conducting guerrilla actions, adding to the instability (McColm et al., 1992, p. 347) as we move into 1992.

Events of 1992.

The Catch 22 situation continued. While Human Rights Watch made the point that “the government of President Violeta Chamorro reacted responsibly and prudently to tense situations in the countryside” (1991b, p. 289), Freedom House stated that she “remained locked in an ill-considered embrace with the Sandinistas” (McColm et al., 1993, p. 385). The stated goal of “national reconciliation” gave way to cooperation in dealing with Sandinista demands (McColm et al., 1993, p. 386). It was for this reason that “the government apparently continues to believe that jailing suspects involved in politically motivated crimes would elicit charges of political persecution” (Human Rights Watch, 1991b, p. 290). The UNO was having difficulties staying together, culminating with a rift between Lacayo and Alfredo Cesar (President of the National Assembly and head of the UNO opposition) (McColm et al., 1993, p. 387).

Overshadowing human rights issues in particular, the Chamorro government could not “guarantee effectively these rights because the Sandinista army and the police operate with impunity” (McColm et al., 1993, p. 387). However, there were some positive moves. In fact, UNO blamed the Sandinistas for acts of terrorism and threats made on the lives of UNO deputies (Human Rights Watch, 1991b, p. 292). “Threats, physical injury, robbery and detentions” were documented by ANPDH during the year (Human Rights Watch, 1991b, pp. 294-295).

It was these developments that likely caused the degrading of Freedom House ratings (see Table 16) to “4,3, Partly Free” for 1992-93, after having held constant at “3,3” for the previous two years. This would be only the beginning of a negative trend (Freedom House, 2001).

A Tripartite Commission, encompassing representatives from the OAS International Commission of Support and Verification, the Catholic Church, and the government was established by President Chamorro. It was specifically established to look into the deaths of former Contras, and would deliver its first report the following year (DoS, 1994c).

Two other major positive events of the year were the reduction of the Nicaraguan army to approximately 20,000 and the establishment of the Civil Inspectorate within the Ministry of Governance (DoS, 1994c). Figure 3 provides a graphic depiction of the changes in military manpower over the decade; however, the significance of this activity can't be minimized as the military had over 60,000 as we began the decade of the 90s. It should be noted that Nicaragua was encountering similar allegations as Guatemala in that it appeared that many former members (suspected of human rights violations) were being given positions in the national police agency after they left the military or security forces (DoS, 1994c).

The Civil Inspectorate (with some of its work cited in Table 15) provided an additional check and reporting agency in order to monitor human rights issues. It "was created to investigate police abuses and became increasingly active throughout the year" (Human Rights Watch, 1991b, p. 289). Additionally, an Office of Human Rights was established within the Attorney General's office (DoS, 1994c).

Lastly, "some former State Security officials known for human rights abuses who had entered the police force were removed from their posts in conflict areas" (Human Rights Watch, 1991b, p. 289).

While the positives sound good, the negative trend of Sandinista control sets the tone for few expectations of future successes.

Events of 1993.

The “unofficial power sharing arrangement between the Chamorro government and the Sandinistas” (McColm et al., 1994, p. 428) continued in 1993 as did “major persistent human rights problems” (DoS, 1994c). It was “a highly polarized environment, a weak central government (including a feeble judicial system) and violent actions by rearmed groups of *ex-contras* and former Sandinista army soldiers, including two major hostage-taking episodes in mid-year” (Human Rights Watch, 1993, p. 119). Impunity, as we’ve heard the term before, became the byword, as justice was hard to come by.

All of these factors contributed to a continued “loss of support by political sectors that had previously constituted its [the Chamorro government’s] base” (Human Rights Watch, 1993, pp. 119-120). A group of eight former UNO legislators that had formed a Center Group” the year before now “joined the Sandinistas in taking control of the National Assembly” (McColm et al., 1994, p. 429). There were allegations that Lacayo had bribed the Center Group to take those actions, which were backed up by evidence collected by the Comptroller General (Guillermo Potoy). After Lacayo fired Potoy, the “UNO walked out of the national assembly” (McColm et al., 1994, p. 429).

There had also been an attempt by President Chamorro to remove General Ortega as the military chief, as she announced that he would be removed the next year (in 1994).

That also initiated furor as both Daniel and the General told her, in so many words, that she didn't have that authority (McColm et al., 1994, pp. 429-430).

It wasn't just the political environment. As the lack of dialogue politically, stymied all activity. There was a dramatic economic recession with unemployment and underemployment (based on government figures) rated at 50 percent. Social instability was as real as the political problems (Human Rights Watch, 1993, p. 120). To help illustrate—in the hostage-taking episodes referenced above, a Contra group took two Sandinista legislators one day, and a Sandinista group took two dozen UNO leaders the next. After a week all were released, and the government granted impunity to all involved (McColm et al., 1994, p. 429).

There had been progress in the judiciary as “some 70 percent of judges had been replaced during Chamorro's term in office” (Human Rights Watch, 1993, p. 120). However, the continuance of amnesties for previous violators lessened legal restraint on current human rights violators, amid other crimes (DoS, 1994c). The amnesty law (the third one since the election) also considerably lessened both the impact of the Tripartite Commission's report and the “restraints on those inclined to commit human rights abuses” (DoS, 1994c).

The Report did implicate military officers in cases of human rights abuse; however, they were able to flee the country before they could be caught. Internally, problems existed because of the involvement of government officials serving on the committee who had other duties, which, due to other national difficulties, had problems attending the meetings. Also, the lack of publicity given the report was “an important oversight” (Human Rights Watch, 1994, p. 121-122). In a related human rights position

issue, the Office of Human Rights, established within the Attorney General's office the year before, "remained unstaffed" (DoS, 1994c).

All this significant amount of inactivity came as there were credible reports of politically motivated violence ("principally criminal, but often had political overtones")—kidnappings and murders, as well as torture, mistreatment of detainees and other violations (DoS, 1994c). Even if the data compiled on Table 15 is not very accurate (and it is extremely sketchy for 1993), it still denotes problems.

Events of 1994.

The deterioration of civil liberties lived out by the events of the previous year, resulted in another drop of Freedom House ratings (refer to Table 16) for Nicaragua. From "4,3" in 1992-93, it moved to "4,5" in 1993-94. It would remain at this level for 1994-95 as well (Freedom House, 2001).

As noted by this researcher earlier in this chapter, the availability of information regarding the human rights activity in Nicaragua was difficult to come up with. In looking at the implications of events already detailed (including declining Freedom House ratings), this is difficult for this researcher to understand. It's almost as if Nicaragua—even though the U.S. was reluctant in providing military aid, and the international community seemed very interested during the civil war years—dropped off of various radarscopes. In gathering research, it was obvious from the standpoint that Human Rights Watch has had little or nothing to say about Nicaragua since the end of 1991. Progress was not noteworthy; in fact the available data indicates that more monitoring could have been advantageous. However, other countries became important

(remember the Gulf War and the pressing preoccupation with the war on drugs in Latin America), which took on new twists during the early 90s. Granted also, in considering the liabilities faced by all three countries reviewed in this study, there are other countries around the world with greater human rights concerns by the international community—Sudan and China as examples.

Perhaps the following, taken from Human Rights Watch in December of 1991 sums it up best:

Having occupied center stage in the U.S. foreign policy battles of the 1980s, Nicaragua virtually disappeared from policy discussion following the 1990 inauguration of President Violeta Chamorro. Most State Department public comment was measured, and emphasized U.S. support for Chamorro's efforts at national reconciliation; for example, in response to a question on the *recontras* on April 9 [1991], spokesman Richard Boucher blandly stated that all sectors of Nicaraguan society should refrain from violence and contribute to national reconciliation. (Human Rights Watch, 1991b, p. 297)

It's almost as if recognition of the Catch 22 is there, followed by a reluctance to condemn the Chamorro government in maintaining its survivability, realizing that it does somewhat temper or contain the Sandinista regime. Again, notes were taken sufficient enough to limit security assistance dollars flowing into the country (which would have ultimately benefited the Sandinistas more than the government since they held the military power).

Returning to the documented events of the year, politically the power arrangement had not changed; however (in anticipation of the 1996 election) there was a move for constitutional reform. "Sandinista and UNO moderates united around a proposal . . . [to] limit presidential powers and ban close relatives of a sitting president from running for the office" (Karatnycky et al., 1995, p. 432). The Sandinista moderates were actually a

splinter off of the FSLN, following former Sergio Ramirez (former vice president under Daniel Ortega) (Karatnycky et al., 1996, p. 360). Note that this change to the constitution would eliminate Lacayo (with aspirations of his own) from the opportunity. Both Lacayo and Daniel Ortega desired to stop the reforms, with Ortega threatening to “block the reforms ‘in the streets’” (Karatnycky et al., 1995, 432). The initiative was not decided before the end of 1994. In terms of potential presidential candidates, General Ortega, is viewed as a potential contender—especially given the opportunity to name his successor as head of the military, and proceed on for political office, giving him additional power.

Human rights still needed attention. The State Department reported that:

politically motivated or connoted violence continued into 1994, as Nicaraguan society continued to be both politically polarized and heavily armed. The police, army, and Sandinista militants continued to kill demobilized RN combatants, but the number of such murders dropped from a monthly average of 6.1 in 1990 to 4.0 in 1994. (DoS, 1995c)

Hardly a glowing comment, and other negative indicators still exist (per Table 15), as real numbers start to come in for some sort of tabulation. That denotes a good sign however, even though those numbers may definitely be insufficient. At least there is some method of reporting and tracking. In fact, the Department of State commented “major local nongovernmental human rights organizations operated freely without government interference” (DoS, 1995c). In particular it cited that “since its establishment, . . . the Tripartite Commission has been the most effective mechanism for raising human rights allegations to an official level and eliciting a response from government authorities” (DoS, 1995c). The government, apparently, while having the flexibility in dealing with the Sandinistas to initiate monitoring activities, could not get beyond the amnesty/impunity issues to take action on their findings and recommendations.

Two other, potentially significant, changes came through a new Military Code passed by the National Assembly. It overall intended “to strengthen civilian control of the military” (DoS, 1995c) by providing for:

The retirement of current EPS Commander General Humberto Ortega in February 1995, presidential appointment of his successor to a term limited to 5 years, civilian court jurisdiction over common crimes committed by the military and police personnel, prohibition of “political intelligence activities” by the EPS’s Defense Intelligence Directorate (DID), and civilian oversight of the newly created military social security system and of EPS-operated private enterprises. (DoS, 1995c)

Obviously, these are all noble endeavors; however, “by the end of 1994, it was not clear whether or not all of these provisions would be implemented successfully” (DoS, 1995c). As we’ve seen in both El Salvador and Guatemala, the mechanisms have come first—before the resolve of the key players in the process (namely the courts, military, and political leadership to some extent).

Events of 1995.

Politically, the key issue left hanging at the end of 1994—that of limiting presidential powers and banning close relatives of a sitting president from running for office—heads the list of interests. A compromise was reached, and in terms of the potential pool of candidates, nothing changed as both Daniel Ortega and Antonio Lacayo remained potential and active candidates (Karatnycky et al., 1996, pp. 359-360).

In another political decision, a law was passed “ensuring the military’s autonomy” (Karatnycky et al., 1996, p. 359). While an important development in the grand scheme of civilian/governmental control of the military, it meant much in terms of an additional candidate for the presidency. At the law’s passage, General Humberto Ortega designated

his second in command, General Joaquin Cuadra as his successor (Karatnycky et al., 1996, p. 359).

Similar to previous years, with the emphasis on the mechanisms in place to handle social problems and human rights issues (not necessarily accompanied by the wherewithal to enforce them), a law passed which provided for compensation for property confiscation by the Sandinista regime. There were approximately 5,000 claims for such confiscation, however, “implementation and enforcement remained uncertain at best” (Karatnycky et al., 1996, p. 360).

Police and the civil courts are overwhelmed by a “surging crime wave” (Karatnycky et al., 1996, p. 360). In one effort to control armed bandit groups in the north:

Clashes between these bands and security forces resulted in numerous deaths on both sides and heightened tensions in the area. In response, the Government initiated “plan café” (also known as “plan norte”) in November 1994. During the succeeding 6 months, the Government deployed increased numbers of army and police to guard coffee transport routes and to protect farmers from extortion or kidnapping. Local human rights groups reported very few cases of human rights abuses by the security forces deployed in the plan, and producers gave the army and police high marks for responsiveness to public security needs. (DoS, 1996c)

In terms of incarceration of criminals, and although not mentioned previously, it’s important to note that prison were “overcrowded and underfunded” (DoS, 1996c). In 1995, the daily expenditure per inmate fell was \$3.06—down from \$3.67 in 1992. The prison population was 3,299 placing it at 60 percent overcapacity—refer to Table 15 to view the numbers of inmates incarcerated within each year. Police holding cells were also overcrowded, compounding the problem (DoS, 1996c). Although not particularly addressed in this study, prison conditions are an element of human rights concerns.

In reviewing Table 15, a general downturn in incidents of abuse (especially in the categories of torture and illegal arrests) is indicated. A positive measure taken to deal with the human rights violations by police was the conduct of human rights seminars by local human rights groups. The seminars included “members of the police, for both active officers at their regional headquarters and new recruits as part of their initial training” (DoS, 1996c).

One last entry for this year of importance in the relationships between human rights organizations and authorities, as well as military and court cases, was documented by the Department of State:

Senior army and police officials had long impeded the work of the Tripartite Commission by refusing to implement its recommendations or respond to its requests for information. However, on June 6 army commander General Joaquin Cuadra [successor to Gen Humberto Ortega] asked President Chamorro to have the Supreme Court review cases involving military personnel. The Minister of Government submitted a similar request on July 11 for review of cases involving the police. The Supreme Court president agreed to form a three-judge panel of court members to review the cases (10 from the army and 9 from the police) but had produced no rulings by year’s end. (DoS, 1996c)

It would appear that, even with governance problems, and difficult relations between parties, some positive initiatives were coming through—again perhaps more in the mechanics than the execution at this point. Freedom House ratings followed suit as they moved up from “4,5” to “4,4” (both Partly Free) from 1994-95 to 1995-96 (Freedom House, 2001). This would begin an enhanced stance for the upcoming three reporting periods.

Events of 1996.

In 1996, “the government’s human rights record improved measurably, but serious problems remain. Police use of excessive force resulted in incidents of extrajudicial killing, but these diminished from previous years” (DoS, 1997c). Because of the differing reporting periods, noted on Table 15, it’s difficult to determine any significant decrease in events reported. Incidents reported to the Office of Civil Inspection remained fairly consistent with 1995 (although there had been a significant drop noted from 1994 to 1995).

There was no solid documentation of extrajudicial killings until 1998 (by the National Police), so the statement within the DoS report may appear to be anecdotal; however, the OAS CIAV “reported 26 deaths of members of the former Nicaraguan Resistance (RN) occurring during the year, none of which it attributed to security forces, unlike previous years” (DoS, 1997c). In another general statement encompassing other areas of interest, Freedom House commented: “human rights groups have reported continuing intimidation, kidnappings (a USAID official was seized in June), false arrest, arbitrary detention and torture” (Karatnycky et al., 1997, p. 384).

The presidential election was held—a selection between 24 candidates. This was after the Supreme Election Council had banned five candidates, including Antonio Lacayo since he was the son-in-law of the sitting president amid accusations of “diverting \$30 million in Venezuelan aid to finance his campaign” (Karatnycky et al., 1997, p. 383). The 3,000 international observers who witnessed the election found it “free and fair” but with “irregularities and registration problems” (Karatnycky et al., 1997, p. 382).

Arnoldo Aleman, of the Liberal Alliance Party and the former mayor of Managua, won without a run-off election by taking 51 percent of the vote. Daniel Ortega took 38 percent for the FSLN. Topping Aleman's platform was army and police reform. It also included: "economic reforms, dismantling of the Sandinista-era bureaucracy . . . and returning property confiscated by the Sandinistas to its original owners" (Karatnycky et al., 1996, p. 383). He immediately named a civilian defense minister (Jaime Cuadra Somarriba). In addressing an additional long-term concern:

While the Army General Staff continues to be dominated by the Sandinistas the new military code [not yet in effect, and needing a potentially tough to gel coalition to pass in the National Assembly] will secure greater power for the defense minister. (Karatnycky et al., 1997, pp. 383-384)

It does appear, that while impunity for past military violation is documented in virtually all sources, some advances are being made. That 1994 Military Code (mentioned earlier) giving civilian court jurisdiction over military charged with common crimes appears to be moving along. "From January to August the Attorney General for Penal Affairs' office received 136 complaints from civilians against members of the military" (DoS, 1997c). In 10 of 72 cases referred to civilian courts, military members were sentenced; the accused were found innocent in 6 of them; and 56 were in the continuing backlog of cases (DoS, 1997c).

Thus, there appear to be more promising signs as a new president takes office, but much remains to be seen as there is still considerable control by the Sandinista party. Freedom House (see Table 16) documented improvements in political rights and civil liberties and both factors moved up one designation from "4,4" to "3,3" since the previous year. It would remain with that rating the upcoming year as well (Freedom

House, 2001). Note that “3,3” is the best rating ever achieved; however, would conditions allow the rating to remain in place for any significant period of time—it had held for two consecutive rating periods 4-5 years earlier (Freedom House, 2001).

Events of 1997.

In the first year of the Aleman administration, very little was accomplished. “The formerly ruling Sandinistas held the government . . . hostage for most of 1997 by threatening massive disruptions in protest of his land reform policies and market-oriented economics policy” (Karatnycky et al., 1998, p. 389). This led to a call by Aleman for a “‘national dialogue’ to seek peaceful solutions” (Karatnycky et al., 1998, p. 389). Later in the year, the National Assembly did pass law “intended to resolve confiscated property claims” (DoS, 1998c). This is extremely important as private investment was hindered by the slow resolution of the property disputes dating back to Sandinista confiscations of the 1980s (DoS, 1998c).

In terms of human rights, the Department of State related that the government’s record “improved measurably, but some serious problems remain” (DoS, 1998c). However, if you look at the numbers provided with that DoS report (and on Table 15), it would appear that the situation did not improve; rather it appears to have gotten worse. (Keep in mind that all is relevant to the accuracy of reporting the previous years.) In one event of extrajudicial killing (of several reported):

The army killed five members of a criminal band while they slept June 18 at La Patriota. Due to lack of local police presence, residents had asked the army to act against the bandits, who had terrorized the town. The army justified the attack. . . . Human rights groups criticized the army’s action, but La Patriota residents applauded it. The army undertook no investigation of the killings. (DoS, 1998c)

In another related turn of events, the Tripartite Commission ended its four-year tasking to review killings of ex-RN members and others.

The commission sent 83 cases involving 164 murders, as well as 181 specific recommendations, to the Government for follow up. In August the military justice system, which is charged with investigating abuses committed in the course of performance of official duties by soldiers and police, reported that it had complied with all but 1 of the 62 recommendations under its jurisdiction. However, only one soldier and five policemen cited by the Commission ever served a prison sentence. (DoS, 1998c)

In a bit more detail relating to prison population, as related on Table 15, the total inmate population was 3,946 as of July. This places it at “an average of 28 percent over capacity” (DoS, 1998c). The care of prisoners was lacking in terms of food and medical care provided to them. Many inmates were brought food by visiting friends and relatives, and “the lack of available medical care led prisons to release ill prisoners convicted of lesser offenses” (DoS, 1998c).

It seems like steps are taken backwards after a period of time when it appears that momentum could be swinging for positive actions. The political problems continued to be underscored by economic problems as unemployment was estimated at 14 percent, underemployment at 35 percent while the country “continued to have a precarious balance of payments position and remained heavily dependent on foreign assistance” (DoS, 1998c).

Events of 1998.

The Aleman government appeared to make some headway as we look at the events of the year. In a dramatic event, Hurricane Mitch hit Nicaragua, apparently

making it easier, and more necessary for Daniel Ortega to join forces with President Aleman (Karatnycky et al., 1999, p. 343) especially in an effort to rebuild the country's infrastructure (economic and otherwise) (DoS, 1999c).

Additionally, and very important politically, the president "seemed to slip the noose of Sandinista blackmail, successfully ignoring threats of massive disruptions in protest of his policies on land reform and economics" (Karatnycky et al., 1999, p. 342). While FSLN leaders threatened the use of violence in various settings, there were no violent confrontations, as had occurred the year before (DoS, 1999c). This all came at a time (as noted by Freedom House) when "Sandinista leadership was in turmoil over Ortega's adopted daughter's charging him of sexual abuse, which he denies, and complaints that he rules the party through strongman tactics and political inflexibility" (Karatnycky et al., 1999, p. 343).

In fact, "a political crisis in the National Assembly was overcome [early in the year] when the ruling party and the Sandinistas agreed to a reorganization of six legislative committees" (Karatnycky et al., 1999, p. 343). At mid-year, Aleman "reduced the number of cabinet ministries from 16 to 12" (Karatnycky et al., 1999, p. 343).

In similar words as the previous year, the State Department characterized, "the Government's human rights record improved in a few areas, but some serious problems remained" (DoS, 1999c). As we can see by Table 15, it appears that the Inspector General's office of the National Police, under Police Inspector General Eva Sacasa, began to take a more active role in accounting for violations. She "stated that the police themselves are often in great danger when apprehending heavily armed members of

criminal gangs. Nevertheless the authorities deemed 11 [of 23] of these killings improper and sanctioned 11 officers as a result” (DoS, 1999c).

While this only relates to one category of violations, it’s notable that the agency took responsibility around the broad spectrum of events. As another example, (although “a degree of impunity persisted”) the Inspector General’s office sanctioned offenders in a number of other torture/treatment cases, and “police were provided with some training during the year, and salaries were increased” (DoS, 1999c).

Perhaps this will amount to a consolidation of power for the administration, with further innovations and advances to come—in governance and human rights—but the jury’s still out on that. The enhanced political situation permitted Freedom House to upgrade their rating (refer to Table 16) to “2,3, Partly Free” for 1998-99—the best ever rating received by Nicaragua (Freedom House, 2001).

Events of 1999.

Aleman encountered “a major political crisis” (Freedom House, 2000c) as he came under fire for “high-level public corruption, including rumored land deals” (Freedom House, 2000c) in which he was involved, as well a “political non-aggression pact” between his party and the FSLN (Daniel Ortega) (Freedom House, 2000c).

On the corruption issue, one of Aleman’s political rivals, Comptroller General Agustin Jarquin was brought up on questionable fraud charges (subsequently dismissed by the criminal court). Jarquin “had been instrumental in exposing some serious corruption cases” (Amnesty International, 2000c). This, along with land issues turned out to be a costly turn of events at a time when the country “continued to have a

precarious balance of payments position and remained heavily dependent on foreign assistance” (DoS, 2000c). “As a result [of these events], the international community postponed granting Nicaragua Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) status, which would have meant the pardoning of 80 percent of the country’s foreign debt, until 2001” (Freedom House, 2000c).

The political non-aggression or governability accord, although it permitted National Assembly to function more smoothly with constitutional reforms initiated, was a major source of discontent within the smaller political parties as they:

Immediately protested that political power was being “carved up” between the two historic antagonists, including giving them greater representation on both the supreme court and the Supreme Electoral Council. As a result of reforms, Aleman is guaranteed a seat both in the Nicaraguan parliament and in the Central American parliament (thus assuring him immunity from prosecution). After the percentage of votes needed to avoid a runoff in the presidential elections was lowered, from 45 to 40 percent, Ortega’s chances of winning back the presidency were seen as greatly enhanced. (Freedom House, 2000c)

These actions precipitated the degradation of the political rights side of the Freedom House equation down to a 3 from the 2 it had received the previous year (see Table 16). Thus the overall rating dropped from “2,3” back to “3,3” (both Partly Free). It had held the higher rating for one year only, and remained at “3,3” for the most current year as well—in results released within the last few months (Freedom House, 2001).

Again, in similar words to previous years addressing the state of human rights abuses, the State Department reported:

The Government generally respected many of its citizens’ human rights; however, serious problems remained in some areas. Members of the security forces committed several extrajudicial killings, and police continued to beat and otherwise abuse detainees. . . . The Government effectively punished some to those who committed abuses; however, a degree of impunity persisted. (DoS, 2000c)

In reviewing the numbers within Table 15, the numbers do take a downturn. National police figures don't indicate that they are out of the woods by any means in terms of any of the offenses, but they are best ever in looking at previous reports.

In other related events, a member of Aleman's ruling party (Benjamin Perez Fonseca) was selected to be the country's first Human Rights Ombudsman. He came out of his former position as President of the Assembly's Human Rights Commission (DoS, 2000c).

Within the judiciary, there had been a continuing campaign (if you recall even within the Chamorro government) to remove incompetent and corrupt judges on the bench. Ten judges were removed by the Supreme Court within the first 6 months of the year. Since 1997, as Aleman took office, over one-third of the 300 judges in the system have been removed (DoS, 2000c).

While there had been improvements over the years within the criminal law system, the Department of State detailed that the:

Country still lacks an effective civil law system. As a result, cases more properly handled in a civil proceeding often are transmuted into criminal proceedings. One party then effectively is blackmailed, being jailed due to action by the party wielding greater influence with the judge. In addition, this heavy civil-based criminal caseload claims attention from an overburdened public prosecutor's office and diverts resources that otherwise could be directed toward genuine criminal matters. (DoS, 2000c)

This has been a mounting problem over the years. Additionally, as noted by Table 15, the prison population went down by approximately 300 inmates from 1999, but conditions were still "harsh" (DoS, 2000c).

Events of 2000.

The impact of last year's political pact stimulated criticism "by sectors of civil society as a threat to the democratic process and to basic human and civil rights" (Amnesty International, 2001c). The National Assembly enacted the resulting package of far-reaching amendments coming out of the alliance between the two major parties on January 20th. Below is a more in depth reading than that provided above which were recommendations the year prior:

Key elements of the legislation included a change in the requirements that a presidential candidate must meet to avoid a second-round runoff election; expansion of the Supreme Court from 12 to 16 judges; expansion of the CSE from 5 to 7 magistrates; an automatic assembly seat for the outgoing President and Vice President; a requirement for two-thirds majority vote in the Assembly, rather than the previous qualified majority vote, to remove presidential immunity from prosecution; and the replacement of a single Controller General with the current five-person collegial body charged with investigating allegations of wrongdoing or financial malfeasance by Government officials. The legislation provided for election of the President and the Vice President in the first round of voting if one political party wins at least 40 percent of the vote, or if one party wins at least 35 percent of the vote and the party in second place is more than 5 percentage points behind the front-runner. In addition, a party will lose its legal status if it obtains less than 4 percent of the vote in a general election. The latter provision is expected to reduce the number of parties eligible to field candidates in general elections; over 20 parties ran candidates in the 1996 elections. (DoS, 2001g)

Because of the dramatic changes giving the current parties in power more leverage, it's difficult to determine an impact within human rights activities. However, it would appear that there are good reasons for reservations by human rights groups.

In the exact same words as last year's report, the State Department described the status of human rights issues in Nicaragua: "The Government generally respected many of its citizens' human rights; however, serious problems remained in some areas" (DoS, 2001g). Indicators within Table 15, as released by government agencies were mixed as

extrajudicial killings continued a three-year downward trend; however overall complaints of police abuse were up. As we noted in previous discussions (particularly with Guatemala), perhaps the public felt more comfortable in reporting violations now more than ever before—potentially accounting for both the rising numbers of complaints, and the number of those having merit.

It appears that the reporting agencies are doing an admirable job and the mechanics of the system are working; however the courts continue to backlog as the Supreme Court “continued its structural reform program for the judicial system” (DoS, 2001g). For example, of the 48 cases of excessive force the National Police IG referred to the courts during the year, none reached final adjudication (DoS, 2001g).

Another modification in law enforcement came regarding the use of voluntary police:

The National Police recently diminished the role of voluntary police in law enforcement. Volunteer police are private citizens who are contracted by the National Police on a volunteer basis to help fill staffing gaps in several precincts. The National Police provide them with a uniform, and in some CASES, WITH A GUN, AT THE DISCRETION OF THE POLICE CHIEF. Voluntary police do not receive a salary from the state—although they may be “subcontracted” to provide security to businesses and farms—nor do they receive any professional training. Given the sustained criticism of voluntary police for their involvement in human rights violations, on August 8, Chief of Police Franco Montealegre approved a new police statute terminating the employment of voluntary police in Managua. Government authorities report that there still are 3,303 voluntary police located throughout the country. (DoS, 2001g)

Perhaps this will prove to be a trend in the years to come (as rural areas have traditionally been more difficult to control).

Another development came in a rule of law issue, involving the accused right to counsel:

In criminal cases, the accused has the right to legal counsel, and defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty. The Judicial Organic Law [recently passed] provided for the establishment of a Public Defender's office to represent indigent defendants. The office in Managua maintained a staff of 13 appointed public defenders throughout the year; however, more are needed. The Court has requested funding for 26 additional public defenders to be located outside of Managua. Elsewhere in the country where public defenders have not been available, the system in effect before the passage of the new law continued in use. Under that system, the presiding judge appoints attorneys from a standard list to represent indigent defendants, but, because they are not paid by the State, many attorneys have paid a fine of about \$8.30 (100 cordobas) rather than represent such clients. (DoS, 2001g)

You may note that the fine of 100 cordobas in Nicaraguan currency has been the standard for a number of years. The value in U.S. dollars has fluctuated from \$1.50 in 1996 to \$10.00 in 1998, dependent upon the valuation against the dollar (DoS, 1997c/DoS, 1999c). The designation of a viable public defenders office corrects a long-standing problem of adequate representation of accused persons.

Amid the concerns of human rights groups in the Assembly's actions earlier in the year, "with some exceptions, human rights groups operated without government interference" (DoS, 2001g). Amnesty International reported that human rights and NGO organizations "were threatened" (2001g).

Additional Information

Overall Aid Perspective.

It was noted earlier, in the first chapter of this study, that there are many more types of aid in addition to military assistance, which the U.S. government may provide to a specific country through a variety of agencies. While the countries involved in this study were selected, among other reasons, because of the limited military assistance

provided during the decade of the 1990s, that is not to say that there were not additional U.S. dollars flowing in under a variety of programs.

Nicaragua's aid package appears to be much smaller (just over one-third) of that of El Salvador, and considerably less than Guatemala. Table 17 offers information regarding the types and amounts of aid provided by year and program, demonstrating that Nicaragua has taken significant cuts since it received substantially more (by internal comparison) in 1992 and 1993, after years of no flow of U.S. funds. Keep in mind that President Chamorro was supported extensively as she won the 1990 presidential election against former Sandinista President Daniel Ortega (who received no support from the U.S.). However, the Sandinista military still maintained substantial control preventing democratic reforms. Thus what may have been believed to encourage positive outcomes, did not materialize (along with the change of U.S. presidential administrations' perspectives—Bush to Clinton).

Table 17 cites U.S. economic and military assistance and totals that year to year; the final column on the far right denotes additional funding specifically for rule of law assistance. The rule of law data is provided from a GAO study that looked at that category of assistance for the specific 6-year period of 1993-98 (GAO, 1999a).

IMET funding was nonexistent prior to FY 97—again the ultimate sanction. From 1999, it's held constant at around \$200,000 per year, and the FY 02 request would grant a substantial increase, upping the total to \$375,000.

The rule of law funds noted within the table came from a variety of sources—"at least 35 entities from various U.S. departments and agencies"—including DoD (GAO, 1999a, p. 2). USAID supplied approximately 64 percent of these funds (GAO, 1999a, p.

2), and oftentimes funds within DA and ESF categories incorporate rule of law funding (G. Thome, personal communication, July 2, 2001). All or some of these funds may be included within other categories shown on Table 17. Therefore they are listed as a separate category/column and not included in the “Total” column within the chart.

Table 17								
<u>U.S. Economic & Military Assistance to Nicaragua, FY '90-01 (Dollars in Thousands)</u>								
Year	IMET ^a	DA	CSD	ESF	PL 480	Peace Corps	Total	Rule of Law Assistance
1990							0	
1991							0	
1992		22,000		150,000	32,000	659	204,659	
1993		42,000		125,000	22,808	882	190,690	8,078
1994		36,941		29,000		824	66,765	3,676
1995		--	--		--	--	0	606
1996		37,234				1,873	39,107	1,688
1997	57					1,583	1,640	1,707
1998	74	23,560		1,000	5,465	1,897	31,996	3,084
1999	200	16,600	11,940			1,869	30,609	
2000	194	14,450	7,932			2,405	24,981	
2001								
(E)	220	16,690	6,858	1,495		2,539	27,802	
2002								
(R)	375	17,000	7,000	1,500		2,659	28,534	
Total	1,120	226,475	33,730	307,995	60,273	17,190	646,783	18,840

Note. Dashes indicate information not available. IMET = International Military Education & Training. DA = Development Assistance. CSD = Child Survival & Diseases. ESF = Economic Support Fund. PL 480 = Public Law 480; Food Assistance. FMF = Foreign Military Finance. FMS Grants = Foreign Military Sales Grants. Narc/INC/INCLE = International Narcotics Control & Law Enforcement. (E) = Estimate. (R) = Recommended. ^aInformation derived from DSCA (1999); remainder of table from Personal Communication from S. Duncan (DoS) derived from various annual Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ): Foreign Operations.

Specifically looking at rule of law assistance, for the overall funding for this 6-year period covered by the GSA report, was \$18.8 million. This was less than half of the \$40.7 million that El Salvador received, and slightly more than the \$15 million provided

to Guatemala. The political decision-making environment could be implied; however, potentially most valuable would be the assessment that the variety of funds permits the U.S. government to specifically target areas of concern for aid programs. While this may be considered a good feature of grants, it does not preclude the country (in this case Nicaragua) from short-funding other programs for which grants are provided and using internal dollars for other budgetary issues (fungibility) (Nice & Fredericksen, 1995, pp. 64-65). You will recall that it was specifically cited that ESF funds “enable a recipient to devote more of its own resources to defense and security purposes [or other national priorities] than it could otherwise do without serious economic or political consequences” (Samelson, 1994, p. 648).

This, in no way, is presumed to be the total amount, but should be a significant portion of the aid provided through official government channels. It is intended to provide a better idea as to the variety of funding sources and potentially extensive dollar amounts that could be granted. (Realize that, especially in the period of time impacted most by Hurricane Mitch, significant aid would have also come into the country via private and religious groups.) Additionally, in terms of trends, all three countries within this study have faced substantially less economic support from the United States (easy to see when comparing Table 17 with Tables 7 and 12).

In the long term and in the context of this study, the emphasis needs to be placed on the fact that the variety of packages that further democratization, rule of law, and human rights issues, make it difficult to truly evaluate a program on its own merits. In essence they provide more variables to be considered influencing the outcomes of all programs.

Military Strength.

Similar to El Salvador and Guatemala, the Nicaraguan military—due to its eminence within the Sandinista organization—has been a stumbling block to democratization and progress in human rights. During previous discussion, the downsizing action within the military was noted. To provide a visual perspective on the actions, Figure 3 is supplied.




Figure 3. Military/Paramilitary Strength—Nicaragua

Nicaragua has had no paramilitary forces since 1991. Prior to that time, there were a small number (approx 1,300) Ministry of Interior troops.

Graph information derived from International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990-2000.

Nicaragua can more easily be compared to El Salvador in that there's been a significant reduction in formal military forces (vice the paramilitary in

Guatemala). The drop has occurred very significantly throughout all three branches of the military. The Army has obviously been the major contributor declining from 57,000 to 14,000. However, in percentage and raw numbers, the Navy and Air Force have also kept pace. The Navy dropped by over 75 percent over the last decade (from 3,500 to 800) while the Air Force went from 3,000 to 1,200—a 60 percent decline (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990 & 2000).

Actual numbers and comparison with El Salvador and Guatemala are contained in Table 3.

E-IMET Student Survey Information/Data

Nicaragua Survey Response.

The survey of previous E-IMET students was the cornerstone of this research. As stated in Chapters 3 and 4, survey data was sought from attendees of specific courses that incorporated human rights issues within course objectives. Within the list of eight courses, Nicaraguan students had attended three of them just since 1999. (You'll recall that Nicaragua has been extremely limited in IMET funding over the early 1990s.) Therefore virtually all students are recent graduates of E-IMET programs. Additionally Nicaragua had the smallest number of graduates, a total of 146.

Another anomaly within the Nicaraguan experience is the absence of any students coming to the U.S. for courses. As of this writing, Nicaragua has its first student in many years currently attending a CONUS course at WHINSEC's Command & General Staff Officer Course; the student will graduate in December 2001.

All three courses within the study received at least an 18 percent response rate; one achieved over 39 percent. The overall response rate was 24 percent. This researcher is very pleased with this result—which is almost three times the rate of El Salvador (see Chapter 3) and five times the rate of Guatemala (Chapter 5). Thus it provides the best opportunity to generalize results within the country.

Recall from the previous chapters, all but one of the schools provided this researcher with the dates and number of attendees to the courses that it sponsored prior to the release of the survey. The one exception was the Center for Civil-Military Relations, which provided limited dates and student numbers (for course P309070) at the outset, but was able to provide a full accounting after the surveys had been returned to the researcher. Thus, some of the student numbers included in this report were provided within days of the report's conclusion. Due to this agency's lack of an electronic data base and time for the staff to research after-action reports for each class, this data was difficult for the school provide. These conditions speak well of the security assistance personnel in researching previous attendees within internal records, enabling the "tracking down" of these students who would have all attended a week-long course within the country.

To reiterate from Chapters 3 and 4, no names of students were provided to this researcher to ensure that participation was strictly voluntary. Table 18 depicts the numbers of students that attended each course each year since the inception of E-IMET. Another important note regarding the demographics of the respondents was that 81 percent identified themselves as military members. Only one person identified as a

civilian affiliated with an NGO, while two were civilians not associated with the Defense Ministry.

Table 18

Course Attendees/Survey Respondents Comparison—Nicaragua

Year	P309051		P309061		P309070		Total Students by Year	
	Att	Resp	Att	Resp	Att	Resp	Att	Resp
1991								
1992								
1993								
1994								
1995								
1996								
1997								
1998								
1999	38	7			28	11	66	18
2000			80	15			80	15
2001								
Unk Course ^a								2
Total by Course	38	7	80	15	28	11	146	35
Resp Rate %	18.4		18.8		39.3		24.0	

Note. Attendee numbers were available/obtained from all schools. All 7 students that attended P309051 also attended P309061; one of those students also attended P309070 (attending all three courses). One other student attended P307061 and P309070. Thus 8 students attended 9 multiple courses. Att = Attendees. Resp = Response(s).

^aThe number in the Unknown Course row specifies respondents that indicated no particular course or dates that they attended.

Overall Survey Evaluation Synopsis.

The findings were parallel between the countries. Generally, very minimal differences occurred in the responses between the countries—especially Nicaragua and El Salvador, which supplied the predominant amount of data. Because Nicaragua had no students that attended CONUS courses, there were no course-dependent differences.

(Therefore the Informational Program, introduced in Chapter 2 and discussed in relation to surveys received in El Salvador and Guatemala, will not be discussed). Due to the sometimes small number of respondents from some courses in particular and the lack of disparity in the ratings/comments between courses, the general questions addressed in the survey will be addressed in the context of the overall response in Chapter 7.

Again, because of the nature of the survey, the most valuable information comes strictly from the frequency of answers to the survey. The survey in English is at Appendix H (in Spanish at Appendix I). The codebook for responses is at Appendix L and the frequency tables for all responses from Nicaragua are at Appendix O. (The frequency tables for El Salvador and Guatemala are at Appendixes M and N respectively; frequency tables consolidated by question for all three countries is at Appendix P.)

Survey Findings.

Table 19 delineates the responses to the key questions, and compares them with the overall findings when all three countries are evaluated jointly. You'll note that there were extremely minimal differences within most answers between Nicaragua's respondents and the overall statistics. General perceptions and answers did not vary significantly between the countries.

Much discussion has occurred over the issue of the target audience within the years of IMET/E-IMET training. Are we reaching the students that need the training—those persons with significant levels of responsibilities, either currently or forthcoming, who can impact policy? The survey response favorably indicates that the E-IMET program is doing so in Nicaragua. Over 80 percent of those responding saw themselves

Table 19

Survey Responses—Nicaragua/Overall Survey Comparison

Survey Question and Description	Nicaragua Response	Consolidated Survey Response (All Respondents)
ID Data: Contact Method	11.5% provided e-mail addresses	17% e-mail
2. Respondent still in same organization.	96% still in same organization.	91% still in same organization
3. Respondent moved to higher level position since attending the course.	30.8% moved to a higher level position since attending the course.	38% moved to a higher level position since course
4. Respondent anticipates a move to higher level position in the future.	65.4% anticipate moving to a higher level position; 61.5% within the next 5 years.	67% anticipate moving; 38% within 5 years.
5. Does the respondent currently have the opportunity to impact policy.	80.8% currently can impact policy; 73.1% impact in the areas of military, human rights, or military justice policy.	75% currently impact; 61% impact the specified areas.
6. Respondent expects to be in a position to influence policy in the future.	57.7% expect to be in a position to influence policy in the future; 57.7% in areas noted in question 5.	63% expect to be in a future position; 54% in the specified areas.
7 & 8. Respondent recalls human rights discussions during the course.	76.9% recall human rights discussions; 92.3% consider personal freedom & human rights more than previously.	81% recall human rights discussions; 86% consider the areas more than before.
9. Course discussions have been helpful for student's leadership abilities or duty performance?	96.2% believed that their course had been helpful in providing leadership capabilities or enhanced duty performance.	80% believed the course helpful in duty performance.
10. Respondent's subsequent contact with school faculty.	Virtually no student noted any contact with the school since course completion. 3.4% didn't know how to contact the school.	4% of students had some contact with school since course completion. 4.4% didn't know how to contact the school.
11. Rating course aspects using Likert scale (0-5):		
11a. Knowledge of US systems.	80.8% rated helpful to very helpful.	77% rated helpful to very helpful.
11b. IP Program.	No applicable students from Nicaragua.	Only CONUS students that responded to the survey were from El Salvador and Guatemala.
11c. Interaction with US personnel.	73.1% rated helpful to very helpful.	76% rated helpful to very helpful.
11d. Interaction with other personnel within home country.	76.9% rated helpful to very helpful.	77% rated helpful to very helpful.
11e. Interaction with personnel from other countries.	69.2% rated helpful to very helpful (30.77% rated as N/A – likely due to no other countries involved in the course).	64% rated helpful to very helpful.
11f. Professional skills enhanced.	80.7% rated helpful to very helpful.	76% rated helpful to very helpful.
11g & h. Additional helpful knowledge or skills	92.7% provided inputs to these questions, with no large consensus on any particular response. Specifically noted were 34.6% with military justice, 30.8% with legal procedures, and 15.4% with civil-military relations.	45% provided inputs. Civil-military relations and military justice each received 11-12%, another 8% cited legal procedures as areas of insight.

in positions to impact policy currently, while two-thirds expected to be in an even better position to impact policy in the future. Most of these perceived their impact in the areas of military, human rights, and military justice policy or issues.

When asked if they remembered human rights-related discussions during their courses, 76.9 percent did recall discussions. Even more than those who recalled the discussions, 92.3 percent went a step further to acknowledge that they considered personal freedoms and human rights more than they had prior to their courses. These numbers are telling, not only that students remember curriculum areas, but also moreover tend to apply them. (Note that this percentage, would tend to dispute the findings of the GAO in 1992 cited earlier in Chapter 2; however, the students involved in the GAO study were primarily attending technical skill-related training as opposed to PME or other programs with the human rights emphasis of E-IMET. The focus on human rights would likely have not been as intense in those technical courses.)

Virtually all respondents (96.2 percent) felt the course was ultimately helpful to them in performing their duties after their return—assisting them in the area of leadership or enhancing duty performance. This input was further reinforced by the 80.7 percent believing the course was helpful to very helpful in building their professional skills (in question 11f).

In all four of the closed-ended (Likert scale) questions (11a, 11c, 11c, and 11e) within the survey applicable to all students, responses indicated that many U.S. target areas for IMET and E-IMET are being addressed with an encouraging likelihood of being met. Those include building and enhancing relationships between U.S. and home-country officials as well as providing an environment for dialogue between the civilian

and military communities within each country. Between 70 and 80 percent answered those facets as being helpful to very helpful.

The question (11e) addressing enhanced relations between officials of various countries also received a significant response of over 69 percent (10 percentage points higher than that of El Salvador), making it a very solid indicator based on the fact that many of the courses would have included persons only within the country where it was conducted. Although multi-country course participation was not particularly addressed in this survey due to the desire of the researcher to keep the survey brief, the courses conducted in the United States would have had multiple countries participating. Some of the Mobile Education Teams also could have had a regional flavor—with one country hosting the team and attendees from other countries in Latin America.

Questions 11g and 11h were left open-ended by this researcher to expressly provide the opportunity for respondents to provide a more detailed response and/or add any additional comments as to how they saw the course as beneficial. Over 90 percent of the respondents from Nicaragua took the time to write in a response. These answers indicated strong ties between the courses to areas like military justice and legal issues (both of those areas drawing over 30 percent of the response. Additionally human rights and civil-military relations each received specific comment in over 15 percent of those fill-in-the-blank responses. Because of the higher concentration of military members within the Nicaraguan sample, the greater variety of answers seen in these questions within the sample from El Salvador did not occur. However, even the smaller variety of answers, would still indicate that it's difficult to segregate many of the principles of democratization.

One other comment to register regarding the student survey is that 11.5 percent from Nicaragua indicated the availability of e-mail. This is noteworthy, especially in the context of the continuing growth of e-mail as a means of communication and the virtual absence of any contact noted between the respondents and the schools that conducted their courses. E-mail may very well hold the key in terms of ease of contact between the two and will be addressed in Chapters 7 and 8.

School Course Director/Instructor Survey Information/Data

The key input that would have come from this instrument was the opportunity provided by each school for additional student contact following their course attendance. Of primary interest is the means of contact. The approximate volume and subjects of discussion for those contacts were also sidelight questions, realizing that it is likely that the schools may not have a tracking system of inquiries of previous students.

Only one response was received between the eight course directors for the courses included in this study. This was from the Center for Civil-Military Relations. Based on the lack of student-noted follow-up contact with the schools, it's likely a reasonable assumption that there was very little basis for each school to respond. Because of the importance of this information, an additional request for responses was dispatched specifying that a negative response was more valuable to the research than the lack of a response from their agency. Still no additional inputs were received.

The lone respondent, CCMR, provides a web site to encourage contact. The degree of its use would also be dependent upon the availability of Internet and e-mail connectivity of course attendees. Although no timing was requested or provided by the

respondent, an approximate total of 3 contacts were noted from Nicaragua. Based on the fact that the only class conducted by CCMR was done in 1999, we can assume that it receives one to two contacts per year from Nicaragua on average.

Again, the lack of school responses to the short survey requesting their information, along with the void of contact noted within the student responses, would indicate little information to provide.

Conclusion

In beginning the study, this researcher selected Nicaragua (as well as El Salvador and Guatemala) due to the perceived “limited” amount of aid it had received over the years—especially military aid. While “limited” aid may have been applied by some standards, humanitarian assistance through a variety of programs still assisted the country in its development and cannot be discounted (never the intent of this researcher). It is in this context that we must base any and all conclusions.

This researcher commented that Nicaragua was the closest control group possible, due to the limited and most recent entry into IMET/E-IMET. Records indicate that Nicaragua has had the smallest accessibility and use of IMET/E-IMET between the three countries included in this study. Because of the years it was locked out of funding, it’s had 50 and 12 percent of what Guatemala and El Salvador has been able to use over the last decade. As with the other two countries, the dollar amount of IMET/E-IMET pales when compared to greater flow of U.S. humanitarian aid flowing into the region.

As in the cases of El Salvador and Guatemala, we can’t assume that E-IMET has had a dramatic input into the human rights/rule of law areas of growth within the country.

Neither can we discount the value of the program based on the information available to us based on the audience it targets and accesses in the overall scheme of U.S. grant programs.

As of this date, under \$1 million dollars of IMET/E-IMET has been provided since the inception of the Expanded IMET program (although the proposed FY02 budget would raise the amount significantly)—and it's a very small percentage of U.S. aid going to Nicaragua during that same period. While it's difficult to come up with the total aid package due to so many sources, for those supplied to this researcher by the U.S. State Department contacts, it would appear that much less than one percent (barely .2 percent) of all aid to El Salvador over the last 10 years came in the form of IMET/E-IMET.

During the previous decade and into the year 2001, the world's perception is that of progress within the human rights arena for Nicaragua is in much better stead. Recall that much of the activity within the country has not been tracked near as extensively as the other two countries involved in this study. Yet the country is not out of the woods as confirmed by data compiled by the U.S. State Department. Progress seems to be tentative in light of the hold that the Sandinistas continue to hold internally, especially within the military, and perceived slow-moving progress in reform.

Nicaragua was a bit different from El Salvador and Guatemala in that hostilities ceased as the U.S. pulled away aid that it had previously been providing to the Contras. The civil war stopped as a result of a unilateral ceasefire initiated by the Sandinistas. There was never any U.N. involvement as we saw in the other countries. Limited involvement has continued as the Chamorro, and other elected governments, have continued to win presidential elections over the Sandinista (Ortega) regime. Since the

mid 1990s, as progress has come at a more “acceptable” pace, small quantities of IMET/E-IMET was released (especially in 1997 and 1998). Still little headway characterizes recent comments by the State Department and Freedom House documents a decline in political rights since 1998-99.

While we can’t assume that E-IMET has had a dramatic input into the human rights/rule of law areas of growth within the country or discount the value of the program, there is another issue we can’t assume—that being that withholding funding was beneficial in the long term of the country’s democratization and human rights development. It’s truly difficult to assess that Nicaragua is doing much, if at all better, than El Salvador or Guatemala in terms of a positive trend. Because of this, Nicaragua is a good debating point on whether sanctions along with the potential loss of the ability to influence are worthwhile trade-offs. There have been varying degrees of control exercised by U.S. decision makers regarding each of the three countries. But perhaps the country the U.S. could have helped the most quickly through IMET/E-IMET was left floundering the longest. Presence has seemed to be a key in El Salvador, and especially Guatemala—in terms of United Nations groups, more financial assistance (in other types of aid, not simply military), as well as involvement in a tailored, but active security assistance program.

It would appear—and would be worthy of further study of this country in particular—that E-IMET has the opportunity to make an impact on current and up-and-coming leadership in the areas of human rights, civil military relations, and rule of law. As a part of a comprehensive package of aid and involvement, the opportunity to further democratization and enhance the relationships between the military, civilian government

officials as well as leadership in other government or non-governmental agencies are worthwhile endeavors. Again, the results of the student survey would indicate that E-IMET can have an impact in a country such as Nicaragua. The primary negative factor in the situation of Nicaragua, is not necessarily a smaller than desired survey response rate, but moreover the relatively short time in which those students trained have had to make an impact on policy.

Just as this researcher closed the previous case study chapters regarding El Salvador and Guatemala with the words of the GAO study concluded in 1999, which looked at rule of law assistance in five Latin American countries (including El Salvador and Guatemala, but not Nicaragua), they deserve repetition here, even though Nicaragua was not included in that study. The GAO found “no instances of duplication of activities and efforts among the U.S. agencies” (GAO, 199b). Funding categories are the same and uses, at least somewhat restrictive/controlled by the issuing agency—regardless of country. All of this would indicate that IMET/E-IMET (as with other parts of an aid package) has a viable and valuable target audience and course materials. Again, we must ask ourselves the same questions as we look at various circumstances around the world where we desire to exercise influence—including Latin America. How fast can we expect countries with the historic difficulties (in some cases tracking back to previous U.S. involvement) to affect real change, how much money and other resources to we (the U.S.) want to put into such programs, and the ultimate related question—do we really need to be there?

Chapter 7

Overall Survey Results

Introduction

At the outset, this researcher desired to treat all three countries involved in this study separately—to allow each case study to stand on its own. This has been done in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. However, due to the similar backgrounds, problems, and parallel survey results, it's believed that there needs to be a segment, which ties it all together in a consolidated package. Although this presentation will be reasonably short, it will attempt to do just that.

E-IMET Student Survey Information/Data

Overall Survey Response.

Due to the lack of initial information from the Center for Civil-Military relations, the pool of students eligible to complete the survey instrument was thought to be approximately 800, covering all three countries, all eight courses. In actuality, the list came to 1178 students. Of that number there were 101 responses spread between the three countries; however, due to 13 persons attending more than one course (12 attended 2, one attended 3), feedback was obtained for 115 student positions. Table 20 provides the breakout by course, inclusive of all three countries.

Table 20

Course Attendees/Survey Respondents Comparison—All Countries Combined Total

Year	B171801		B171425		D171032		D176006		P309051		P309061		P309070		Total Students by Year	
	Att	Resp	Att	Resp	Att	Resp	Att	Resp	Att	Resp	Att	Resp	Att	Resp	Att	Resp
1991			8	0											8	0
1992			9	0											9	0
1993			1	0					34	0					35	0
1994													35	0	35	0
1995									62	5			60	0	122	5
1996			2	0							80	0			82	0
1997	1	0	2	1	2	0					80	0	120	2	205	3
1998	1	0	2	2	4	1	8	2			127	1	62	3	206	9
1999			3	3					38	7			182	15	223	25
2000			5	2	4	0					80	15	75	1	164	18
2001	1	0											88	23	89	23
Unk Date		3										6		9		18
Unk Course																14
Total by Course	3	3	32	8	10	1	8	2	134	12	367	22	622	53	1178 ^c	115
Resp Rate %	100		25.0		10.0		25.0		9.0		6.0		8.5		9.8 ^c	

Notes. Attendee numbers were available/obtained from all schools. A total of 13 students attended more than one course (12 attended two courses/1 attended three courses). Att = Attendees. Resp = Response(s).

^aNumbers in Unknown (Unk) Date row specifies respondents that indicated no particular year of the course attended, but did indicate the course. ^bThe number in the Unknown (Unk) Course row specifies respondents that indicated no particular course or dates that they attended. ^cThe total number of attendees, and the overall percentage of respondents factors in the two non-respondents from D173036. This course showed a 0% return rate, and was eliminated from the table for reasons of space.

Overall response rate was 9.8 percent of all students. In breaking that down into the rates between those who attended CONUS courses versus those that attended the week-long Mobile Education Team courses, the CONUS courses appeared to be easier to locate with a 25.5 percent rate of return. MET students responded at a 7.75 percent rate. There was one course for which no responses were received. That was the Civil-Military Strategy for Internal Development conducted at Hurlburt Field, Florida. There were only two participants from Guatemala involved with that course (class conducted in 1998).

Survey Findings.

Tables 9, 14, and 19 documented the survey responses for El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua respectively, with the ability to compare to overall response data; however, those responses within the overall context of the survey were not discussed. While not within the original intent of this research (as it was unanticipated that the survey responses would so closely align themselves irrespective of country), it deserves a general review. The following discussion will highlight the most significant overall areas. The consolidated frequency tables for each question are at Appendix P.

Even with an overall response rate of just under 10 percent, it would appear that the answer to one of the most far-reaching questions—that of reaching the right persons with E-IMET courses have positive indicators and bears more study. Over 37 percent of all respondents had already moved to a higher job since attending their course, while over 66 percent anticipated moving to a higher level position (37.6% envisioned that move within 5 years of completing their course). More than three-fourths of the respondents believed that they currently have a position in which they can influence some area of

policy and over 63 percent felt their influence would continue as they moved to subsequent positions later in their career. Given the size of the response, it may be debatable that courses are reaching the right target audience, but this response is, nonetheless, very encouraging.

Also of importance within this study, is the question—is the curriculum leaving its mark within the area of the target subject. Again, the data is encouraging. Broken out, of those who believed they had an impact on policy, human rights policy garnered the most applicability with almost 24 percent. Other key areas of interest were military justice and military policy arenas.

Also addressing human rights, over 81 percent recalled human rights discussions during their course, and over 85 percent responded that they considered human rights issues more than they had prior to their course. Thus it would appear that even some of those who don't recall class activity, take some of the desired impact home with them. It was noted in each case study chapter that this percentage, would tend to dispute the findings of the GAO in 1992 cited earlier in Chapter 2. In fact, it was the comment in the GAO study that drove this researcher to pursue this question on the survey instrument. However, the students involved in the GAO study were primarily attending technical skill-related training as opposed to PME or other programs with the human rights emphasis of E-IMET. The focus on human rights would likely have not been as intense in those technical courses. Therefore, there may very well not be any discrepancy between the results of these two study inputs.

Human rights was a significant part of the overall mix within the open-ended questions as well, with its impact felt on how the course benefited the respondent's

performance at work. Almost 12 percent of those responding linked to human rights, which, along with civil-military relations and legal practices were close behind in emphasis.

The quality indicators for the courses also appear to be in good stead within the realm of the response rate. The overwhelming response in those areas is also positive. Over 75% of all respondents saw the knowledge gained regarding the U.S. institutions, interaction with U.S. personnel, and interaction with personnel from various agencies within their own country's system as helpful to very helpful.

While the student survey response rate leaves much to be desired in drawing conclusions that can easily be generalized. It does, however, provide positive indicators and insight into continued research and actions that can be taken to secure future data.

School Course Director/Instructor Survey Information/Data

The only issue more disappointing than the student survey response rate was the comparable rate for the various schools. Only one of the eight course directors responded. Although this input was secondary, it would have served to more substantially validate the need for a better system of student follow-up. More will be addressed in Chapter 8 regarding recommendations and conclusions; however, it's the belief of this researcher (after having talked on the phone with virtually all the course directors during this research process), that there is little done in the way of encouraging continued dialogue between the student and school personnel.

Conclusion

The survey information is only one part of this study. The review of history within each country's recent past provides some insight as to what has been done, as well as what has yet to be done. The survey data was gathered to provide information on a potentially fruitful method to accomplish those goals yet to be realized. And it is only one method—and hopefully a part of a larger program that as the GSA put it, is not a “duplication of activities and efforts among the U.S. agencies” (GSA, 1999b).

The GPRA has a definitive, logical place in all efforts of government. It's important to take stock of what we're doing—even though it may be a painful and time-consuming process. The key is having a process to do it. It is hoped that, in addition to expanding the breadth of knowledge in terms of the E-IMET program success that this study also provides more input into that all-encompassing process.

Chapter 8

Findings and Recommendations

Introduction

In this final chapter, this researcher will attempt to pull together both the academic/analytical findings and the practical application of this study. Obviously much was learned in the process, not just the final outcomes. Initially, the timing of the study will be addressed. Then, in keeping with the two primary concerns, we'll look at how this researcher views the conclusions in terms of those hypotheses outlined at the outset of Chapter 3. These will be followed by a number of factors of application and recommendations that will be reviewed in detail.

The Timing of the Study

Recall that the GAO, in 1992, recommended the Director of DSAA (now DSCA) to “continue efforts to develop a mechanism to evaluate the effectiveness of the human rights awareness training, as part of the evaluation system for IMET” (GAO, 1992, p. 37). It was believed that five more years would be needed to better evaluate E-IMET and its impact on such values—allowing it more potential to influence participating countries, through student advancement into “prominent positions to effect change” (GAO, 1992, p. 25).

This researcher believes that it would have been difficult to accomplish this study in 1997—it was a major challenge in locating the students and securing participation in

the survey. Again, the response rate, while providing encouraging information, cannot be used for overarching generalizations. But the major difficulty in conducting this study for the three countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, would have most definitely been providing enough time between training and opportunity for advancement and influence.

As noted in each of the three case studies, most of the training was done after 1996 within the realm of courses selected for their human rights emphasis. Of El Salvador's 801 attendees, only 152 attended courses prior to 1996. In Guatemala and Nicaragua (because of various sanctions and limitations for attendance), there were only 57 (of 231) and 0 (of 146) students respectively prior to 1997. (Nicaragua didn't have any students until 1999—making them the “control group” of sorts.) METs played a major part of training over the most recent 5 years in terms of numbers of students, truly providing access to training (in volume and content) that could not be provided by sending students to the states.

It is the observation of this researcher that E-IMET is just now reaching the point where research can be fruitful. The numbers of students are sufficient, with enough time passed since training for the students to ably assess their advancement opportunities along with impact they may have on internal programs. Additionally, better record-keeping processes are being developed (and likely will continue to evolve) which will make it easier for additional research to be conducted on the subject.

Lastly, this researcher believes that E-IMET is the best starting point to approach the look at the effectiveness of security assistance programs. The goals of E-IMET, while very broad, are defined and varied enough to pursue student data regarding areas

such as human rights, civil-military relations, and resource management. As will be addressed later in this chapter, the schools (for both CONUS and MET-conducted courses) hold the key in further research opportunities.

The Hypotheses

As alluded to earlier, the findings of this research were sufficiently hampered by a lack of survey respondents to form any major, unquestionable, unequivocal findings. But this researcher is excited about the resounding response in terms of strong endorsement of the program—especially in looking at the student survey as a whole. As iterated within earlier chapters, the alignment/closeness of the responses between countries was very encouraging. However, the historical glances at each country was also very helpful in seeing progress made, in light of numerous programs fostered by the U.S. government for these three countries. Let's look at the three contributing hypothesis outlined in Chapter 3, and then conclude with the primary hypothesis—E-IMET's furtherance of U.S. and international human rights goals in the Central American countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua.

Student Progression.

The first contributing hypothesis: Students that have attended E-IMET courses are progressing within their governments or non-governmental organization to positions of greater responsibility—placing them in a position to influence human rights policy.

Certainly the reply of the respondents indicates that a number of them perceive themselves as having the ability to influence policy currently as well as the potential to

do so in the future. However, the sampling cannot be considered random in any sense of the word and the response rate of fewer than 10 percent help us reach can only be classified as encouraging. The signs indicate that we very well may be reaching the target audience desired within the spectrum of courses attended by the international community.

Strengthened Human Rights Laws and Policies.

The second contributing hypothesis: Human rights laws and policies have been enacted and/or strengthened (in line with democratic principles) over the years that these countries have participated in the E-IMET program.

Mixed reviews characterize this finding. It can be said that laws and policies have been strengthened within each of the three countries over recent years; however application of these laws and policies has been slow in coming. But progress is, sometimes slowly, being made. The narratives of each of the case studies outline progressive actions in judicial processes, policing, and human rights organizational involvement—indicating in varying degrees positive changes. Freedom House rating, cited as well within each case study provide in a easy-to-follow year-to-year analysis of activity. All three countries have demonstrated, again some more limited than others year-to-year, progress—especially as each ended their many years of civil war.

The generally accepted progress by El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua is only part of the story. Much has occurred during the timing of E-IMET; however, it is due to the activity of a number of players in the human rights arena—U.N., U.S., other countries, as well as groups internal within each of the three countries. While it is

difficult to assess the pace of progress due to a level of involvement, it appears that the more involvement from international organizations, and the more organizations playing the part of the watchdog, the greater the opportunity for progress.

As noted within the case studies, and again worth quoting as we conclude:

The GAO found “no instances of duplication of activities and efforts among the U.S. agencies” (GAO, 199b) in looking at five countries in Latin America—including El Salvador and Guatemala. This also would indicate that a variety of players can meet a variety of needs. The results of all facets of the research encompassing this study again are positive and encouraging that E-IMET can be a viable participant in that environment.

Decline of Human Rights Abuses.

The third contributing hypothesis: Human rights abuses have declined during the period that these countries have participated in the E-IMET program.

Again, progress by El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua has been documented via a number of sources through the State Department that situations are better in each of these countries. However, as with the advent and multiplication of human rights laws and policies, E-IMET can’t take much of the credit. There simply has not been enough money, time or students to conclude such a direct result. Additionally, all three countries concluded civil war during the decade of the 90s—since the activation of E-IMET. This alone drove down the number of abuses, just as the involvement of other organizations (especially ONUSAL in El Salvador and MINUGUA in Guatemala—which still continues in operation).

Training has been part of the process within all three countries among a number of international and domestic organizations, with a variety of targets. Again, indicators make for reasonable assumptions that E-IMET can meet the needs of a variety of the actors in the human rights arena within such countries.

E-IMET Effectiveness in Selected Countries.

The primary hypothesis: E-IMET is furthering U.S. and international human rights goals in the Central American countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua.

Evidence exists, based on this study, that E-IMET is furthering U.S and international human rights goals in these three countries. Survey results are a major factor in this conclusion, and again, it's a conclusion that is very difficult to quantify. The respondents, even with the small number of them, indicate that the courses they attended made some sort of impact—a great number noting human rights in some regard.

Furthering is also an “unquantifiable” term; however, does it need to be? If any program, E-IMET or some other, reaches a particular audience (as a part of a comprehensive plan) it can be termed as furthering such work. The real question, again in terms of performance measurement, is it worthy of continuation or expanding.

Again, this researcher would answer that the results of this study are promising and encouraging—giving better indicators than much of the previous research offers. Hope is offered as is the recommendation for future (survey) research, using the most opportunistic methods available.

Linking to the Security Assistance Process

From the beginning of the research/survey process, this researcher has dealt with numerous persons in the chain of security assistance and international training. All have been extremely helpful and facilitated this research (many noted in the acknowledgments at the beginning of this document). In fact, it was the input of a couple of key persons in the chain that helped focus the subject area and methodology used. Without their help, this task would not have been possible. However, as time went on over the approximate 8 months of concentrated effort, there were a variety of factors that made the task so much more tedious and difficult—not only for this researcher, but also for those who took hours of their time supporting the endeavor.

The following pages of issues and recommendations are offered, not only to those who have the opportunity to facilitate enhancements in the way business is conducted, but also to assist future researchers in knowing some potential pitfalls prior to initiating research. They are not meant to point fingers at the various agencies and individuals who did their best to provide accurate details. Rather it hopefully demonstrates the difficulties they may have in performing their daily tasks due to difficulties in keeping track of information or internal policies that limit effectiveness. In addition to specifics surrounding this particular research project, a couple of other observations will be addressed.

Conflicting or Absent Database Information.

Disjointed information regarding issues such as students trained or budgetary data made it extremely difficult to ensure that this research was quoting accurate data. In

some cases the information is not available to the user without going directly to a government source (person). Therefore, if a researcher does not know who the best person is to direct a question or confirm an answer, information thought to be accurate may very well not be the best available. Cited are a couple of examples causing the most difficulty for this researcher.

There was no available consolidated aid (by country) information readily available. This researcher was forwarded (faxed/e-mail) information from State Department personnel, which was very helpful and important. (This information was inserted within Chapters 4, 5, and 6.) However, the totals that it provided sometimes conflicted with other information—most specifically the amount of IMET provided the particular country in a particular year. In the area of budget figures and particular programs, it was difficult to know what the figure was that was being reviewed. Was it the proposed budget, approved budget, or actual expenditure? These could, in fact, be very different figures. Because of these issues, multiple sources had to be used to provide the best possible product.

A database of total IMET/E-IMET student totals is difficult to find. At the outset of research, it was noted that the DSCA Facts Book (1999) was the best source for student numbers by country and region, by year. This was realized after seeing major differences on the web page for the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM). These were not minor differences—for a couple of years DISAM's graphic was showing twice as many students trained (literally thousands more) than the DSCA Facts Book. DISAM personnel, advised use of the Fact Book as the authoritative document.

This was compounded when within days of concluding this project, after reaching the conclusion that the Fact Book did not include the numbers of students trained by Mobile Education Teams. At that point, it was learned that the numbers over the last five years (the key years of E-IMET) have been massaged by hand to make sure that all student numbers are reported correctly in the Congressional Budget Justification. (Note that this is the same document that State Department used in providing aid budget figures.) Fortunately, by working with the schools and USSOUTHCOM training personnel, this researcher was using good student figures for these particular countries involved in the E-IMET courses participating in this study. In dealing with them early on it was realized that they had to literally maintain hard-copy data of after-action reports from year to year to help maintain accurate accounting. (This researcher would not go into any other detailed student figures for E-IMET, even for just these three countries because of these difficulties.) In this day of automation, there should be a way to make this a better process to allow (especially to those within the security assistance community) easy access to such data. It's simply difficult to get a handle on. The shame of it is that it seems the ones who try there best to maintain such numbers are doing so with "stubby pencils."

Student Accountability/Follow-Up.

The previous section outlined the need for a better system of tracking students as a whole in order have a good handle on the numbers attending various training. It is somewhat linked to the topic of this section; however, the critical need addressed here is that of school's tracking (by name) who has attended their courses.

A differentiation needs to be addressed here between courses conducted in the states and those conducted in country (METs). Students attending stateside courses are more easily tracked as Invitational Travel Orders (ITOs—typed, authenticated, and maintained by U.S. personnel) document the course attendance. This has come to be a very automated process, thereby making these students more easily tracked. (These are the “easy figures” most readily available in the DSCA Facts Book.) METs are a different matter, as travel orders would not be maintained by U.S. personnel—who are on their own in documenting attendance, maintained either by the school conducting the training or the Security Assistance Offices, or both. Realize that the orders are very generic in terms of student information, providing the basics such as student name, rank, and date/place of birth. This information is geared to validate the student authorization to come to the states based on agreements between the U.S. and his or her home country.

While the succeeding paragraphs deal exclusively with MET schools, more than a simple ITO is needed with an electronic ingredient to maintain student information at the CONUS schools. Additionally, neither schools nor SAOs maintain student records (such as ITOs) indefinitely. Because of the flow and volume of students (U.S. and international), school records may be sent to centralized storage points immediately after the student graduates. SAOs are required to keep hard-copy ITOs and related materials for three years after the funding source (case) authorizing the travel is closed. Because of these rules, SAOs may have some ITO information readily available for a number of years, but that will vary between country—in light of the annual funding for IMET, this information would be on file for between 4-5 years dependent upon when the student actually attended training.

During this study, it was discovered that MET school databases vary greatly—from excellent to relative nonexistence. This is not to say that there must be a centralized format or central control outside of each school to oversee what's going on. However, it behooves each school to have information on the numbers of students that have attended their courses at their fingertips. For example, CCMR couldn't readily tell this researcher numbers and dates of courses—as noted within the case studies, they were able to provide some detailed data after several months of delays due to other faculty commitments and ongoing courses. CCMR and DIILS informed me that they had no electronic databases with student information; although DIILS readily supplied a spreadsheet with numbers of students (civilian and military breakouts) that attended course with the dates of conduct. WHINSEC had no electronic database whatsoever covering student information. During my initial phases, I found out that they simply had folders in a file cabinet with student training reports filed by year and country. CMSID had no electronic system; however, they conduct only 2-4 courses each year, and readily have hard copy data of student names, and are building additional student information. IAFA had an excellent database system with student info readily accessible in terms of graduation data.

As a sidelight to this issue, I was told that schools could not release student names or identifying data to me for research purposes—that it was understandably sensitive information. However, National Defense University (NDU) had class photos with names and countries of all International Fellows classes (back through 1985) readily available on their website. Granted this is a very prestigious program and it's students are obviously the “up and comers” in their home country's military establishment. Thus this

sensitive data is available to anyone on the worldwide web. This is not interjected as a put down to NDU; however, it demonstrates the varying ways student information may be handled.

Again, there doesn't need to micromanagement in this process. All it would take would be a simple Excel/Access system with a number of important fields carrying information. Without the most basic student data base, future contact or tracking of previous students is not possible.

The Need for In-Country Student Tracking.

Currently there's no real mechanism in place to formally validate/track students whether attending CONUS or MET programs; whatever is done in this regard is either by accident or happenstance. Additionally, and very importantly, no SAO organization is manned to handle such a task. (This research can say that based upon this research as well as personal experience.)

DSCA or the unified commands aren't in the position to handle this responsibility—it needs to be at the “nuts and bolts” level. This would mean either the SAO in country or the school conducting the individual program. Because of the role of SAOs, their hands are tied in terms of the tracking of students.

In forming the methodology for this study, this researcher was informed that direct feedback could not be obtained from country teams (especially SAOs) due to the fact that they were restricted from gathering or conducting human intelligence (HUMINT) gathering. This is very understandable as these personnel are in place to assist the county in training personnel. An SAO's position would be compromised if the

country believed that intelligence gathering was a significant part of that person's responsibilities. (For this reason, very little information was obtained for this report directly from SAOs—only very minimal amount of clarification was sought from them regarding information secured from other data sources). In this light, this researcher cannot recommend any change in the SAO's role in the training process. (Again, their offices are not structured and manned to do so as some SAOs have multiple duties—training only being a segment of them.)

If we can't use country teams, it must fall on the schools to conduct their own follow-up. (Again, this makes their internal record-keeping important.) Manning must be considered when assigning such a responsibility however. Such follow-up can be done under the auspices of academic validation. Is their institution teaching the subject areas that are most important to the attendees? Are students using the information that they're gleaning from the course they attended?

Answering these questions is a part of the normal instructional systems development/design process—an additional and primary rationale for schools to take on this responsibility. Many U.S. military schools send questionnaires to previous graduates to answer these questions. Some also survey supervisors of previous students to see how the student is performing in order to seek out enhancements that can be made to curriculum. We can attempt to do the same with international students as well for courses specifically geared for them, while maintaining the subject matter and democratization goals inherent to these programs.

This would go beyond the end-of-course critique, which is also a normal part of each institution's process. Dependent upon the course, end-of-course critiques often

times may only touch on the effectiveness of the actual instruction, not necessarily the applicability of the lesson's learned to the student's primary responsibilities upon their return. Even so, the school would get a more meaningful response after the student returns home and attempts to apply that instruction.

A number of factors make the school the best entity to maintain and use such information. They're definitely in the best position to more quickly affect curriculum changes in light of student feedback from the international participants, as well as policy changes from the U.S. perspective.

Maintaining Student Contact.

Much of what's already been noted is integral to the principle of maintaining student contact beyond the time of the individual's course. Much can be said regarding the importance of the school needed the student for feedback; however, just as important is the student needing the school for follow-up information. It is for this reason that means of contact for the student was such a key ingredient within the student survey instrument. (Note its prominence in the identification data leading off the survey, as well as particular questions dealing with follow-on discussions with the school. It was also mindful in question 11c—relating to establishing relationships with U.S. personnel.)

In years gone by, communications difficulties played a valid part in the rationale of not pursuing contact with previous students. The only real player in the process was the opportunity for Professional Military Education (PME) schools to contact SAOs to see what persons from their list of country graduates had gone on to become the most senior of leadership. This opened a door for at least a one-time follow-up as these

persons' achievements are commemorated at the school in some way, as related in Allen's research (related more to output, vice outcome data).

However, the continuing growth of e-mail provides the means to maintain contact with the more "typical" student on a more regular basis. While this may vary between countries currently, it obviously can be the wave of the future in maintaining contact with previous attendees to various programs. Not even to presume that much of a generalization can be made by virtue of the student survey data of this study, this researcher was surprised to find that almost 18 percent of the overall respondents currently have access to e-mail. In Guatemala, the percentage was almost 78 percent in its small response, which tended to skew the other countries' 11-12 percent.

Even this minimal response from Guatemala causes us ponder the possibilities. Recall that the SAO was able to send the survey instrument to approximately 15 people who were a part of the study. Furthermore, it was the belief of the SAO that most of the persons that would have participated in IMET/E-IMET courses would have e-mail access currently. Because of this ease of access, the office has added the opportunity for the student to annotate an e-mail address on an internal information form (F. Santizo, personal communications, July 20, 2001). In light of the lack of response from Guatemalan students, the question might be asked as to how these students would have reacted had they seen a name they recognized as the surveyor. Strictly rhetorical: would the propensity to respond have been greater? Even with such a small sample's results, the group from Guatemala demonstrated the greatest propensity to make school contact.

This researcher cannot close out this section without noting some additional personal experience with a bearing on this subject. This occurred as the Civil-Military

Strategy for Internal Development (CMSID) requested assistance in validating their course (not for this region, but rather the Eastern Europe/Central Asia area) in February 2001. This particular course brought together persons from approximately 15 former Soviet/Warsaw Pact countries—equivalent of a regional MET, but conducted at Hurlburt Field, Florida.

Although previously noted that CMSID did not have an electronic database to track students, they seemed to have the makings of a great mechanism to do so. They collect locator data, make a simple roster, and print/distribute it to all course attendees (providing it at the end of the course). This lists names, addresses, phone numbers, and e-mail as applicable for each student facilitating dialogue between them after the course ends and all return home. (Instructor/Course Director information is also listed, as was this researcher due to the involvement with this particular course.)

The results of this, from a personal standpoint have been phenomenal. Almost all of the participants had e-mail access. In the time since the course, this researcher has received e-mail from five of the students (all from different countries). While there have been some specific questions—asking for some specific information or insights, much has been simply an effort to “keep in touch,” not losing contact for the future. It should also be noted that had this researcher not been involved with this project at the time, the idea of maintaining contact or keeping track of it would have gone undone. As an additional sidelight, just 4 months after the course ended one of the students was knocking on this researchers door as he had been selected to attend a PME school at the researcher’s location.

Funding Implications of Regional METs.

In addressing the value of METs with in-country security assistance officers, this researcher found a common area of concern regarding the payment for such programs. Keeping in mind that the purpose of holding a regional MET is to hold down the cost of a course while permitting various nations within a geographic area to benefit (at the reduced cost).

Under current policy and billing practices, the costs are usually divided among all students. This sounds like the reasonable method; however, when the final bill is closed out, any remaining charges are usually billed to host country, if monies are available in their IMET account. This can be a two-edged sword as it may keep a country from hosting a regional MET. Another related draw back to a country hosting a regional MET is that not every country will participate. One SAO related that the country he supports hosted a regional MET at which only three out of eight potential countries participated because of funding limitations.

Many would benefit, and courses could be more easily planned for and coordinated (thus more effective) if a amount of E-IMET funding were pre-designated for regional METs. This will allow for an almost guarantee all countries participating and equal numbers as well. For example, there could be a designated fund for Central America (including the countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras, Panama, Costa Rica, Belize, Dominican Republic, and Mexico) containing say \$100,000 for a regional civilian-military MET with specific topics that DoS and DoD desire. By splitting the money evenly, more countries would send representatives, and no one country would bear the brunt of the cost.

It was also suggested that there could be an additional Distinguished Visitor Program portion paid by unified command funds, which would bring legislators or cabinet ministers in for a one or two-day visit to see the importance of this type of training. The line of thinking—we can teach all we want to the executer, but if the real policy-makers do not like it, all we teach is in vain. This provides an alternative angle to educate key personnel regarding the topics involved with the various E-IMET objectives.

The General Applicability of Defense Department Education and Training.

Recent years have provided great discussion regarding DoD programs for the military of other countries, as well as non-military participation. Most of this discussion, mentioned earlier in this document, has centered on the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (formerly the School of the Americas)—and questions regarding the curriculum it has used and issues taught to persons from Latin America. Although not specifically addressed in this research, the overall curriculum played a part in selection of one of its courses being used within this study.

This researcher saw no reason to question any of the curriculum reviewed during this process. WHINSEC has undergone a thorough review of its curriculum in recent years due to questions created during the Clinton administration—changing the emphasis from what it was during earlier decades. It would appear to this observer that whatever may have raised such questions should be rectified by this time. Additionally, through the course of this study, this researcher has had very close contacts with organizations that may have been/may still be critical of the curriculum used at WHINSEC. Through this study, it has become plainly evident that there need to be a variety of avenues and

venues of education programs to reach the variety of actors that influence the democratization process in the countries which receive a focus of U.S. and international attention. Organizations can, and should, work together—whether various DoD schools interacting among themselves or NGOs.

From various readings regarding WHINSEC that this researcher has seen during the course of this study, it appears that WHINSEC is more than ready to host organizations which may still have questions regarding the WHINSEC's responsibilities. This researcher strongly encourages this dialogue. Again to quote the GAO which found "no instances of duplication of activities and efforts among the U.S. agencies" (GAO, 199b). There's a role for everyone and the opportunity build strong civil-military relations internally within the U.S. as we strive to build them elsewhere in the world.

The Need for Continuing Dialogue Between Security Assistance Training Players.

Although there are some avenues of dialogue for the various organizations and persons involved in security assistance, these need to be expanded and used as frequently as possible. There are SAO conferences, as well as conferences for those at schools and military installations dealing with international students. These conferences include other players in the realms of policy, course scheduling, disclosure, etc. However, there are very few opportunities for the two ends of the education and training pipeline to interact. Any additional opportunities that can further the dialogue need to be strongly pursued.

Training is one means of furthering understanding and dialogue. DISAM has courses for all persons—tailored specifically for their role in the program. This obviously needs to continue, but whatever greater interaction this institution can foster by

use of its training program needs to be strongly pursued. Training brings with it the opportunity to bring other players, and their perspective, to the others in the pipeline.

Although much is to be said regarding persons in the various “jobs” of security assistance, it should also be noted the importance of dialogue between those with similar responsibilities. Much is said regarding best practices among similar organizations in government, and that dialogue also needs to be pursued. This researcher found out a number of great things regarding curriculum as well as student activities by talking to all (and visiting two of the schools) involved in this study. Dialogue between the services needs to be addressed—not due to any pride of ownership, but more simply because the players don’t necessarily think of calling a sister service school to find out how they handle a variety of issues. There are many good ideas out there that don’t get spread around because people don’t find the time to dialogue.

IMET/E-IMET Budget Increase Implications.

In recent days, discussion has become more prominent regarding the increase of IMET/E-IMET funding. Recall in earlier chapters, individual country increases, as well as the requested IMET funding of \$65 million for FY 02. Although this researcher is not aware of any accompanying requirements or guidance in terms of E-IMET use within the IMET appropriation, the increase of IMET would obviously impact the opportunity for E-IMET to provide greater benefits to participating countries. Obviously a continuing significant increase accompanied by the current “goal” of 30 percent E-IMET use of the IMET funding would mean a greater strain on the infrastructure providing the support to E-IMET—CONUS courses and METs.

In a related concern, noted by this researcher with persons at a variety of positions in the security assistance training arena, is the question of availability of course opportunities to accommodate increased IMET funding. It was noted earlier in this study that part of the problem within international training is supplying the quantity of training (seat allocations) requested by our numerous customers—allies and coalition partners. The training establishment currently has difficulty meeting current demands (based on the primary goal of U.S. training—meeting U.S. training requirements), especially in the CONUS environment. Part of the answer will be the opportunity this provides to METs to meet the needs by sending instructors in country; however, there are infrastructure concerns with METs as well in terms of instructor personnel in a downsized military environment and associated support.

Additionally, with an almost exclusive impact on CONUS programs, will DLIELC be able to accommodate an increased demand/requirement for additional English language training student quotas? The verdict is still out on this question, but a detail to be considered is the timely flow of students, as the timing of the courses for which those students require those English skills could create peak periods, which could max out the support facilities available on that campus.

Based on this study, this researcher could easily recommend increasing IMET/E-IMET funding (with the ensuring that infrastructure can cope with such an increase). It would be a source of additional frustration throughout the training environment—from home country military and SAOs, unified command training offices, to service course schedulers, to course directors, and students, if this is not handled with a lot of forethought. It does not help if more aid is provided, but there is not a means to spend it

on training meaningful to the user. However, in a constricted environment, E-IMET may be a “safety valve” which may both help further specific goals to countries tending to use money more stringently for E-IMET, desiring to spend their grant on the more purely military training (IMET). Again, this researcher sees METs very well holding a key in resolving some infrastructure issues (encountered by CONUS schools, such as housing students), but E-IMET’s infrastructure needs can’t be minimized.

Lastly, in terms of budget implications, what about the percentage desired for E-IMET usage within IMET—already noted as 30 percent. From feedback, again from a variety of sources, 30 percent seems to be a reasonable percentage, but again, it comes down to being able to send persons to course openings (IMET or E-IMET). E-IMET, as we’ve looked at Central America, appears to have a “market” in terms of supply and demand. It appears that countries use and will continue to use it based upon the funding allocations they receive. However, the regional MET payment issue, noted earlier in this chapter is a concern.

Conclusion

In May 2001, the United States was conspicuously not voted in to retain its “historical” seat on the United Nations Commission on Human Rights—for the first time since the commission’s inception. This does not negate the role that the nation must continue to play in an effort to promote democratization worldwide through a wide variety of programs.

While this study may not have unequivocally documented the exclusive human rights successes of E-IMET in the countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, it

has hopefully provided some substance to the void of information that was simply unknown, some valuable insights into strengthening IMET/E-IMET and security assistance, and a building block for future research.

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Appendix A

List of Acronyms

AIASA	Annual Integrated Assessment of Security Assistance
ANPDH	Nicaraguan Association for Human Rights
CALDH	Guatemalan NGO; Center for Legal Assistance in Human Rights
CBJ	Congressional Budget Justification
CIAV	OAS International Commission of Support and Verification
CINC	Commander in Chief
CCMR	Center for Civil Military Relations
CEH	Guatemalan Comision de Esclarecimiento Historico or Historical Clarification Commission; The Truth Commission
CENIDH	Nicaraguan Center for Human Rights
CHDS	Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies
COPREDEH	Guatemalan President's Commission on Human Rights
CPDH	Nicaraguan Permanent Commission for Human Rights
CSD	Child Survival and Diseases (Foreign Aid Category)
DA	Development Assistance (Foreign Aid Category)
DCS	Direct Commercial Sales
DFAS	Defense Finance and Accounting Service
DIILS	Defense Institute of International Legal Studies
DISAM	Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management
DLI	Defense Language Institute
DoD	United States Department of Defense
DoS	United States Department of State
DSAA	Defense Security Assistance Agency
DSCA	Defense Security Cooperation Agency
ECL	English Comprehension Level
E-IMET	Expanded International Military Education & Training
ESF	Economic Support Fund
FMF or FMFP	Foreign Military Financing Program
FMLN	El Salvadoran Farabundo Marti Front for National Liberation (government opposition during civil war)
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
FSLN	Nicaraguan Sandinista National Liberation Front
GAO	United States General Accounting Office
GPRA	Government Performance Results Act
HACFO	House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Foreign Operations
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IAAFA	Inter-American Air Forces Academy
IACHR	Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
IG	Inspector General

IMET	International Military Education & Training
IMS	International Military Student
INC or INCLE	International Narcotics Control Programs; INCLE succeeded INC as the program name
INSS	Institute for National Strategic Studies
IP	Informational Program
ITO	Invitational Travel Order
LAWG	Latin America Working Group
MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAP	Military Assistance Program
MET	Mobile Education Team
MINUGUA	United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala
MOD	Minister of Defense
MTT	Mobile Training Team
NDU	National Defense University
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NPS	Naval Postgraduate School
ODHAG	Guatemalan Archbishop's Office of Human Rights
ONUSAL	United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador
ONUV	United Nations Verification Office in El Salvador
PACs	Guatemalan Civil Defense Patrols
PDDH	El Salvadoran Government's Office of the Ombudsman for the Protection of Human Rights
PDH	Guatemalan Government's Office of Human Rights Ombudsman
PKO	Peacekeeping Operations
PL 480	Public Law 480; Food Assistance (Foreign Aid Category)
PME	Professional Military Education
PN	"Old" Civilian Police (prior to reforms); same acronym used in El Salvador and Guatemala
PNC	National Civilian Police (after reforms); same acronym used in El Salvador & Guatemala
PNC UID	El Salvadoran Disciplinary Investigative Unit of the National Police
PPDDH	Nicaraguan Government Ombudsman's Office for the Defense of Human Rights
RN	Nicaraguan Resistance (or "Contras")
SAO	Security Assistance Officer
SATPMR	Security Assistance Training Program Management Review
SIC	Guatemalan National Civilian Police Criminal Investigations Service
UFCO	United Fruit Company
UID	Disciplinary Investigating Unit; El Salvadoran National Police Internal Affairs Office
UNHRC	United Nations Human Rights Commission

UNO	United Nicaraguan Opposition
URNG	Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USAFSOS	United States Air Force Special Operations School
USARSA	United States Army School of the Americas, redesignated as the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC) in January 2001
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
USEUCOM	United States European Command
USIS	United States Information Service
USPACOM	United States Pacific Command
USSOUTHCOM	United States Southern Command
WHINSEC	Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, redesignated from United States Army School of the Americas (USARSA) in January 2001

Appendix B

Definitions

The following terms have been defined as listed below for the purposes of this study:

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM): Organization responsible for oversight of the Security Assistance Network, the computer network tying together international training requirements, authorized quotas and travel orders sending international students to training in the United States. The institute also conducts a number of courses for personnel involved in security assistance roles both in foreign countries as well as at stateside training locations.

Defense Security Coordination Agency (DSCA): This agency was formerly known as the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) and is charged with implementing US security assistance programs.

Effectiveness: The production of a decided, decisive, or desired effect.

Efficiency: The ratio of outputs to inputs in a process.

E-IMET: Expanded International Military Education & Training program. Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (as amended in 1990 for FY91) which allowed for foreign civilian personnel in other than ministries of defense to attend US military education programs.

Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Training: Another program geared to provide training to defense personnel from other countries. Training provided under this program is paid for by the requesting country – not as grant from the United States government.

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Public Law 101-513 (as amended by the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976): Established the legal authority for IMET (and subsequently E-IMET) training as a separate entity within security assistance.

Government Performance & Results Act (GPRA) of 1993, Public Law 103-62: This Act, in general terms, directed various units within the national government to formulate strategic plans for their organizations, culminating with program performance reviews documenting effectiveness of programs in terms of goals being realized or unrealized.

International Military Education & Training Program (IMET): A *grant* program to provide military education and training to the international community. Training provided by this program is a gift from the United States to the sponsored country.

Mobile Education Team: A group of American-led professionals tasked to travel to a host country to conduct IMET or E-IMET courses. It should be noted that “METs” differ from the more commonly known military “MTTs” (Mobile Training Teams). METs are primarily civilian educators that teach military-to-civilian education courses, where MTTs are primarily military personnel who delivery military-to-military training. Mobile Education Teams may conduct regional training, in which the course is taught in a host country with several countries participating.

Outcome Measurement: An assessment of the results of a program activity as compared to its intended purpose. Outcome refers to the impact on society of a particular public sector activity and is closely related to the concept of effectiveness.

Output Measurement: The tabulation, calculation, or recording of an activity or effort. Output measurement traditionally refers to the quantity of the good or service provided, and is closely related to the concept of efficiency.

Performance Measure: A quantitative or qualitative characterization of performance.

Security Assistance: Or International Security Assistance, is the broad term for the means in which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense related services, by grant, loan, credit or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives.

Security Assistance Officer/Office (SAO): A person (U.S. representative) in a particular country advising them on security assistance issues to include training.

Unified Command: Major echelon of control handling war-fighting, humanitarian and coalition/peacekeeping responsibilities of the United States military. There are currently nine unified commands – four having a functional responsibility and five have geographic responsibilities.

United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM): One of the five regionally based unified commands of the United States military. Its headquarters is in Miami, Florida. Southern Command is responsible for the land mass of Latin America south of Mexico; the waters adjacent to Central and South America; the Caribbean Sea, its 13 island nations, European and U.S. territories; the Gulf of Mexico; and a portion of the Atlantic Ocean. It encompasses 32 countries (19 in Central and South America and 13 in the Caribbean) and covers about 12.1 million square miles (31.3 million square kilometers). The region represents about one-sixth of the landmass of the world assigned to regional unified commands.

Appendix C

**Consolidated Table: U.S. Federal/Security Assistance/IMET Budget Comparison (in Millions of Dollars)
with Worldwide and USSOUTHCOM Students Trained by Fiscal Year**

Fiscal Year	U.S. Federal Budget Total ^a	Security Assistance Budget Total ^b	Security Assistance % of Federal Budget	Total IMET Budget	IMET % Of Federal Budget	Worldwide No. Of IMET Students Trained	SOUTHCOM IMET Budget	SOUTHCOM No. of Students Trained
1950-1989	14,139,498	126,107	0.89	2,391.243 ^c	0.0169	554,270 ^c	266.315 ^c	108,347 ^c
1990	1,253,198	8,652	0.69	43.461 ^c	0.0035	4,975 ^c	8.445 ^c	1,964 ^c
1991	1,324,403	9,823	0.74	46.040 ^c	0.0035	4,898 ^c	13.378 ^c	2,430 ^c
1992	1,381,684	7,490	0.54	42.209 ^c	0.0031	4,380 ^c	11.988 ^c	2,289 ^c
1993	1,409,512	7,639	0.54	42.627 ^c	0.0030	4,417 ^c	10.885 ^c	2,199 ^c
1994	1,461,902	6,642	0.45	22.250 ^c	0.0015	2,597 ^c	4.551 ^c	1,382 ^c
1995	1,515,837	5,252	0.35	26.350 ^c	0.0017	2,659 ^c	4.458 ^c	1,048 ^c
1996	1,560,572	4,565	0.29	38.997 ^c	0.0025	3,482 ^c	8.217 ^c	1,389 ^c
1997	1,601,282	4,632	0.29	43.475 ^c	0.0027	3,454 ^c	8.532 ^c	1,385 ^c
1998	1,652,619	5,135	0.31	50.0 ^c	0.0030	8,070 ^c	9.693 ^c	2,387 ^c
1999	1,702,875	5,531	0.32	50.0 ^c	0.0029	8,947 ^c	9.857 ^c	2,767 ^c
2000	1,788,826	6,387	0.36	50.000 ^d	0.0028	8,216 ^c	9.89 ^d	2,684 ^c
2001 (E)	1,856,238	6,320	0.34	57.875 ^d	0.0031	9,655 ^e	10.445 ^d	2,861 ^c
2002 (R)	1,960,564	6,701	0.34	65.0 ^e	0.0033	10,307 ^e	12.610 ^e	3,399 ^e

Note. Dashes indicate that information was not available. Information included in this table was taken from a number of sources as annotated by specific notes below. Full reference information is included within the Reference list of this document. This table consolidates Tables 1 and 2 of this study. No. = Number. (E) = Estimate. (R) = Recommended.

^aInformation for years 1950-1989 derived from OMB (2001a); information for years 1990-2002 derived from USGPO (2001). ^b Information for years 1950-1957 from USGPO (1958, p. 954). Information for years 1958-1961 from USGPO (1963, p. 425). Information for years 1962-2001 derived from USGPO (2001). ^cInformation from DSCA (1999). ^dInformation derived from Martin (2001, pp. 19-20). ^eInformation provided by K. Judkins, personal communication, July 3, 2001.

Appendix D

Listing of Countries Involved in IMET by Region
(Fiscal Years 2000/2001)WESTERN HEMISPHERE—25 Countries

Argentina	Eastern Caribbean	Nicaragua
Bahamas	Ecuador	Panama
Belize	El Salvador	Paraguay
Bolivia	Guatemala	Peru
Brazil	Guyana	Suriname
Chile	Haiti (00)	Trinidad & Tobago
Colombia	Honduras	Uruguay
Costa Rica	Jamaica	Venezuela
Dominican Republic	Mexico	

AFRICA—36 Countries

Angola	Gabon	Nigeria
Benin	Ghana	Rwanda
Botswana	Guinea	Sao Tome
Cameroon	Guinea-Bissau	Senegal
Cape Verde	Kenya	Seychelles
Central African Republic	Lesotho	Sierra Leone (01)
Chad	Madagascar	South Africa
Congo (Brazzaville)(01)	Malawi	Swaziland
Congo (Kinshasa)	Mali	Tanzania
Cote d'Ivoire (00)	Mauritius	Uganda
Djibouti	Mozambique	Zambia
Eritrea	Namibia	Zimbabwe (00)
Ethiopia	Niger (01)	

EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC—12 Countries

Fiji (00)	Papua New Guinea	Thailand
Indonesia (01)	Philippines	Tonga
Laos (01)	Samoa	Vanuatu
Malaysia	Solomon Islands	Vietnam (01)
Mongolia		

EUROPE—18 Countries

Albania	Greece	Poland
Bosnia & Herzegovina	Hungary	Portugal
Bulgaria	Latvia	Romania
Croatia	Lithuania	Slovakia
Czech Republic	Macedonia	Slovenia
Estonia	Malta	Turkey

INDEPENDENT STATES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION—8 Countries

Georgia	Moldova	Ukraine
Kazakhstan	Russian Federation	Uzbekistan
Kyrgyzstan	Turkmenistan	

NEAR EAST—9 Countries

Algeria	Jordan	Oman
Bahrain	Lebanon	Tunisia
Egypt	Morocco	Yemen

SOUTH ASIA—5 Countries

Bangladesh	Maldives	Sri Lanka
India	Nepal	

NOTES:

1. Countries with (00) or (01) beside their name indicates funding for only that year; the lack of a number indicates that they were funded in both years.
2. Total of \$57,875,000 appropriated worldwide for FY 01 IMET (from which E-IMET is also taken). (FY 00 funding was \$50,000.)
3. Range of individual country allocations is from \$25,000 (one country: Greece) to \$1,700,000 (one country: Turkey).
4. As implied/indicated by Note 1, the list of countries, as well as the amount of the grant given to a country, can change from year to year based upon the budget request through Department of State or unilateral Congressional action.

This information derived from Kenneth Martin's articles in the DISAM Journal (2000, pp. 22-26 and 2001, pp. 15-20).

Appendix E

E-IMET Objectives and Sub-Objectives With Associated Attributes & Performance Indicators (from Calhoun Study, 1998)

The following is excerpted directly from the Calhoun study (1998, pp. 84-89 & 109-110).

Overall E-IMET Objective:
Improved Military Justice Systems In Accordance With International Human Rights

Sub-Objective #1
Eliminate the Potential for War Crimes

Sub-Objective #2
Eliminate Peacetime Human Rights Abuses by the Military
(The second sub-objective can be further broken down
into the following two additional objectives.)

Additional Objective A
Establish a Western Style Military Justice System That Recognizes
The Rights of the Individual

Specific Attributes & Indicators of Performance:

1. Established legal system based on the assumption of innocence, the law of evidence, and the burden of proof.
 - A new or revised military justice code is adopted that contains written rules akin to the U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) which define offenses, authority and jurisdiction requirements, and outline procedures for the legal system.
 - The system allows for representation of the accused.
 - Conscientious objection is decriminalized.
 - The legal system controls the release of personal information.
 - The professional corps of legal officers is established within the military (i.e. a JAG corps).
 - Military persons are afforded the same protections that civilians have in the country's civilian judicial system.
 - Appeals are allowed.
 - Court officers are both military officers and officials of the court.
2. The prosecutor, defense counsel, investigator, and judge have legally established roles. (This is broken down into three attributes.)
 - a. Effective advocacy
 - The accused is allowed to consult with a defense lawyer prior to the trial.

- Military and civilian legal sectors work together to ensure the rights of the accused are not violated.
 - Trial advocacy clinics are established for military lawyers.
- b. Fair, Impartial, and Authoritative Judgements:
- Judgements of the court are carried out.
 - Human rights executive training seminars are established for military judges.
 - Members of the military are openly willing to have their cases heard before a military court.
- c. Official criminal investigative procedures recognize the rights of the accused and accepted standards for the search and seizure of evidence.
- The investigative process is revised recognizing the right of the individual.
 - Interrogation and the potential for self-incrimination are constrained by law.
 - The search and seizure of evidence is strictly regulated.
3. The sentencing process is fair and impartial.
- Detention practices are revised recognizing the right of due process and the assumption of innocence.
 - Alternatives for punishment exist aside from prison. These include administrative punishment, nonjudicial punishment, and reduction in pay and grade.
4. Humane military prison system.
- No torture is allowed.
 - Rules exist that enforce the humane treatment of prisoners.
 - Outside agencies, such as the International Red Cross, are allowed to inspect prison facilities.
5. Corruption and the abuse of power are prevented and ethical behavior is promoted.
- No undue command influence is exercised by the military.
 - Tampering with the judicial process is made illegal.
 - Rules of engagement (ROE) are developed during military operations that respect the sanctity of human life and the role of non-combatants.

Additional Objective B Civilian Control Over the Military

Specific Attribute:

1. Elected officials control the military justice system.
- The military justice system originated with the civilian authority that controls the military.
 - Members of the military have the right to bring unresolved problems to the attention of their elected representatives.

Appendix F

E-IMET Course List Used for This Study (Due to Democratization/Human Rights Emphasis)

MASL ^a	Course Title	Responsible School	Course Length	Course Location	E-IMET Students Military/Civilian			Total E-IMET Students Military/Civilian (Grand Total)
					ES ^b	GT ^b	NU ^b	
D173063	Civil-Military Strategy for Internal Development (CMSID)	USAF Special Operations School (USAFSOS)	2 Weeks	CONUS Hurlburt Field, FL	0/0	1/1	0/0	1/1 (2)
B171801	National Defense University International Fellows Program	National Defense University (NDU)	52 Weeks	CONUS Ft McNair, DC	2/0	1/0	0/0	3/0 (3)
B171425	Command & General Staff Officer Course School	Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC)	49 Weeks	CONUS Fort Benning, GA	15/0	17/0	0/0	32/0 (32)
D171032	Company Grade Officer Professional Development Course	Inter-American Air Force Academy (IAAFA)	7 Weeks	CONUS Lackland AFB, TX	0/0	9/1	0/0	9/1 (10)
D176006	The Rule of Law & Disciplined Military Operations	IAAFA		CONUS Lackland AFB, TX	0/0	5/3	0/0	5/3 (8)
P309051	Introductory Executive Seminar	Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS)	5 Days	In-Country	46/16	19/15	20/18	84/49 (134)
P309061	DIILS Follow-On Seminar(s)	DIILS	5 Days	In-Country	120/124	20/23	30/50	170/197 (367)
P309070 ^c	Civil-Military Relations Mobile Education Team (MET)	Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR)	5 Days	In-Country	478	116	28	622
	Student Totals by Country (with Grand Totals)				183/140 (801)	72/43 (231)	50/68 (146)	305/251 (556)

Note. Human Rights Instructor Course, MASL B166150 (3-week course conducted at WHINSEC), although a course included in the study was not listed due to having no attendees from El Salvador, Guatemala, or Nicaragua. Dashes indicate that information was not available.

^aMASL indicates the Military Articles and Services List number, a reference number used by the security assistance community. ^bNumbers and categories of students were provided by individual schools. ^cBreakout of military and civilian attendees was not available from CCMR; number indicates total attendees.

Appendix G

Generic Text of Letter Soliciting In-Country Survey Support

I am writing to request your assistance in a survey of international military and civilian students who receive training through the U.S. sponsored Expanded International Military Education and Training (E-IMET) Program. Lieutenant Colonel (Lt Col) Ron Reynolds, U.S. Air Force, is conducting the survey. He is currently assigned to the International Office School at Air University, at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Lt Col Reynolds has extensive experience in security assistance and is very knowledgeable of all of our programs.

Lt Col Reynolds is conducting a study as part of his doctoral program, which focuses on the effectiveness of E-IMET in achieving the specified goals of the program. As part of this study, he would like previous students to respond to a short written questionnaire. These students would include those who have attended E-MET courses within the United States as well as short courses (Mobile Education Teams) held in respective country. A list of the courses and numbers of attendees is attached to this letter to give you an idea of the scope of this project.

Responses from students will be kept in strictest confidence, although Lt Col Reynolds will have to receive names from your office and your approval to communicate with them. We would encourage respondents to participate strictly as volunteers without any initial contact from him. The final report will not include student names or any other information that could identify individual respondents. Lt Col Reynolds' questions will center on the students' current responsibilities, especially in terms of the content of their courses and continuing contact with persons at the schools attended.

We fully encourage and endorse this effort, believing that it will document E-IMET successes that our agency can then use to substantiate growth for both E-IMET and IMET. The potential impact for your particular country could be to enhance the view of our Administration and Congress in providing additional funding, with fewer limitations on its use – this is our hope.

Lt Col Reynolds desires to complete the survey within a span of 30 days during the months of May and June. He will strive to minimize the impact on time and effort on your personnel in obtaining as much information in as short a time as possible. On behalf of the Defense Cooperation Agency, I would like to thank you in advance for your support, believing that the benefits of this study can be far-reaching and beneficial to all concerned.

The letter was signed by Mr. Keith B. Webster; the Director of Policy, Plans, and Programs, for the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.

Appendix H

Student Survey Instrument (English Version)

Directions: Please fill out answers as best/concisely as possible. All information will be kept confidential by the researcher. Names and other identifying data are optional/voluntary and will be used only for potential future contact or to clarify a response.

Name: _____

Home Country: _____

Current Rank/Civil Service Grade: _____

Branch of Service or Government, or NGO Name: _____

Address: _____

Phone/Fax/E-Mail Address: _____

1. Courses Attended: (Circle & Provide Month/Year Graduated for Each Course Attended)

Only courses pertaining to the particular country will be listed in that country's survey sheet as noted.

- MASL D173036; Civ-Mil Strategy for Internal Development: _____
(Hurlburt Field, Florida) **GT Only**

- MASL B171801; NDU/National War College: Class of: _____
(Fort McNair, Washington DC) **ES & GT Only**

- MASL B171425; Command & General Staff College: Graduated in December, _____
(USARSA/WHINSEC at Fort Benning, Georgia) **ES & GT Only**

- MASL D171032; Company Grade Officer Professional Development: _____
(IAAFA) **GT Only**

- MASL D176006; The Rule of Law & Disciplined Military Operations: _____
(IAAFA) **GT Only**

- MASL P309051; Introductory Executive Seminar: _____
(Defense Institute of International Legal Studies; in Home Country City) **All Countries**

- MASL P309061; Follow-On Seminar: _____
(Defense Institute of International Legal Studies, in Home Country City) **All Countries**

- MASL P309070; CCMR Civil Military Relations MET: _____
(Center for Civil Military Relations, in Home Country City) **All Countries**

2. Are you still with the same Branch or Service or Government, or NGO that you were when you attended your most recent course?

Yes _____ No _____

If not, what was your previous organization? _____

3. Have you moved to a higher level job since you attended your most recent course?

Yes _____ No _____

4. Could you reasonably expect to move into a higher level job in the future? If so, what approximate year?

Yes _____; Year _____ No _____

5. Are you now in a position to influence organizational or national policy in your current job; if so specify what area of policy (i.e. national military policy, military justice policy, human rights, etc.)

Yes _____; Type of Policy _____ No _____

6. Could you reasonably expect to enter a position which can influence organizational or national policy in the future; if so specify what area of policy (i.e. national military policy, military justice policy, human rights policy, etc.) and in what year.

Yes _____; Type of Policy _____; Year _____

No _____

7. Do you recall discussions in your course(s) regarding human rights policy or issues?

Yes _____ No _____

8. Did the course you attended cause you to consider or think about the issue of personal freedoms or human rights more than you had previously?

Yes _____ No _____

9. Do you believe that discussions on democratization, human rights policy or related subjects have been helpful to you in your leadership or performance of your duties since attending the course(s)? If so, please briefly describe how?

Yes _____ No _____

Helpful how? _____

10. Have you maintained any contact with any faculty from the course you attended since you completed training? If so, please provide as much information as possible to questions below:

Yes _____; Approx Date of Last Contact _____

Subject Discussed (if recalled): _____

Person Last Contacted if Known: _____

How did you contact them (circle one): Phone E-Mail or Fax Letter

Have Not Contacted Since End of Course _____

11. Please rate the following in terms of how the course(s) have helped you in your duties within the each area based on the following scale. Note that you may add subjects in areas f and g as you desire regarding specific knowledge/skills or any other subject.

5	4	3	2	1	0
Very Helpful	Helpful	Neutral	Not Helpful	Obstructive	Not Applicable

a. Knowledge of US governmental system, military or institutional ideals.	
b. In particular, if you attended a course in the United States, how did the informational trips (i.e. visits to Washington DC, other cities, or institutions such as a courthouse) benefit you?	
c. Interaction and relationships with US personnel.	
d. Interaction and relationships with personnel (military and/or civilian) from my country.	
e. Interaction with personnel from countries other than the United States.	
f. Professional knowledge that will help in my career in my country.	
g. Particular knowledge/skill in the area of: _____	
h. Other: _____	

Note that with the actual margins and format of the instrument (by only including courses applicable for each particular country on page one), the survey did not exceed three pages.

Appendix I

Student Survey Instrument (Spanish Version)

Instrucciones: Favor de contestar las preguntas en la manera más oportuna y concisa posible. El investigador mantendrá confidencial toda la información. Los nombres y otros datos de identificación son opcionales/voluntarios y éstos se utilizarán sólo para lograr contacto en el futuro o para clarificar una respuesta.

Nombre: _____

País de origen: _____

Grado militar o civil actual: _____

Rama del servicio o gobierno o nombre de la organización no gubernamental (NGO): _____

Dirección: _____

Teléfono/Fax/Dirección de correo electrónico: _____

1. Cursos completados: (Coloque un círculo e indique el mes y año en que se graduó de cada curso)

Sólo se incluirán en la hoja de encuesta los cursos que corresponden al país específico.

- MASL D173063; “Civ-Mil Strategy for Internal Development” (“Estrategia Cívico-Militar para el Desarrollo Interno”): (Hurlburt Field, Florida) ***Guatemala solamente.***

- MASL B171801; Universidad Nacional de Defensa (NDU)/Escuela Superior de Guerra; Clase de: _____ (Fuerte McNair, Washington, DC) ***El Salvador y Guatemala solamente***

- MASL B171425; Escuela de Comando y Estado Mayor; Se graduó en diciembre de _____ (USARSA/WHINSEC en el Fuerte Benning, Georgia) ***El Salvador y Guatemala solamente***

- MASL D171032; “Company-Grade Officer Professional Development” (“Curso de Capacitación Profesional para Oficiales a Nivel de Compañía”): _____
(Academia Interamericana de la Fuerza Aérea [IAAFA]) ***Guatemala solamente***

- MASL D176006; “The Rule of Law and Disciplined Military Operations” (“El Imperio de la Ley y las Operaciones Disciplinadas Militares”): _____
(Academia Interamericana de la Fuerza Aérea [IAAFA]) ***Guatemala solamente***

- MASL P309051; Conferencia Ejecutiva Introductoria:

 (“Defense Institute of International Legal Studies” [“Instituto de Estudios Legales Internacionales del Ministerio de Defensa”], en una ciudad del país de origen) ***Todos los países***

- MASL P309061; Conferencia de Seguimiento:

 (“Defense Institute of International Legal Studies” [“Instituto de Estudios Legales Internacionales del Ministerio de Defensa”], en una ciudad del país de origen) ***Todos los países***

- MASL P309070; “CCMR” Relaciones Cívico-Militares, Tarea Esencial para la Misión (MET): _____
 (“Center for Civil-Military Relations” [“Centro de Relaciones Cívico-Militares”], en una ciudad del país de origen) ***Todos los países***

2. ¿Pertenece usted a la misma rama del servicio, gobierno u organización no gubernamental a la cual estaba asignado cuando completó su curso más reciente?

Sí _____ No _____

Si indicó que no, ¿a qué organización estaba asignado anteriormente?

3. ¿Ha transferido a un puesto superior desde que completó su curso más reciente?

Sí _____ No _____

4. ¿Anticipa transferirse a un empleo superior en el futuro? Si es posible esto, ¿en qué año aproximadamente?

Sí _____; Año _____ No _____

5. ¿Se encuentra usted en un puesto donde puede influir en la política orgánica o nacional? Si contestó que sí, hay que especificar el tipo de política (por ejemplo, la política militar nacional, la política de justicia militar, los derechos humanos, etc.)

Sí _____; Tipo de Política _____; No _____

6. ¿Anticipa obtener un cargo en que puede influir en la política orgánica o nacional? Si contestó que sí, hay que especificar el tipo de política (por ejemplo, la política militar nacional, la política de justicia militar, los derechos humanos, etc.) y el año.

Sí _____; Tipo de Política _____; Año _____
No _____

7. ¿Recuerda usted si había diálogos y discusiones en su curso sobre la política relativa a los derechos humanos o asuntos relacionados con el tema?

Sí _____ No _____

8. ¿Le provocó el curso considerar o examinar más detalladamente el asunto de las libertades personales o los derechos humanos?

Sí _____ No _____

9. ¿Cree usted que las discusiones sobre la democratización, la política sobre los derechos humanos o los asuntos relacionados hayan resultado provechosas en su mando o desempeño de deberes desde que completó el curso/cursos? Si es así, explique brevemente.

Sí_____. No_____

Explicación:_____

10. ¿Ha mantenido comunicaciones con algunos miembros del cuerpo docente del curso que completó desde que se concluyó la instrucción? De serlo así, conteste las siguientes preguntas con tantos detalles posibles:

Sí_____;
Fecha aproximada del contacto más reciente:_____

Tema de la discusión (si se recuerda):_____

Individuo con quien habló (si se recuerda):_____

¿Cómo comunicó con el individuo (indique uno):

Teléfono Correo Electrónico (E-Mail)/Fax Carta

No se ha tenido comunicación con nadie desde la conclusión del curso:_____

11. Favor de evaluar lo siguiente con respecto a la forma en que el curso/los cursos le han ayudado en sus tareas dentro de cada área según la escala que se da a continuación. Hay que observar que se pueden indicar temas en las áreas “f” y “g”, si quiere, en lo relativo a los conocimientos/destrezas específicas o cualquier otro asunto.

5	4	3	2	1	0
Muy provechoso	Provechoso	Neutral	No provechoso	Obstructivo	No se aplica

a. Conocimiento del sistema de gobierno de EE.UU., conceptos militares e institucionales	
b. En particular, si usted realizó un curso en Estados Unidos, ¿cómo le servirán los viajes informativos (es decir, las visitas a Washington, DC, otras ciudades o institutos tales como el palacio de justicia)	
c. Interacción y compañerismo con el personal estadounidense	
d. Interacción y compañerismo con el personal (militar o civil) de mi país.	
e. Interacción con el personal proveniente de otros países además de Estados Unidos	
f. Conocimientos profesionales que me servirán en mi carrera en mi país	
g. Conocimientos/destrezas específicas en el área de:	
h. Otros:	

Appendix J

School Course Director/Instructor Survey Instrument

Directions: Please fill out answers as best/concisely as possible. All information will be kept confidential by the researcher. Names and other identifying data are optional/voluntary and will be used only for potential future contact or to clarify a response.

Name: _____

U.S. School Assigned: _____

Current Rank/Civil Service Grade: _____

Branch of Service: _____

Address: _____

Phone/Fax/E-Mail Address: _____

1. Course(s) You Are Direct/Instruct (annotate all that apply):

- MASL D173036; Civ-Mil Strategy for Internal Development (USAFSOS)
(Hurlburt Field) *Had **GT Attendees Only***
- MASL B171801; NDU/National War College:
(Fort McNair) *Had **ES & GT Attendees Only***
- MASL B171425; Command & General Staff College
(USARSA/WHINSEC, Fort Benning, Georgia) *Had **ES & GT Attendees Only***
- MASL D171032; Company Grade Officer Professional Development
(IAAFA) *Had **GT Attendees Only***
- MASL D176006; The Rule of Law & Disciplined Military Operations
(IAAFA) *Had **GT Attendees Only***
- MASL P309051; Introductory Executive Seminar
(DIILS; MET) *Involved **All 3 Countries***
- MASL P309061; Follow-On Seminar
(DIILS; MET) *Involved **All 3 Countries***
- MASL P309070; CCMR Civil Military Relations MET
(CCMR; MET) *Involved **All 3 Countries***

2. Which countries pertaining to this study have you been involved with in terms of the courses noted on page one only since 1990 or when your course was initiated—whichever occurred later (annotate all that apply)?

El Salvador

Guatemala

Nicaragua

3. Have you (or previous faculty) developed any formal means of initiating follow-on contact with previous students? If so, provide a brief explanation of the process.

Yes _____

No _____

4. Have you had any continuing contact via e-mail, letter, telephone, or any other means of communication with any students?

Yes _____

No _____

If so, which country (or countries), approximate number of students from each country, and particular topics discussed if recalled (no student names please)?

5. Please provide any anecdotal data regarding any of the three countries, their students (no student names please), or changing conditions regarding democratization/human rights you may feel would be helpful to the researcher. (Add additional sheets of paper as necessary or feel free to type and attach to this form.)

Appendix K

Explanation of Freedom House Ratings Methodology

The following explanation was extracted and reprinted with permission from the Freedom House Website regarding the methodology of their rating system (Freedom House, 2000d).

Survey Methodology

Since its inception in the 1970s, Freedom House's Freedom in the World survey has provided an annual evaluation of political rights and civil liberties throughout the world. The Survey attempts to judge all countries and territories by a single standard and to emphasize the importance of democracy and freedom. At a minimum, a democracy is a political system in which the people choose their authoritative leaders freely from among competing groups and individuals who were not designated by the government. Freedom represents the opportunity to act spontaneously in a variety of fields outside the control of the government and other centers of potential domination.

The *Survey* rates countries and territories based on real world situations caused by state and nongovernmental factors, rather than on governmental intentions or legislation alone. Freedom House does not rate governments per se, but rather the rights and freedoms enjoyed by individuals in each country or territory. The Survey does not base its judgment solely on the political conditions in a country or territory (i.e., war, terrorism, etc.), but by the effect which these conditions have on freedom.

Freedom House does not maintain a culture-bound view of democracy. The Survey demonstrates that, in addition to countries in Europe and the Americas, there are free states with varying forms of democracy functioning among people of all races and religions in Africa, the Pacific, and Asia. In some Pacific islands, free countries can have political systems based on competing family groups and personalities rather than on European- or American-style political parties. In recent years, there has been a proliferation of democracies in developing countries, and the Survey reflects their growing numbers. To reach its conclusions, the Survey team employs a broad range of international sources of information, including both foreign and domestic news reports, NGO publications, think tank and academic analyses, and individual professional contacts.

Definitions and categories of the Survey

The *Survey's* understanding of freedom encompasses two general sets of characteristics grouped under political rights and civil liberties. Political rights enable people to participate freely in the political process, which is the system by which the polity chooses authoritative policy makers and attempts to make binding decisions affecting the national, regional, or local community. In a free society, this represents the right of all adults to vote and compete for public office, and for elected representatives to have a decisive vote

on public policies. Civil liberties include the freedoms to develop views, institutions, and personal autonomy apart from the state.

The *Survey* employs two series of checklists, one for questions regarding political rights and one for civil liberties, and assigns each country or territory considered a numerical rating for each category. The political rights and civil liberties ratings are then averaged and used to assign each country and territory to an overall status of “Free,” “Partly Free,” or “Not Free.” (See the section below, “Rating System for Political Rights and Civil Liberties,” for a detailed description of the *Survey*’s methodology.)

Freedom House rates both independent countries and their territories. For the purposes of the *Survey*, countries are defined as internationally recognized independent states whose governments are resident within their officially claimed borders. In the case of Cyprus, two sets of ratings are provided, as there are two governments on that divided island. This does not imply that Freedom House endorses Cypriot division. We note only that neither the predominantly Greek Republic of Cyprus, nor the Turkish-occupied, predominantly Turkish territory of the Republic of Northern Cyprus, is the de facto government for the entire island. This year, East Timor moved from the disputed territory to country category following the region’s successful referendum on independence in August 1999. The referendum, which was widely recognized by the international community, led to East Timor being placed under United Nations administration during its transition to full sovereignty.

Freedom House divides territories into two categories: related territories and disputed territories. Related territories consist mostly of colonies, protectorates, and island dependencies of sovereign states which are in some relation of dependency to that state and whose relationship is not currently in serious legal or political dispute. Puerto Rico, Hong Kong, and French Guiana are three examples of related territories. Since most related territories have a broad range of civil liberties and some form of self-government, a higher proportion of them have the “Free” designation than do independent countries. Disputed territories represent areas within internationally recognized sovereign states which are usually dominated by a minority ethnic group and whose status is in serious political or violent dispute. This group also includes territories whose incorporation into nation-states is not universally recognized. In some cases, the issue of dispute is the desire of the majority of the population of that territory to secede from the sovereign state and either form an independent country or become part of a neighboring state. Tibet, Kashmir, and Abkhazia are examples falling within this category.

Freedom House assigns only designations of “Free,” “Partly Free,” and “Not Free” for the eight related territories with populations under 5,000, designated as “microterritories,” without corresponding category numbers. However, the same methodology is used to determine the status of these territories as for larger territories and independent states. The microterritories in the *Survey* are Cocos (Keeling) Islands, Rapanui (Easter Island), Falkland Islands, Niue, Norfolk Island, Pitcairn Islands, Svalbard, and Tokelau. The *Survey* excludes from its consideration uninhabited territories and such entities as the U.S.-owned Johnston Atoll, which has only a transient military population and no native inhabitants.

Political Rights Checklist

1. Is the head of state and/or head of government or other chief authority elected through free and fair elections?
2. Are the legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections?
3. Are there fair electoral laws, equal campaigning opportunities, fair polling, and honest tabulation of ballots?
4. Are the voters able to endow their freely elected representatives with real power?
5. Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system open to the rise and fall of these competing parties or groupings?
6. Is there a significant opposition vote, de facto opposition power, and a realistic possibility for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections?
7. Are the people free from domination by the military, foreign powers, totalitarian parties, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any other powerful group?
8. Do cultural, ethnic, religious, and other minority groups have reasonable self-determination, self-government, autonomy, or participation through informal consensus in the decision-making process?

Additional discretionary

Political Rights questions:

- A. For traditional monarchies that have no parties or electoral process, does the system provide for consultation with the people, encourage discussion of policy, and allow the right to petition the ruler?
- B. Is the government or occupying power deliberately changing the ethnic composition of a country or territory so as to destroy a culture or tip the political balance in favor of another group?

To answer the political rights questions, Freedom House considers the extent to which the system offers the voter the chance to make a free choice among candidates, and to what extent the candidates are chosen independently of the state. Freedom House recognizes that formal electoral procedures are not the only factors that determine the real distribution of power. In many Latin American countries, for example, the military retains a significant political role, and in Morocco the king maintains considerable power over the elected politicians. The more that people suffer under such domination by unelected forces, the less chance the country has of receiving credit for self-determination in our Survey.

The Civil Liberties Checklist

A. Freedom of Expression and Belief

1. Are there free and independent media and other forms of cultural expression? (Note: in cases where the media are state-controlled but offer pluralistic points of view, the Survey gives the system credit.)
2. Are there free religious institutions and is there free private and public religious expression?

B. Association and Organizational Rights

1. 1. Is there freedom of assembly, demonstration, and open public discussion?
2. Is there freedom of political or quasi-political organization? (Note: this includes political parties, civic organizations, ad hoc issue groups, etc.)
3. Are there free trade unions and peasant organizations or equivalents, and is there effective collective bargaining? Are there free professional and other private organizations?

C. Rule of Law and Human Rights

1. Is there an independent judiciary?
2. Does the rule of law prevail in civil and criminal matters? Is the population treated equally under the law? Are police under direct civilian control?
3. Is there protection from political terror, unjustified imprisonment, exile, or torture, whether by groups that support or oppose the system? Is there freedom from war and insurgencies? (Note: freedom from war and insurgencies enhances the liberties in a free society, but the absence of wars and insurgencies does not in and of itself make a not free society free.)
4. Is there freedom from extreme government indifference and corruption?

D. Personal Autonomy and Economic Rights

1. Is there open and free private discussion?
2. Is there personal autonomy? Does the state control travel, choice of residence, or choice of employment? Is there freedom from indoctrination and excessive dependency on the state?

3. Are property rights secure? Do citizens have the right to establish private businesses? Is private business activity unduly influenced by government officials, the security forces, or organized crime?
4. Are there personal social freedoms, including gender equality, choice of marriage partners, and size of family?
5. Is there equality of opportunity, including freedom from exploitation by or dependency on landlords, employers, union leaders, bureaucrats, or other types of obstacles to a share of legitimate economic gains?

When analyzing the civil liberties checklist, Freedom House does not mistake constitutional guarantees of human rights for those rights in practice. For states and territories with small populations, particularly tiny island nations, the absence of trade unions and other types of association is not necessarily viewed as a negative situation unless the government or other centers of domination are deliberately blocking their formation or operation. In some cases, the small size of these countries and territories may result in a lack of sufficient institutional complexity to make them fully comparable to larger countries. The question of equality of opportunity also implies a free choice of employment and education. Extreme inequality of opportunity prevents disadvantaged individuals from enjoying full exercise of civil liberties. Typically, very poor countries and territories lack both opportunities for economic advancement and other liberties on this checklist. The question on extreme government indifference and corruption is included to highlight that the human rights of a country's residents suffer when governments ignore the social and economic welfare of large sectors of the population. Government corruption can pervert the political process and hamper the development of a free economy.

Rating System for Political Rights and Civil Liberties

The *Survey* rates political rights and civil liberties separately on a seven-category scale, 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free. A country is assigned to a particular numerical category based on responses to the checklist and the judgments of the Survey team at Freedom House. According to the methodology, the team assigns initial ratings to countries by awarding from 0 to 4 raw points per checklist item, depending on the comparative rights or liberties present. (In the Surveys completed from 1989-90 through 1992-93, the methodology allowed for a less nuanced range of 0 to 2 raw points per question.) The only exception to the addition of 0 to 4 raw points per checklist item is additional discretionary question B in the political rights checklist, for which 1 to 4 raw points are subtracted depending on the severity of the situation. The highest possible score for political rights is 32 points, based on up to 4 points for each of eight questions. The highest possible score for civil liberties is 56 points, based on up to 4 points for each of fourteen questions.

After placing countries in initial categories based on checklist points, the Survey team makes minor adjustments to account for factors such as extreme violence, whose intensity may not be reflected in answering the checklist questions. These exceptions

aside, the results of the checklist system reflect real world situations and allow for the placement of countries and territories into their respective categories.

Freedom House assigns upward or downward trend arrows to countries and territories to indicate general positive or negative trends that may not be apparent from the ratings. Such trends may or may not be reflected in raw points, depending on the circumstances in each country or territory. A country cannot receive both a numerical ratings change and a trend arrow in the same year, nor can it receive trend arrows in the same direction in two successive years. Distinct from the trend arrows which appear before the name of a country above its respective country report, the triangles located next to the political rights and civil liberties ratings (see accompanying tables of comparative measures of freedom for countries and related and disputed territories) indicate changes in those ratings caused by real world events since the last Survey.

Without a well-developed civil society, it is difficult, if not impossible, to have an atmosphere supportive of democracy. A society that does not have free individual and group expression in nonpolitical matters is not likely to make an exception for political ones. There is no country in the Survey with a rating of 6 or 7 for civil liberties and, at the same time, a rating of 1 or 2 for political rights. Almost without exception in the Survey, countries and territories have ratings in political rights and civil liberties that are within two ratings numbers of each other.

Political Rights	
Category No.	Raw Points
1	28-32
2	23-27
3	19-22
4	14-18
5	10-13
6	5-9
7	0-4
Civil Liberties	
Category No.	Raw Points
1	50-56
2	42-49
3	34-41
4	26-33
5	17-25
6	9-16
7	0-8

Explanation of Political Rights and Civil Liberties Ratings

Political Rights

Countries and territories which receive a rating of 1 for political rights come closest to the ideals suggested by the checklist questions, beginning with free and fair elections. Those who are elected rule, there are competitive parties or other political groupings, and the opposition plays an important role and has actual power. Citizens enjoy self-determination or an extremely high degree of autonomy (in the case of territories), and minority groups have reasonable self-government or can participate in the government through informal consensus. With the exception of such entities as tiny island states, these countries and territories have decentralized political power and free subnational elections.

Countries and territories rated 2 in political rights are less free than those rated 1. Such factors as gross political corruption, violence, political discrimination against minorities, and foreign or military influence on politics may be present and weaken the quality of democracy.

The same conditions which undermine freedom in countries and territories with a rating of 2 may also weaken political rights in those with a rating of 3, 4, or 5. Other damaging elements can include civil war, heavy military involvement in politics, lingering royal power, unfair elections, and one-party dominance. However, states and territories in these categories may still enjoy some elements of political rights, including the freedom to organize quasi-political groups, reasonably free referenda, or other significant means of popular influence on government.

Countries and territories with political rights rated 6 have systems ruled by military juntas, one-party dictatorships, religious hierarchies, or autocrats. These regimes may allow only a minimal manifestation of political rights, such as competitive local elections or some degree of representation or autonomy for minorities. Some countries and territories rated 6 are in the early or aborted stages of democratic transition. A few states are traditional monarchies that mitigate their relative lack of political rights through the use of consultation with their subjects, toleration of political discussion, and acceptance of public petitions.

For countries and territories with a rating of 7, political rights are absent or virtually nonexistent due to the extremely oppressive nature of the regime or severe oppression in combination with civil war. States and territories in this group may also be marked by extreme violence or warlord rule which dominates political power in the absence of an authoritative, functioning central government.

Civil Liberties

Countries and territories which receive a rating of 1 come closest to the ideals expressed in the civil liberties checklist, including freedom of expression, assembly, association, and religion. They are distinguished by an established and generally equitable system of rule of law and are comparatively free of extreme government indifference and

corruption. Countries and territories with this rating enjoy free economic activity and tend to strive for equality of opportunity.

States and territories with a rating of 2 have deficiencies in three or four aspects of civil liberties, but are still relatively free.

Countries and territories which have received a rating of 3, 4, or 5 range from those that are in at least partial compliance with virtually all checklist standards to those with a combination of high or medium scores for some questions and low or very low scores on other questions. The level of oppression increases at each successive rating level, particularly in the areas of censorship, political terror, and the prevention of free association. There are also many cases in which groups opposed to the state engage in political terror that undermines other freedoms. Therefore, a poor rating for a country is not necessarily a comment on the intentions of the government, but may reflect real restrictions on liberty caused by nongovernmental terror.

Countries and territories rated 6 are characterized by a few partial rights, such as some religious and social freedoms, some highly restricted private business activity, and relatively free private discussion. In general, people in these states and territories experience severely restricted expression and association, and there are almost always political prisoners and other manifestations of political terror.

States and territories with a rating of 7 have virtually no freedom. An overwhelming and justified fear of repression characterizes these societies.

Free, Partly Free, Not Free

The Survey assigns each country and territory the status of “Free,” “Partly Free,” or “Not Free” by averaging their political rights and civil liberties ratings. Those whose ratings average 1-2.5 are generally considered “Free,” 3-5.5 “Partly Free,” and 5.5-7 “Not Free.” The dividing line between “Partly Free” and “Not Free” usually falls within the group whose ratings numbers average 5.5. For example, countries that receive a rating of 6 for political rights and 5 for civil liberties, or a 5 for political rights and a 6 for civil liberties, could be either “Partly Free” or “Not Free.” The total number of raw points is the definitive factor which determines the final status. Countries and territories with combined raw scores of 0-30 points are “Not Free,” 31-59 points are “Partly Free,” and 60-88 are “Free.” Based on raw points, this year there is one unusual case: Mali’s ratings average 3.0, but it is “Free.”

It should be emphasized that the “Free,” “Partly Free,” and “Not Free” labels are highly simplified terms that each cover a broad third of the available raw points. Therefore, countries and territories within each category, especially those at either end of each category, can have quite different human rights situations. In order to see the distinctions within each category, one should examine a country or territory’s political rights and civil liberties ratings.

The differences in raw points between countries in the three broad categories represent distinctions in the real world. There are obstacles which “Partly Free” countries must

overcome before they can be called “Free,” just as there are impediments which prevent “Not Free” countries from being called “Partly Free.” Countries at the lowest rung of the “Free” category (2 in political rights and 3 in civil liberties, or 3 in political rights and 2 in civil liberties) differ from those at the upper end of the “Partly Free” group (e.g., 3 for both political rights and civil liberties). Typically, there is more violence and/or military influence on politics at 3, 3 than at 2, 3.

The distinction between the least bad “Not Free” countries and the least free “Partly Free” may be less obvious than the gap between “Partly Free” and “Free,” but at “Partly Free,” there is at least one additional factor that keeps a country from being assigned to the “Not Free” category. For example, Lebanon, which was rated 6, 5 “Partly Free” in 1994, was rated 6, 5, but “Not Free,” in 1995 after its legislature unilaterally extended the incumbent president’s term indefinitely. Though not sufficient to drop the country’s political rights rating to 7, there was enough of a drop in raw points to change its category.

Freedom House does not view democracy as a static concept, and the Survey recognizes that a democratic country does not necessarily belong in our category of “Free” states. A democracy can lose freedom and become merely “Partly Free.” Sri Lanka and Colombia are examples of such “Partly Free” democracies. In other cases, countries that replaced military regimes with elected governments can have less than complete transitions to liberal democracy. Guatemala fits the description of this kind of “Partly Free” democracy. Some scholars use the term “semi-democracy” or “formal democracy,” instead of “Partly Free” democracy, to refer to countries that are democratic in form but less than free in substance.

The designation “Free” does not mean that a country enjoys perfect freedom or lacks serious problems. As an institution which advocates human rights, Freedom House remains concerned about a variety of social problems and civil liberties questions in the U.S. and other countries that the Survey places in the “Free” category. An improvement in a country’s rating does not mean that human rights campaigns should cease. On the contrary, the findings of the Survey should be regarded as a means to encourage improvements in the political rights and civil liberties conditions in all countries.

Appendix L

Student Survey Code Book

Field 1 – CNTRY

Character/Text (Width: 2)

Country

ES – El Salvador

GT – Guatemala

NU – Nicaragua

Field 2 – CONT

Numerical (Width: 1)

Contact Method with School if it's occurred. (Question 10 B.)

0 – No Response

1 – E-Mail

2 – Telephone or Fax

3 – Address

Field 3 – MULTCRS

Numeric (Width: 1)

Multiple Courses Attended: The number of courses respondent has attended (when noted).

0 – No Response

1 – One Course Attended

2 – Two Courses Attended

3 – Three Courses Attended

Field 4 – COURSE1

Numeric (Width: 6)

1st Course Attended: Numeric MASL minus the alpha character.

173036 176006 0 – No Response

171801 309051

171425 309061

171032 309070

Field 5 – CRSDT1

Numeric (Width: 46) (ex. 199909)

Course Completion Date of 1st Course; Year/Month

0 – No Response

Field 6 – COURSE2

Numeric (Width: 6)

2nd Course Attended: Numeric MASL minus the alpha character.

173036 176006 0 – No Response

171801 309051

171425 309061

171032 309070

Field 7 – CRSDT2

Numeric (Width: 46) (ex. 199909)

Course Completion Date of 2nd Course; Year/Month

0 – No Response

Field 8 – STATUS

Numeric (Width: 1)

Primary Organization Status/Agency of Employment

0 – No Response

1 – Military

2 – Civilian (Civil Service – Ministry of Defense)

3 – Civilian (Civil Service – Non Ministry of Defense)

4 – Civilian (NGO)

5 – Elected Official

Field 9 – RANK or Job Specialty

Character/Text (Width: 5)

Military or Civilian Rank/Grade (Specialty was used only when mil rank was not specified).

0 – No Response

Nat Ably (Civ Svc)

Cont/Fin (Fin Mgt)

O-2 Mil JA (Unk Mil or Civ)

Press

O-3 Pgm Dir

Medical

O-4 Architect

Atty - Attorney

O-5 Leg – Legislature (elected official)

Legal – non-Attorney

O-6 Int Rel – International Relations

Bus Admin

Univ Prf – University Professor

Eng – Engineer

Pub Def – Public Defender Pol Con – Political Consultant

MDN – Ministry of Defense Employee (Mil/Civ Unk)

Field 10 – SMORG

Numeric (Width: 1)

Same Organization: Is the respondent with the same organization (Civ, Mil, NGO) as when attended training? (Does not mean that military member may not have changed duty positions.) (Question 2)

0 – No Response

1 – Yes

2 – No

Field 11 – HJB

Numeric (Width: 1)

Higher Job: Has the respondent moved to a higher level job since attending course.
(Question 3)

0 – No Response

1 – Yes

2 – No

Field 12 – JBPG

Numeric (Width: 1)

Job Progression: Does the respondent anticipate a move in the future.

(Question 4A)

0 – No Response

1 – Yes

2 – No

Field 13 – PYRS

Numeric (Width: 1)

Job Progression: Does the respondent anticipate a move in the future; if so, when.

(Question 4B)

0 – No Response

1 – 1-2 Years

2 – 3-5 Years

3 – 6-10 Years

4 – Longer than 10 Years

5 – Indefinite

Field 14 – POL1

Numeric (Width: 1)

Policy Implications: Is the respondent currently in a position to influence policy.

(Question 5A)

0 – No Response

1 – Yes

2 – No

Field 15 – POLNOW

Numeric (Width: 1)

Policy Implications: If the respondent is currently in a position to influence policy; what kind of policy can they influence. (Question 5B)

0 – No Response

1 – Military Policy

2 – Human Rights/Humanitarian Issues

3 – Military Justice

4 – Legislative

5 – Miscellaneous (Organizational, Press, Social, Education)

Field 16 – POL2

Numeric (Width: 1)

Policy Implications 2: Does the respondent anticipate being in a position later in his/her career in which they will be able to influence policy. (Question 6A.)

0 – No Response

1 – Yes

2 – No

Field 17 – POLAT

Numeric (Width: 1)

Policy Implications 2: If the respondent anticipates being in a position later in his/her career in which they will be able to influence policy, what kind of policy will they be likely to influence. (Question 6B.)

0 – No Response

1 – Military Policy

2 – Human Rights/Humanitarian Issues

3 – Military Justice

4 – Legislative

5 – Miscellaneous (Organizational, Press, Social, Education)

Field 18 – POLYRS

Numeric (Width: 1)

Policy Implications 2: When does the respondent anticipate being in a position later in his/her career in which they will be able to influence policy. This is number of years after completing course most recent course. (Question 6C.)

0 – No Response

1 – 1-2 Years

2 – 3-5 Years

3 – 6-10 Years

4 – Longer than 10 Years

5 – Indefinite

Field 19 – HRDSN

Numeric (Width: 1)

Human Rights Discussions: Does the respondent recall human right discussions in the course(s) attended. (Question 7.)

0 – No Response

1 – Yes

2 – No

Field 20 – HRCDR

Numeric (Width: 1)

Human Rights Considerations: Did the course(s) attended cause the respondent to consider personal freedoms/human rights more that they had previously? (Question 8.)

0 – No Response

1 – Yes

2 – No

Field 21 – DTYIMP

Numeric (Width: 1)

Duty Impact: Have the discussions on democratization, human rights policy or related subjects been helpful to the respondent in terms of enhancing leadership skills or duty performance since attending the course(s). (Question 9A.)

0 – No Response

1 – Yes

2 – No

Field 22 – DTYIMPHOW

Numeric (Width: 1)

Duty Impact How: If the discussions on democratization, human rights policy or related subjects were helpful to the respondent, how were they helpful. (Question 9B.)

0 – No Response

1- Furthered Civil-Military Relations

2- Enhanced Human Rights Knowledge & Practices

3- Furthers Knowledge of Legal Practices

4- Furthers Democratization Principles

5- Furthers/Improves Discussion & Education of Officials on Such Issues

6- Enhances Military Professionalism

7- Invaluable Experience with Other Countries' Military (CONUS Course Comment)

Field 23 – SCHCT

Numeric (Width: 1)

School Contact: Has the respondent had any follow-on contact with the school. (Question 10A.)

0 – No Response

1 – Yes

2 – No

3 – Didn't know how to contact them

Field 24 – CTMD

Numerical (Width: 1)

Contact Method with School if it's occurred. (Question 10B.)

0 – No Response

1 – E-Mail or Fax

2 – Telephone

3 – Letter

Note: There were no responses to this part of the question.

Field 25 – SUBDSN

Numerical (Width: 1)

Subject discussed with the school, if there's been contact. (Question 10C.)

0 – No Response

1 – Military Policy

2 – Human Rights/Humanitarian Issues

3 – Military Justice

4 – Legislative

5 – Miscellaneous (Organizational, Press, Social, Education)

The Following areas are Likert Scale ratings of particular parts of the course – how subject areas benefited the respondent within individual duties.

Field 26 – Q11A

Numerical (Width: 1)

Knowledge of US governmental system, military, or institutional ideas.

0 – Not Applicable

1 – Obstructive

2 – Not Helpful

3 – Neutral

4 – Helpful

5 – Very Helpful

Field 27 – Q11B

Numerical (Width: 1)

In particular, if you attended a course in the United States, how did the informational trips (i.e. visits to Washington DC, other cities, or institutions such as a courthouse) benefit you?

0 – Not Applicable

1 – Obstructive

2 – Not Helpful

3 – Neutral

4 – Helpful

5 – Very Helpful

Field 28 – Q11C

Numerical (Width: 1)

Interaction and relationships with US personnel.

0 – Not Applicable

1 – Obstructive

2 – Not Helpful

3 – Neutral

4 – Helpful

5 – Very Helpful

Field 29 – Q11D

Numerical (Width: 1)

Interaction and relationships with personnel (military and/or civilian) from my country.

- 0 – Not Applicable
- 1 – Obstructive
- 2 – Not Helpful
- 3 – Neutral
- 4 – Helpful
- 5 – Very Helpful

Field 30 – Q11E

Numerical (Width: 1)

Interaction with personnel from countries other than the United States.

- 0 – Not Applicable
- 1 – Obstructive
- 2 – Not Helpful
- 3 – Neutral
- 4 – Helpful
- 5 – Very Helpful

Field 31 – Q11F

Numerical (Width: 1)

Professional knowledge that will help in my career in my country.

- 0 – Not Applicable
- 1 – Obstructive
- 2 – Not Helpful
- 3 – Neutral
- 4 – Helpful
- 5 – Very Helpful

Field 32 – Q11G

Numerical (Width: 2)

Particular Knowledge/skill in the area of _____ (respondent fill-in). Areas added (same as in Q11H):

- 0 – None Added
- 1 – Civil-Military Relations (w/other Government Agencies)
- 2 – Human Rights Education
- 3 – Military Justice
- 4 – Democratization
- 5 – Legal Procedures/Arguments
- 6 – Professionalism of the Military
- 7 – Economics Issues
- 8 – Social Issues
- 9 – Public Safety Issues
- 10 – Miscellaneous (Planning/National Security/Legislation/Peace Operations)

Field 33 – Q11H

Numerical (Width: 2)

Other. _____ (respondent fill-in), to allow for any additional ideas. Areas added (same as in Q11G):

0 – None Added

1 – Civil-Military Relations (w/other Government Agencies)

2 – Human Rights Education

3 – Military Justice

4 – Democratization

5 – Legal Procedures/Arguments

6 – Professionalism of the Military

7 – Economics Issues

8 – Social Issues

9 – Public Safety Issues

10 – Miscellaneous (Planning/National Security/Legislation/Peace Operations)

Appendix M

Frequency Tables for El Salvador Student Survey

Frequency Table for CONT

CONT	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent

0	39	59.09	39	59.09
1	8	12.12	47	71.21
2	18	27.27	65	98.48
3	1	1.52	66	100.0

Frequency Table for MULTCRS

MULTCRS	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent

0	12	18.18	12	18.18
1	52	78.79	64	96.97
2	2	3.03	66	100.0

Frequency Table for COURSE1

COURSE1	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent

0	12	18.18	12	18.18
171425	5	7.58	17	25.76
171801	2	3.03	19	28.79
309051	5	7.58	24	36.36
309061	6	9.09	30	45.45
309070	36	54.55	66	100.0

Frequency Table for CRSDT1

CRSDT1	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent

0	28	42.42	28	42.42
1998	3	4.55	31	46.97
1999	2	3.03	33	50.0
199507	5	7.58	38	57.58
199712	1	1.52	39	59.09
199812	2	3.03	41	62.12
199912	2	3.03	43	65.15
200006	1	1.52	44	66.67
200104	22	33.33	66	100.0

Frequency Table for COURSE2

COURSE2	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent

0	64	96.97	64	96.97
309070	2	3.03	66	100.0

Frequency Table for CRSDT2

CRSDT2	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent

0	64	96.97	64	96.97
1999	1	1.52	65	98.48
200104	1	1.52	66	100.0

Frequency Table for STATUS

STATUS	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent

0	5	7.58	5	7.58
1	8	12.12	13	19.7
2	32	48.48	45	68.18
3	11	16.67	56	84.85
4	6	9.09	62	93.94
5	4	6.06	66	100.0

Frequency Table for RANK

		Cumulative		Cumulative
RANK	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent

0	5	7.58	5	7.58
ARCHTECT	1	1.52	6	9.09
ATTY	5	7.58	11	16.67
BUSADMIN	2	3.03	13	19.7
CONT/FIN	1	1.52	14	21.21
ENG	1	1.52	15	22.73
INT REL	1	1.52	16	24.24
LEG	4	6.06	20	30.3
LEGAL	1	1.52	21	31.82
MDN	30	45.45	51	77.27
MEDICAL	1	1.52	52	78.79
O-4	6	9.09	58	87.88
O-6	2	3.03	60	90.91
PGM DIR	1	1.52	61	92.42
PRESS	2	3.03	63	95.45
PRS APPT	1	1.52	64	96.97
UNIV PRF	2	3.03	66	100.0

Frequency Table for SMORG

SMORG	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent
0	1	1.52	1	1.52
1	59	89.39	60	90.91
2	6	9.09	66	100.0

Frequency Table for HJOB

HJOB	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent
0	4	6.06	4	6.06
1	24	36.36	28	42.42
2	38	57.58	66	100.0

Frequency Table for JBPG

JBPG	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent
0	5	7.58	5	7.58
1	44	66.67	49	74.24
2	17	25.76	66	100.0

Frequency Table for PGYRS

PGYRS			Cumulative	Cumulative
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent

0	39	59.09	39	59.09
1	10	15.15	49	74.24
2	7	10.61	56	84.85
3	8	12.12	64	96.97
4	1	1.52	65	98.48
5	1	1.52	66	100.0

Frequency Table for POL1

POL1			Cumulative	Cumulative
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent

0	4	6.06	4	6.06
1	48	72.73	52	78.79
2	14	21.21	66	100.0

Frequency Table for POLNOW

POLNOW	Cumulative		Cumulative	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent

0	22	33.33	22	33.33
1	10	15.15	32	48.48
2	18	27.27	50	75.76
3	9	13.64	59	89.39
4	4	6.06	63	95.45
5	3	4.55	66	100.0

Frequency Table for POL2

POL2	Cumulative		Cumulative	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent

0	7	10.61	7	10.61
1	44	66.67	51	77.27
2	15	22.73	66	100.0

Frequency Table for POLAT

POLAT	Cumulative		Cumulative	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
0	23	34.85	23	34.85
1	9	13.64	32	48.48
2	16	24.24	48	72.73
3	11	16.67	59	89.39
4	4	6.06	63	95.45
5	3	4.55	66	100.0

Frequency Table for POLYRS

POLYRS	Cumulative		Cumulative	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
0	46	69.7	46	69.7
1	6	9.09	52	78.79
2	3	4.55	55	83.33
3	8	12.12	63	95.45
4	1	1.52	64	96.97
5	2	3.03	66	100.0

Frequency Table for HRDSN

HRDSN	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent
0	4	6.06	4	6.06
1	53	80.3	57	86.36
2	9	13.64	66	100.0

Frequency Table for HRCDR

HRCDR	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent
0	3	4.55	3	4.55
1	54	81.82	57	86.36
2	9	13.64	66	100.0

Frequency Table for DTYIMP

DTYIMP	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent
0	4	6.06	4	6.06
1	47	71.21	51	77.27
2	15	22.73	66	100.0

Frequency Table for DTYIMPHOW

DTYIMPHOW	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent
0	38	57.58	38	57.58
1	6	9.09	44	66.67
2	4	6.06	48	72.73
3	4	6.06	52	78.79
4	4	6.06	56	84.85
5	7	10.61	63	95.45
6	2	3.03	65	98.48
7	1	1.52	66	100.0

Frequency Table for SCHCT

SCHCT	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent
0	32	48.48	32	48.48
2	31	46.97	63	95.45
3	3	4.55	66	100.0

Frequency Table for CTMD

CTMD	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent

0	66	100.0	66	100.0

Frequency Table for SUBDSN

SUBDSN	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent

0	66	100.0	66	100.0

Frequency Table for Q11A

Q11A	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent

0	1	1.52	1	1.52
3	17	25.76	18	27.27
4	21	31.82	39	59.09
5	27	40.91	66	100.0

Frequency Table for Q11B

Q11B			Cumulative	Cumulative
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent

0	59	89.39	59	89.39
3	1	1.52	60	90.91
4	3	4.55	63	95.45
5	3	4.55	66	100.0

Frequency Table for Q11C

Q11C			Cumulative	Cumulative
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent

0	4	6.06	4	6.06
3	13	19.7	17	25.76
4	21	31.82	38	57.58
5	28	42.42	66	100.0

Frequency Table for Q11D

Q11D			Cumulative	Cumulative
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent

0	2	3.03	2	3.03
3	15	22.73	17	25.76
4	22	33.33	39	59.09
5	27	40.91	66	100.0

Frequency Table for Q11E

Q11E			Cumulative	Cumulative
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent

0	12	18.18	12	18.18
3	15	22.73	27	40.91
4	24	36.36	51	77.27
5	15	22.73	66	100.0

Frequency Table for Q11F

Q11F	Frequency		Cumulative	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
0	4	6.06	4	6.06
3	15	22.73	19	28.79
4	14	21.21	33	50.0
5	33	50.0	66	100.0

Frequency Table for Q11G

Q11G	Frequency		Cumulative	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
0	49	74.24	49	74.24
1	4	6.06	53	80.3
2	2	3.03	55	83.33
3	2	3.03	57	86.36
4	2	3.03	59	89.39
7	2	3.03	61	92.42
8	2	3.03	63	95.45
9	1	1.52	64	96.97
10	2	3.03	66	100.0

Frequency Table for Q11H

Q11H	Cumulative		Cumulative	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
0	60	90.91	60	90.91
1	3	4.55	63	95.45
4	1	1.52	64	96.97
7	1	1.52	65	98.48
9	1	1.52	66	100.0

Appendix N

Frequency Tables for Guatemala Student Survey

Frequency Table for CONT

CONT			Cumulative	Cumulative
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent

1	7	77.78	7	77.78
2	2	22.22	9	100.0

Frequency Table for MULTCRS

MULTCRS			Cumulative	Cumulative
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent

1	6	66.67	6	66.67
2	3	33.33	9	100.0

Frequency Table for COURSE1

COURSE1	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent

171032	1	11.11	1	11.11
171425	3	33.33	4	44.44
171801	1	11.11	5	55.56
309070	4	44.44	9	100.0

Frequency Table for CRSDT1

CRSDT1	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent

0	2	22.22	2	22.22
199708	2	22.22	4	44.44
199905	1	11.11	5	55.56
199910	1	11.11	6	66.67
199912	1	11.11	7	77.78
200012	2	22.22	9	100.0

Frequency Table for COURSE2

COURSE2	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent

0	6	66.67	6	66.67
176006	2	22.22	8	88.89
309061	1	11.11	9	100.0

Frequency Table for CRSDT2

CRSDT2	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent

0	6	66.67	6	66.67
199803	1	11.11	7	77.78
199811	1	11.11	8	88.89
199909	1	11.11	9	100.0

Frequency Table for STATUS

STATUS	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent

1	5	55.56	5	55.56
2	1	11.11	6	66.67
4	3	33.33	9	100.0

Frequency Table for RANK

RANK	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent

ARCHTECT	1	11.11	1	11.11
O-5	4	44.44	5	55.56
O-6	1	11.11	6	66.67
PGM DIR	2	22.22	8	88.89
POL CON	1	11.11	9	100.0

Frequency Table for SMORG

SMORG	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent

1	8	88.89	8	88.89
2	1	11.11	9	100.0

Frequency Table for HJOB

HJOB	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent

0	1	11.11	1	11.11
1	6	66.67	7	77.78
2	2	22.22	9	100.0

Frequency Table for JBPG

JBPG	Cumulative		Cumulative	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
0	1	11.11	1	11.11
1	6	66.67	7	77.78
2	2	22.22	9	100.0

Frequency Table for PGYRS

PGYRS	Cumulative		Cumulative	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
0	4	44.44	4	44.44
1	1	11.11	5	55.56
2	4	44.44	9	100.0

Frequency Table for POL1

POL1	Cumulative		Cumulative	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
1	7	77.78	7	77.78
2	2	22.22	9	100.0

Frequency Table for POLNOW

POLNOW	Cumulative		Cumulative	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
0	2	22.22	2	22.22
1	5	55.56	7	77.78
3	1	11.11	8	88.89
4	1	11.11	9	100.0

Frequency Table for POL2

POL2	Cumulative		Cumulative	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
0	1	11.11	1	11.11
1	5	55.56	6	66.67
2	3	33.33	9	100.0

Frequency Table for POLAT

POLAT	Cumulative		Cumulative	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
0	4	44.44	4	44.44
1	4	44.44	8	88.89
4	1	11.11	9	100.0

Frequency Table for POLYRS

POLYRS	Cumulative		Cumulative	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
0	7	77.78	7	77.78
1	1	11.11	8	88.89
2	1	11.11	9	100.0

Frequency Table for HRDSN

HRDSN	Cumulative		Cumulative	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
1	9	100.0	9	100.0

Frequency Table for HRCDR

HRCDR	Cumulative		Cumulative	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
0	1	11.11	1	11.11
1	8	88.89	9	100.0

Frequency Table for DTYIMP

DTYIMP	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent

0	1	11.11	1	11.11
1	8	88.89	9	100.0

Frequency Table for DTYIMPHOW

DTYIMPHOW	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent

0	2	22.22	2	22.22
1	1	11.11	3	33.33
2	1	11.11	4	44.44
4	2	22.22	6	66.67
5	2	22.22	8	88.89
7	1	11.11	9	100.0

Frequency Table for SCHCT

SCHCT	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent

0	5	55.56	5	55.56
1	4	44.44	9	100.0

Frequency Table for CTMD

CTMD			Cumulative	Cumulative
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
0	5	55.56	5	55.56
1	4	44.44	9	100.0

Frequency Table for SUBDSN

SUBDSN			Cumulative	Cumulative
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
0	6	66.67	6	66.67
1	2	22.22	8	88.89
2	1	11.11	9	100.0

Frequency Table for Q11A

Q11A			Cumulative	Cumulative
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
4	4	44.44	4	44.44
5	5	55.56	9	100.0

Frequency Table for Q11B

Q11B			Cumulative	Cumulative
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent

0	4	44.44	4	44.44
4	4	44.44	8	88.89
5	1	11.11	9	100.0

Frequency Table for Q11C

Q11C			Cumulative	Cumulative
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent

4	2	22.22	2	22.22
5	7	77.78	9	100.0

Frequency Table for Q11D

Q11D			Cumulative	Cumulative
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent

4	2	22.22	2	22.22
5	7	77.78	9	100.0

Frequency Table for Q11E

Q11E	Cumulative		Cumulative	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
0	1	11.11	1	11.11
4	3	33.33	4	44.44
5	5	55.56	9	100.0

Frequency Table for Q11F

Q11F	Cumulative		Cumulative	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
4	3	33.33	3	33.33
5	6	66.67	9	100.0

Frequency Table for Q11G

Q11G	Cumulative		Cumulative	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
0	6	66.67	6	66.67
2	1	11.11	7	77.78
6	2	22.22	9	100.0

Frequency Table for Q11H

Q11H	Cumulative		Cumulative	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
0	6	66.67	6	66.67
1	1	11.11	7	77.78
10	2	22.22	9	100.0

Appendix O

Frequency Tables for Nicaragua Student Survey

Frequency Table for CONT

CONT	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent

0	5	19.23	5	19.23
1	3	11.54	8	30.77
2	17	65.38	25	96.15
3	1	3.85	26	100.0

Frequency Table for MULTCRS

MULTCRS	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent

0	2	7.69	2	7.69
1	16	61.54	18	69.23
2	7	26.92	25	96.15
3	1	3.85	26	100.0

Frequency Table for COURSE1

COURSE1	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent

0	2	7.69	2	7.69
309051	7	26.92	9	34.62
309061	7	26.92	16	61.54
309070	10	38.46	26	100.0

Frequency Table for CRSDT1

CRSDT1	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent

0	2	7.69	2	7.69
199908	7	26.92	9	34.62
199909	10	38.46	19	73.08
200005	7	26.92	26	100.0

Frequency Table for COURSE2

COURSE2	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent

0	18	69.23	18	69.23
309061	8	30.77	26	100.0

Frequency Table for CRSDT2

CRSDT2	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent

0	18	69.23	18	69.23
200005	8	30.77	26	100.0

Frequency Table for STATUS

STATUS	Cumulative		Cumulative	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent

0	2	7.69	2	7.69
1	21	80.77	23	88.46
3	2	7.69	25	96.15
4	1	3.85	26	100.0

Frequency Table for RANK

RANK	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent

0	2	7.69	2	7.69
CIV APPT	1	3.85	3	11.54
MIL JA	1	3.85	4	15.38
O-2	2	7.69	6	23.08
O-3	10	38.46	16	61.54
O-4	8	30.77	24	92.31
PUB DEF	1	3.85	25	96.15
UNIV PRF	1	3.85	26	100.0

Frequency Table for SMORG

SMORG	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent

0	1	3.85	1	3.85
1	25	96.15	26	100.0

Frequency Table for HJOB

HJOB	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent
0	2	7.69	2	7.69
1	8	30.77	10	38.46
2	16	61.54	26	100.0

Frequency Table for JBPG

JBPG	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent
0	3	11.54	3	11.54
1	17	65.38	20	76.92
2	6	23.08	26	100.0

Frequency Table for PGYRS

PGYRS	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent
0	10	38.46	10	38.46
1	6	23.08	16	61.54
2	10	38.46	26	100.0

Frequency Table for POL1

POL1	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent

0	2	7.69	2	7.69
1	21	80.77	23	88.46
2	3	11.54	26	100.0

Frequency Table for POLNOW

POLNOW	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent

0	5	19.23	5	19.23
1	2	7.69	7	26.92
2	6	23.08	13	50.0
3	11	42.31	24	92.31
5	2	7.69	26	100.0

Frequency Table for POL2

POL2	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent

0	7	26.92	7	26.92
1	15	57.69	22	84.62
2	4	15.38	26	100.0

Frequency Table for POLAT

POLAT	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent

0	11	42.31	11	42.31
1	2	7.69	13	50.0
2	4	15.38	17	65.38
3	9	34.62	26	100.0

Frequency Table for POLYRS

POLYRS	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent

0	19	73.08	19	73.08
1	5	19.23	24	92.31
2	2	7.69	26	100.0

Frequency Table for HRDSN

HRDSN	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent

0	2	7.69	2	7.69
1	20	76.92	22	84.62
2	4	15.38	26	100.0

Frequency Table for HRCDR

HRCDR	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent
0	1	3.85	1	3.85
1	24	92.31	25	96.15
2	1	3.85	26	100.0

Frequency Table for DTYIMP

DTYIMP	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent
0	1	3.85	1	3.85
1	25	96.15	26	100.0

Frequency Table for DTYIMPHOW

DTYIMPHOW	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent
0	2	7.69	2	7.69
1	5	19.23	7	26.92
2	7	26.92	14	53.85
3	7	26.92	21	80.77
5	1	3.85	22	84.62
6	4	15.38	26	100.0

Frequency Table for SCHCT

SCHCT	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent

0	4	15.38	4	15.38
2	21	80.77	25	96.15
3	1	3.85	26	100.0

Frequency Table for CTMD

CTMD			Cumulative	Cumulative
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent

0	26	100.0	26	100.0

Frequency Table for SUBDSN

SUBDSN	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent

0	26	100.0	26	100.0

Frequency Table for Q11A

Q11A			Cumulative	Cumulative
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent

0	5	19.23	5	19.23
4	8	30.77	13	50.0
5	13	50.0	26	100.0

Frequency Table for Q11B

Q11B			Cumulative	Cumulative
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent

0	26	100.0	26	100.0

Frequency Table for Q11C

Q11C			Cumulative	Cumulative
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent

0	5	19.23	5	19.23
3	2	7.69	7	26.92
4	9	34.62	16	61.54
5	10	38.46	26	100.0

Frequency Table for Q11D

Q11D	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent

0	3	11.54	3	11.54
3	3	11.54	6	23.08
4	8	30.77	14	53.85
5	12	46.15	26	100.0

Frequency Table for Q11E

Q11E	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent

0	8	30.77	8	30.77
4	10	38.46	18	69.23
5	8	30.77	26	100.0

Frequency Table for Q11F

Q11F	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent

0	5	19.23	5	19.23
4	4	15.38	9	34.62
5	17	65.38	26	100.0

Frequency Table for Q11G

Q11G			Cumulative	Cumulative
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent

0	2	7.69	2	7.69
1	4	15.38	6	23.08
2	2	7.69	8	30.77
3	9	34.62	17	65.38
5	7	26.92	24	92.31
6	1	3.85	25	96.15
10	1	3.85	26	100.0

Frequency Table for Q11H

Q11H			Cumulative	Cumulative
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent

0	21	80.77	21	80.77
2	2	7.69	23	88.46
5	1	3.85	24	92.31
6	2	7.69	26	100.0

Appendix P

Consolidated Student Survey Frequency Tables

Frequency Table for CNTRY

CNTRY			Cumulative	Cumulative
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
ES	66	65.35	66	65.35
GT	9	8.91	75	74.26
NU	26	25.74	101	100.0

Frequency Table for CONT

CONT			Cumulative	Cumulative
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
0	44	43.56	44	43.56
1	18	17.82	62	61.39
2	37	36.63	99	98.02
3	2	1.98	101	100.0

Frequency Table for MULTCRS

MULTCRS	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent

0	14	13.86	14	13.86
1	74	73.27	88	87.13
2	12	11.88	100	99.01
3	1	0.99	101	100.0

Frequency Table for COURSE1

COURSE1	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent

0	14	13.86	14	13.86
171032	1	0.99	15	14.85
171425	8	7.92	23	22.77
171801	3	2.97	26	25.74
309051	12	11.88	38	37.62
309061	13	12.87	51	50.5
309070	50	49.5	101	100.0

Frequency Table for CRSDT1

CRSDT1	Cumulative		Cumulative	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent

0	32	31.68	32	31.68
1998	3	2.97	35	34.65
1999	2	1.98	37	36.63
199507	5	4.95	42	41.58
199708	2	1.98	44	43.56
199712	1	0.99	45	44.55
199812	2	1.98	47	46.53
199905	1	0.99	48	47.52
199908	7	6.93	55	54.46
199909	10	9.9	65	64.36
199910	1	0.99	66	65.35
199912	3	2.97	69	68.32
200005	7	6.93	76	75.25
200006	1	0.99	77	76.24
200012	2	1.98	79	78.22
200104	22	21.78	101	100.0

Frequency Table for COURSE2

COURSE2	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent

0	88	87.13	88	87.13
176006	2	1.98	90	89.11
309061	9	8.91	99	98.02
309070	2	1.98	101	100.0

Frequency Table for CRSDT2

CRSDT2	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent

0	88	87.13	88	87.13
1999	1	0.99	89	88.12
199803	1	0.99	90	89.11
199811	1	0.99	91	90.1
199909	1	0.99	92	91.09
200005	8	7.92	100	99.01
200104	1	0.99	101	100.0

Frequency Table for STATUS

STATUS	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent
0	7	6.93	7	6.93
1	34	33.66	41	40.59
2	33	32.67	74	73.27
3	13	12.87	87	86.14
4	10	9.9	97	96.04
5	4	3.96	101	100.0

Frequency Table for RANK

RANK	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent
0	7	6.93	7	6.93
ARCHTECT	2	1.98	9	8.91
ATTY	5	4.95	14	13.86
BUSADMIN	2	1.98	16	15.84
CIV APPT	1	0.99	17	16.83
CONT/FIN	1	0.99	18	17.82
ENG	1	0.99	19	18.81
INT REL	1	0.99	20	19.8
LEG	4	3.96	24	23.76
LEGAL	1	0.99	25	24.75

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MDN	30	29.7	55	54.46
MEDICAL	1	0.99	56	55.45
MIL JA	1	0.99	57	56.44
O-2	2	1.98	59	58.42
O-3	10	9.9	69	68.32
O-4	14	13.86	83	82.18
O-5	4	3.96	87	86.14
O-6	3	2.97	90	89.11
PGM DIR	3	2.97	93	92.08
POL CON	1	0.99	94	93.07
PRESS	2	1.98	96	95.05
PRS APPT	1	0.99	97	96.04
PUB DEF	1	0.99	98	97.03
UNIV PRF	3	2.97	101	100.0

Frequency Table for SMORG

SMORG	Cumulative		Cumulative	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
0	2	1.98	2	1.98
1	92	91.09	94	93.07
2	7	6.93	101	100.0

Frequency Table for HJOB

HJOB	Cumulative		Cumulative	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
0	7	6.93	7	6.93
1	38	37.62	45	44.55
2	56	55.45	101	100.0

Frequency Table for JBPG

JBPG	Cumulative		Cumulative	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
0	9	8.91	9	8.91
1	67	66.34	76	75.25
2	25	24.75	101	100.0

Frequency Table for PGYRS

PGYRS	Cumulative		Cumulative	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
0	53	52.48	53	52.48
1	17	16.83	70	69.31
2	21	20.79	91	90.1
3	8	7.92	99	98.02
4	1	0.99	100	99.01
5	1	0.99	101	100.0

Frequency Table for POL1

POL1	Cumulative		Cumulative	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
0	6	5.94	6	5.94
1	76	75.25	82	81.19
2	19	18.81	101	100.0

Frequency Table for POLNOW

POLNOW	Cumulative		Cumulative	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent

0	29	28.71	29	28.71
1	17	16.83	46	45.54
2	24	23.76	70	69.31
3	21	20.79	91	90.1
4	5	4.95	96	95.05
5	5	4.95	101	100.0

Frequency Table for POL2

POL2	Cumulative		Cumulative	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent

0	15	14.85	15	14.85
1	64	63.37	79	78.22
2	22	21.78	101	100.0

Frequency Table for POLAT

POLAT	Cumulative		Cumulative	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
0	38	37.62	38	37.62
1	15	14.85	53	52.48
2	20	19.8	73	72.28
3	20	19.8	93	92.08
4	5	4.95	98	97.03
5	3	2.97	101	100.0

Frequency Table for POLYRS

POLYRS	Cumulative		Cumulative	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
0	72	71.29	72	71.29
1	12	11.88	84	83.17
2	6	5.94	90	89.11
3	8	7.92	98	97.03
4	1	0.99	99	98.02
5	2	1.98	101	100.0

Frequency Table for HRDSN

HRDSN	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent
0	6	5.94	6	5.94
1	82	81.19	88	87.13
2	13	12.87	101	100.0

Frequency Table for HRCDR

HRCDR	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent
0	5	4.95	5	4.95
1	86	85.15	91	90.1
2	10	9.9	101	100.0

Frequency Table for DTYIMP

DTYIMP	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Cumulative
			Frequency	Percent
0	6	5.94	6	5.94
1	80	79.21	86	85.15
2	15	14.85	101	100.0

Frequency Table for DTYIMPHOW

DTYIMPHOW	Cumulative		Cumulative	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
0	42	41.58	42	41.58
1	12	11.88	54	53.47
2	12	11.88	66	65.35
3	11	10.89	77	76.24
4	6	5.94	83	82.18
5	10	9.9	93	92.08
6	6	5.94	99	98.02
7	2	1.98	101	100.0

Frequency Table for SCHCT

SCHCT	Cumulative		Cumulative	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
0	41	40.59	41	40.59
1	4	3.96	45	44.55
2	52	51.49	97	96.04
3	4	3.96	101	100.0

Frequency Table for CTMD

CTMD	Cumulative		Cumulative	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
0	97	96.04	97	96.04
1	4	3.96	101	100.0

Frequency Table for SUBDSN

SUBDSN	Cumulative		Cumulative	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
0	98	97.03	98	97.03
1	2	1.98	100	99.01
2	1	0.99	101	100.0

Frequency Table for Q11A

Q11A	Cumulative		Cumulative	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
0	6	5.94	6	5.94
3	17	16.83	23	22.77
4	33	32.67	56	55.45
5	45	44.55	101	100.0

Frequency Table for Q11B

Q11B			Cumulative	Cumulative
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent

0	89	88.12	89	88.12
3	1	0.99	90	89.11
4	7	6.93	97	96.04
5	4	3.96	101	100.0

Frequency Table for Q11C

Q11C			Cumulative	Cumulative
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent

0	9	8.91	9	8.91
3	15	14.85	24	23.76
4	32	31.68	56	55.45
5	45	44.55	101	100.0

Frequency Table for Q11D

Q11D			Cumulative	Cumulative
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent

0	5	4.95	5	4.95
3	18	17.82	23	22.77
4	32	31.68	55	54.46
5	46	45.54	101	100.0

Frequency Table for Q11E

Q11E			Cumulative	Cumulative
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent

0	21	20.79	21	20.79
3	15	14.85	36	35.64
4	37	36.63	73	72.28
5	28	27.72	101	100.0

Frequency Table for Q11F

Q11F			Cumulative	Cumulative
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent

0	9	8.91	9	8.91
3	15	14.85	24	23.76
4	21	20.79	45	44.55
5	56	55.45	101	100.0

Frequency Table for Q11G

Q11G			Cumulative	Cumulative
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent

0	57	56.44	57	56.44
1	8	7.92	65	64.36
2	5	4.95	70	69.31
3	11	10.89	81	80.2
4	2	1.98	83	82.18
5	7	6.93	90	89.11
6	3	2.97	93	92.08
7	2	1.98	95	94.06
8	2	1.98	97	96.04
9	1	0.99	98	97.03
10	3	2.97	101	100.0

Frequency Table for Q11H

Q11H	Cumulative		Cumulative	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
0	87	86.14	87	86.14
1	4	3.96	91	90.1
2	2	1.98	93	92.08
4	1	0.99	94	93.07
5	1	0.99	95	94.06
6	2	1.98	97	96.04
7	1	0.99	98	97.03
9	1	0.99	99	98.02
10	2	1.98	101	100.0